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Joint Implementation and Accreditation of
Emission Reductions
Abstract: A “correct” accreditation is a key issue when evaluating Joint Implementation as a
global environmental instrument. Problems mentioned in the literature on Joint
Implementation — including the problem of additionality — are often relating to the problem
of dej?ning a correct accreditation. This paper lists some of these problems and lists some of
the tools available to solve the reported problems of accreditation. The paper concludes that
the institutional framework is crucial in dejining what a correct accreditation is. It also
concludes that dz~erent groups mq have dl~erent interests in Joint Implementation, and that
each of the reported problems mqy be a problem to some of the Joint Implementation interests
groups but not to others. In designing the institutionalji-amework forJI it is important to know
the incentives and motivations of the dlj$erent groups. The main part of the paper is an analysis
of the basic incentives and motivations of the dljj$erentJoint Implementation interest groups.
This analysis can be used to weight the problems of Joint Implementation j-em an
environmental perspective andfiom the perspective of cost effectiveness.
1. Introduction
This paper deals with accreditation. Im- or explicitly this is what the bulk of literature on Joint
Implementation is dealing with. The accreditation aspect is what characterises Joint
Implementation from other instrumen~; ”and ‘the problems relating to accreditation are the
problems to be solved to make Joint Implementation operational. Issues like baseline,
additionality, incremental costs, control, cost curves, fairness and equity — discussed in
extension in the literature on Joint Implementation — are all related to the accreditation
methodology. The following will describe how.
Joint Implementation is an environmental economic instrument, which involves both market
forces and administrative procedures:
The aim of Joint Implementation is to level out differences in cost of emission reductions
between countries, regions or for example firms. Host countries supply emission reduction
projects, and donor countries demand emission reduction projects at costs, which are as low as
possible. If prices are right, the donor countries finance the emission reduction projects in the
host countries. Prices equalise supply and demand, and Joint Implementation in this way makes
use of the market forces.
The reason why donor countries are interested in financing emission reductions in other
countries is that Joint Implementation allow the donor countries to substitute be~een emission
reductions at home and abroad, and allow them to be accredited the emission reductions
financed abroad. The accreditation of emission reductions abroad is crucial to the donor
countries because the higher the accredited emission reduction, the easier and the less
expensive it will be to fulfil the national emission reduction targets. The accreditation
,.
procedure is an administrative procedure
single .JI project.
The market for JI projects levels out
involving official acceptance of (in principle) every
differences in emission reductions costs between
countries, delivers a price on emissions reductions (for example a price per ton COZ reduced)
and minimises in-optimal ities. The market price is conditional on the institutional framework
for JI. What the market can not do by itself is first, to assure that there is a limit to the supply of
projects to the market for JI, and second, to avoid cheating and leakage effects. The
institutional framework must deal with these problems.
The main problems connected to an international acceptance of JI as instrument are tied to the
problems of avoiding extensive cheat and extensive leakage effects and the problems of
additionality (limiting the supply of JI projects): For the instrument to be effective, it is
important that national and international acceptance of JI projects are limited to projects which
contribute to reduce global emissions by more than would otherwise have been done, and it is
important that the national and/or international accreditations of these projects reflect real
emissions reductions. If it is possible to bring cheating and leakage effects to a minimum, and
possible to assure that credit is assigned only to the “right” projects — JI will be a desirable
instrument in theory and in practice.
The theoretical and practical problems connected to JI are mirrored in the accreditations, and
therefore it may be informative to compare the problems in relation to their effects on the
accreditation.
The accreditation of emission reductions raises a long range of practical and theoretical
problems. These problems are dealt with in the following section 2. Section 3 deals with the
“tools” needed — or available — to help a correct accreditation, and section 4-8 analyse the
incentives and motivations of the different agents participating in a JI arrangement.
Section 2 concludes that a theoretically correct accreditation is non-existing. Instead the JI
framework and the specific contracts associated with every particular JI project will define,
what is the correct accreditation. The JI framework and the specifications in the JI contracts
must cope with the problems connected to the accreditation.
The analysis of motivations, incentives and leakage in this paper demonstrate that the character
of cheating and leakage is very much dependent on the host country’s status as annex 1 or non
annex 1 country. This point is not new, but the argument is one output from a more systematic
and detailed analysis.
Internationally there have not yet been any agreements on the institutional framework needed to
regulate Joint Implementation. A very important — if not the most important — criteria for
which framework to choose is the ability of the institutional framework to assure that the agents
incentives work in the direction of maximizing the environmental and other benefits of JI, and
minimizing the associated direct and indirect costs. Sections 4-8 analyses the incentives,
motivations and interests of the participants directly and indirectly involved in a given JI
arrangement.
Which international framework (international rules, international bodies) there might be set up
to regulate Joint Implementation in a FCCC perspective will not be discussed in this paper. And
it wil I not be discussed which national regulations or mechanisms in the donor countries will
make it advantageous to the firms or industries in the donor countries, to engage in JI
arrangements.
Most of the analyses presuppose fixed reduction targets measured relative to a given base year
put on all annex 1 countries.
2. Problems related to accreditation
There are several reasons why accreditation is not straightforward. The problems show UP
when you ask questions like, how to assure correct accreditations for JI projects. Problems
occur on a theoretical and a practical level.
The theoretical and practical problems may best be illustrated by the fact that it is a problem
even to define what a correct accreditation is:
A clear-cut definition of the theoretical correct accreditation (on the project level) is
impossible, if the emission reductions associated with different JI projects (and other
investments) are not separable. Non separability means that there are no theoretical answers to,
how to allocate emissions reductions between interdependent JI projects.
Another theoretical and practical problem is, that it is not obvious, what will be the correct
accreditation, if a JI project fails due to circumstances that the donor (and maybe even the host)
have no influence on, and could not foresee. Who will bear the risk of project failures?
A large amount of the future investments in donor and host countries may imply reduced
emissions. But not all these investments will be approved as JI projects — and therefore credit
wi II not be given for every emission reduction observed in the future. Projects suitable for JI are
usual Iy limited to additional projects, i.e. projects that would not have been carried out without
JI. Countries are supposed to make projections of the economy - reference scenarios or
“base[ines” — showing the development of the economy and the future emissions without JI
(i.e. without the additional projects). But if JI becomes a possibility, JI may change the
investment behaviour, and additionally may be a very difficult criterion. Afier some years with
JI, JI — like every other actual policy — is taken into account in plans and projections — and
the reference scenario may be constructed as a residual. The residual will show a “realistic”
projection of the economy, but subtracted the projects that the countries want to be approved as
JI projects. In this case additionally has no positive meaning.
Below is listed some important problems related to a correct accreditation at the project level:
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Additionality. If accreditation is given for emission reductions additional to those that would
otherwise have been carried out. How can additionality be defined?
References. The additionality concept involves a reference scenario. Should “no regret
options” be included in the reference scenario (if yes, this implies that “no regret options”
can not be JI projects)? Should the reference scenario include standard assumptions. Should
there be special requirements to the level of energy prices in the reference scenarios — or
the level of growth of energy prices?
Time perspective. For how long time should it be possible to the donors to be accredited a
specific JI project. The JI project may for example be a simple forwarding of a later
baseline project.
Project failure. Who will bear the risk of project failures. Failures may be caused by
circumstances outside the control of the donor and host.
Other (minor) uncertainties. Who will bear the risk of uncertainties. What will for example
be the correct accreditation, if the emission reductions are higher or lower than projected
due to higher or lower activity level — at the national economy level, or at the plant level —
than projected.
Leakage. if a JI project implies increased emissions elsewhere — for example because firms
and countries change behaviors towards importing polluting goods rather than producing
these goods — the net effect on emissions reductions of that project may be Iimited, and
even negative.
Systems effects. What will be the correct accreditation if the indirect emission reduction
decreases because of for example other JI projects.
. Incentives. Who (at the project, systems and macro level) will be in a position, where they
have all relevant information, so they in principle can report the emission reductions? What
are the incentives to reveal the true direct and indirect emission reduction?
l Control. What are the needs for control (given different institutional frameworks)? Will the
control be effective?
As it is difficult to make a clear-cut definition of the theoretical correct accreditation, and as the
practical problems relating to accreditation are even bigger, the institutional framework for
Joint Implementation becomes very important in defining what should be accredited for. A very
simple example of the importance of institutions may be that every single JI contract speci~,
who will bear the burden of project failure and uncertainties, and the price of the accreditation
associated with the JI project reflect the specific contract conditions. Project failures and
uncertainties may be problems which can be solved by for example host and donor firms
themselves. But the analysis in section 8 show that if the host and donor countries are
committed by the contracts, they may want to approve or even directly negotiate the contract
conditions.
The best answer to the theoretical and practical problem of defining what a correct
accreditation is, may be that the accreditation depends on the institutional framework for Joint
Implementation. The accredited emission reductions may be the emission reductions actually
experienced in relation to a concrete project (with or without systems and macroeconomic
effects (for example price effects)) or emissions reductions experienced in relation to for
example a pool of projects (eventually related to the total emission reductions of the host
country). The institutional framework will define at which “level of aggregation” the emission
reductions can be “measured”. And the institutional framework or the JI contract will specifi
who will bear the risk of project failure, etc.
Several parties — for example donor and host countries, donor and host firms and industries,
the international community (represented by different international institutions) — may be
interested in a particular JI project. Their perspectives on JI (the reason why they are interested
in JI) may be different. Their main concerns are in the money transfer, the accreditation, and
the emission reductions. But they are not necessarily interested in accreditation at the same
level of aggregation (i.e. country, industry, systems or project level). The international (JI)
institutions may for example be interested in accreditation at the country level, while
accreditation at project and system levels are only of secondary interest, if at all interesting.
This means that the different parties will pose different demands to the accreditation
methodolo=q (and to the institutional framework for JI), for example with respect to accuracy,
treatment of uncertainties, verification and control.
At which level the accreditation is carried out is decisive to which tools are needed to assure a
“correct” accreditation.
A “correct” accreditation at the project level demands a detailed and carefully elaborated
accreditation methodoloag. The need for base[ines, technical and macroeconomic models,
external control of the fulfillment of the JI contract, etc. may be extensive in this case.
A correct accreditation at the country level may, with respect to CO? , be fairly simple. It may
be as simple as, a technical measuring of the COZ emissions at two different dates for two
different countries engaging in JI arrangements with each other.
Given a demand for a correct accreditation at the project level, the institutional framework
should be designed in a way so as to minimise cheat, and to minimise the necessary control of
the claimed accreditations. The framework must deal with, how to reveal the, in principle,
private information concerning the exact emission reductions, how to avoid incentives to cheat,
how to take account of systems and other effects, project failures etc. An effective control of
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the project data is essential at this level of accreditation. The framework must make the
effective control possible.
If successful the accreditation methodology (the JI framework) must deal with the problems
listed above. Section 4-8 analyse the list from the perspective of the agents involved in JI. To
whom is additional ity a problem, who needs baselines etc. The analysis show that the different
agents have different interests, incentives and motivations.
3. How can the problems related to accreditation be
dealt with?
In the previous sections the expression “correct accreditation” was used in the meaning “the
theoretical correct accreditation”. But as mentioned this idea of a correct accreditation is not
possible neither in theory nor in practice.
In practice a correct accreditation is defined according to the accreditation methodology
specified by the particular framework for JI in question. As it may be useful to refer to both the
“theoretical correct accreditation” and the ‘<accreditation specified by the JI framework” the
later is referred to by the term “framework accreditation”.
Different “tools” may be needed or help/assure a correct framework accreditation. Some of
these are listed below.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Appropriate macroeconomic models.
Appropriate technical models — project and/or system level.
Official (and other) physical plans for the energy supply sector, and ener=~ demand.
Official forecasts of the macroeconomy.
List of existing and planned policies with relevance for emissions.
Official definitions of terms relevant for the accreditation, for example
baselines.
Control
International agreements on, and accept of, the accreditation procedures
a definition of
The tools may be used to construct:
. Baseline scenarios
. JI scenarios
. Cost curves for emission reductions.
— and to implement effective control.
The tools on the list are all tools that especially the host governments may want to use to help
prioritizing JI projects, and to help the host government prevent that individual firms or
industries via JI-arrangements commit the host country to reduce emissions more than these
firms and industries themselves can be hold responsible for. The tools may also be used to help
control the actual emissions from the firms and industries, and to take the interrelationship of
projects (for example system effects and macroeconomic effects) into account
The donor government may be interested in baselines, cost curves, plans, etc. pertaining the
host countries to evaluate the market, the prices and the potentials in the host countries for
emissions reductions and Joint Implementation. The donor governments — and the donor
. .
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plants and industries — may have special interests with respect to the particular (type o~ JI
project (and the economic and technical environment to the project) that they want to engage
in. A macroeconomic projection of the host economy may give the donors some idea of for
example the uncertainties with respect to the emissions reductions connected to a particular
project
The donor governments may want these tools — baselines and cost curves for the donor
country itself — to help prioritizing between the amount of emissions reductions carried out at
home and abroad, and which emissions reductions projects should be carried out at home.
Host industries and plants need projections of the future markets for their products — and good
estimates of their likelihood of/ability to reduce emissions
4. The interests of the “players” in JI
Cheating and leakage effects become problems because some of the participants in JI
arrangements have other interests than the environment. This section analyses the participants
(agents/players) primary and secondary interests in JI. The interests of the participants will
influence their attitudes to baselines, additionality, control etc.
The analysis tell something about in which direction different agents may wish to exploit JI if
they follow their own interests. Especially big donors or hosts may be in a position to exploit
their market powers on the market for JI. An example could be that host firms are “forced” to
use technology produced or developed in powerful donor countries.
The analysis may also tell something about conflicting or mutual interests of the different
agents: donor and host, host country and host firm, etc.
The knowledge of primary and secondary interests of the agents and conflicting and mutual
interests of the agents is valuable when desie~ing the institutional framework for JI.
The table below assumes fixed reduction targets (uniform or non uniform) posed on donor and
annex 1 host countries. If there were no fixed reduction targets all hosts would have the same
interests and motivations as non annex 1 hosts. Donors would not have fixed reduction targets
as driving force and primary interest but another incentive to engage in JI. Otherwise the
interests of the donors would be the same.
It is obvious that what the table lists as the agents primary and secondary interests, will not be
true in all cases. Countries and even firms may for example have the environment as first
priori~. What is listed is the interests and motivations when emissions reductions are analysed
as a free rider problem. The area of Joint Implementation will typically be emissions with
global deposition, for example CO? , and for this type of emissions free riding may be a serious
problem.
. -v..- . . ..~./, ”.J .,’”” “!-4’’”,,0 ‘“ u. L. I-, L.4. c- ,/, #i u, / Uri -. . . . . . . “
Primary interests Secondary interests
International Bodies Environment. JI as development aid
That countries keep to their reduction Transfer of technology
commitments (to obtain the full environmental
effects).
An environmentally and economically efficient
emission reduction effort (to assure the success
and credibility of the policy).
Donor countries Keep the emission reduction targets (to avoid Environment
a bad international reputation and to avoid To promote national
possible sanctions) technology and products in
To buy the emissions reduction as cheap as the host countries.
possible
Host Countries
a) amex 1 To sell emissions reductions as dear as Local environmental
possible — without hindering the fulfillment of benefits
the country’s own commitment at low costs
(good business).
New and resource saving techniques are
introduced and financed by foreign
countries/firms/industries
b) non amex 1 To sell emissions reductions as dear as Local environmental
possible. There will be no limit to the supply benefits
of JI projects.
New and resource saving techniques are
introduced and financed by foreign
countrieslfirmslindustries
Donor industries To avoid the burden of national measures To promote own products
(fixed commitments, taxes, etc.) and to buy or own technology.
emissions reductions as cheap as possible. To promote a desired
environmental profile
Host industries To sell emissions reductions as dear as Local environmental
possible. benefits
New and r,esource saving techniques are
financed by foreign countries/firms/ industries
(may be a competitive advantage)
Donor firms To avoid the burden of national measures To promote own products
(fixed commitmen~ taxes, etc.) and to buy or own technology.
emissions reductions as cheap as possible. To promote a desired
environmental profile
Host firms To sell emissions reductions as dear as Local environmental
possible. benefits.
New and resource saving techniques are
financed by foreign countrieslfirmsl industries
(may be a competitive advantage).
5. Leakage
A leakage connected to a JI project is an increase in emissions which are not taken into account
in the accreditation for JI projects. Leakages occur at the 31 plant, or in other parts of the
national or international economy. Leakages may be very difficult to measure, because leakages
may be indirect effects of the JI projects or because the leakage effects as just mentioned may
occur in other parts of the national or international economy.
Examples of indirect leakage effects are increased activity levels caused by JI projects: In
general JI may reduce energy consumption and ener=~ demand and thereby lower enere~
prices. If lower energy prices stimulate to higher energy consumption — and this is not taken
into account in the JI accreditation — this is a leakage effect. Another indirect leakage effect
(relevant in many eastern European countries) maybe increased private energy consumption for
heating purposes — and increased welfare — followed by JI insulation projects.
Examples of direct leakage effects are JI projects which involve a cut of of polluting processes,
or export of these processes, and buying of intermediate “polluted” products.
Leakages occur when JI projects are evaluated in “isolation” (for example at the plant level)
(and in this perspective reduces emissions), but if evaluated at higher levels of aggregation
(industry, country, world) reduces emissions by less, or even increase emissions.
Table 2 describes to whom leakages maybe a problem.
Leakages are a problem to an agent, if the agent cannot pass it (further) on to somebody else.
Leakages are a problem to the environment if no agents are responsible of neutralizing the
leakages. The institutional frameworks will im- or explicitly decide who will bear the burden of
neutralizing the effects of leakages. If the institutional framework or the JI contract does not
specifi explicitly who will be responsible of neutralizing leakages there are several
possibilities:
. donor firm/industry/country is responsible. For example: the contract specifi that the donor
should be accredited actual emission reductions at the plant level, but emissions at the plant
level are not reduced as much as expected because of a rise in activity due to JI (better or
cheaper products). This makes the donor bear the burden of leakage, because the donor gets
less emissions reductions than he expected.
. Annex 1 host is responsible. For example: the contract specifi that donor should have the
contracted, fixed accreditation, despite the actual emissions reductions, or should be
accredited the emissions reductions compatible with a specified activity level. In this case
the host firn-dindustry or country is responsible for neutralizing the leakage effects.
l Environment is victim. For example: polluting processes or firms are exported to non annex
1 countries, which do not have any national obligations to reduce emissions. The increases
in emissions in these countries, due to the import of polluting processes and firms, will
therefore not be offset by decreases in emissions elsewhere.
If donors and annex 1 host countries are committed by fixed reduction targets leakages are only
a problem to the environment if the leakage effects occur in a non annex 1 country. In this
respect leakage may be seen as a problem of coordinating the international agreements on fixed
reduction targets. If those countries which today are non annex 1 counties are committed by
realistic fixed reduction targets leakages will not be a problem to the environment. i
[ Realistic fixed reduction targets means that these targets on the one hand must be compatible with the
international environmental goals. On the other hand, if a substantial part of the cheap reduction potentials
(low cost JI projects) is located in the non amex 1 countries, it is important to limit leakages and make the
non-annex 1 counties interested in efficient emissions reductions projects (cf. table 1) by simply having a
not too “loose” fixed target.
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Table 2: Types of leakages relevant to dlj$erent agents, when countries emissions targets are
-.jixed
Annex 1 host country
International bodies
(leakage is a problem)
National government
(leakage may be a bene
fit or a problem)
a) Donor
b) Host
[ndustries (Pool)
I) Donor
J) Host
‘lants
i) Donor
)) Host
Export of polluting industrial
processes, firms or industries to nor
annex 1 countries
Import of “polluting products” from
non amex 1 countries
Problem: if leakages in the host
sountry diminish the amount of
zmissions reductions accredited to
relevant JI projects
Benefit: It may be the cheapest way
[also as part of JI projects) to reduce
:missions, to export polluting
industrial processes, firms or
!ndustries to other countries (annex
1 or non annex 1) and to import the
‘polluting products” tlom abroad
?roblem: if leakages for examp!e
he to increasing activity levels
iiminish the amount of emissions
“educed, and if this makes a gap
]etween the emissions reductions
;old — and legally committed to
‘deliver” — and the actual
:missions reductions, extra steps
vill be necessary to reach the
‘revised” emission reduction target.
.eakages in the host country
firmhdustry is only a problem if
he donor industry is (legally or
)therwise (by sanction)) obliged to
‘neutralise” the leakages
.eakages is only a problem if the
lost industry is (legally or otherwise
by sanction)) obliged to
‘neutralise” the leakages
,eakages in the host country
firrn/indust~ is only a problem if
he donor firm is (legally or
Itherwise (by sanction)) obliged to
neutralise” the leakages
,eakages is only a problem if the
ost plant is (legally or otherwise
by sanction)) obliged to
neutralise” the leakages
Nonamex 1 host country
Removal of polluting industrial
processes, firms or industries to other
firms or industries within the host
economy or to other non annex 1
countries
Import of “polluting products” fi-om
other firms or industries within the
economy or from other non amex 1
It will be no disadvantage to the host
country to bear the “risk” of leakage
unless the international body “makes
it a risk”. Leakage will therefore only
be a problem to the donor if the
international body makes it a risk to
the donor.
Leakage is no problem to the host —
unless others makes it a problem (for
example by making it a precondition
to engaging in JI arrangements with
annex 1 countries).
Leakages is no problem unless legally
mforced
.eakages is no problem unless legally
:nforced
.eakages is no problem unless legally
:nforced
.eakages is no problem unless legally
mforced
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If the donor or annex 1 host country bear the burden of leakages, they can pass it further on to
plants or industries, consumers, taxpayers, etc.
6. Additionality
One of the problems about an international agreement on Joint Implementation is to limit the
amount of projects supplied to the JI market. The limit inherent in the market for JI projects is
the level of emissions reduction costs (there is no idea in supplying high cost projects which
wi II have no chance of being financed through JI). But this is not the only limit relevant in an
environmental perspective: There are huge numbers of projects which involves reduced
emissions, but al 1 these projects cannot be financed through JI and all the emission reductions
cannot be assigned credit. The success of JI is dependent on choosing the right projects for JI.
The main purpose of JI is to reach the international environmental goals at as low extra costs as
possible. The outcome of an efficient international market for JI is to give you as much direct
and indirect emission reduction as possible per unit of cost. Emissions reductions which are
secondary effects of normal investment practise are free. Therefore JI financing should not be
given to this type of projects — and this type of projects should be excluded from the “optimal”
JI market. The “maximum emission reduction is obtained when the JI projects supplied at the
market for JI are additional.
But how crucial is it that JI projects are additional. Is lack of additionality always a problem to
the environment or is it the cost minimizing property of JI which is lost.
There is no environmental effect, and therefore no cost reducing elements, in financing JI
projects in non annex 1 countries, unless the JI projects are additional. If the donor countries
are accredited emission reductions they off cause experience low costs, but if the net effect to
the environment is zero, the JI projects has failed to bring you any step nearer the international
environmental goals.
Whether additional or not, there will always be a cost reducing element in financing JI projects
in annex 1 host countries as long as the emission reduction costs are lower in the host country
than in the donor country. But if the JI projects are additional the environmental effects and the
cost reducing effects of JI are maximised. As long as the annex 1 host country is committed by
a fixed reduction target, and by international sanctions of JI contracts which means extra
obligations to reduce emissions — additionality is not a problem to the environment, but a
problem to the host, who does not get the optimal effects out of JL In second place non
additionality can be a problem to firms, industries and consumers because the host country can
pass the extra costs of reducing the emissions on to these groups. So, when table ~ say that non
additionality is not a problem to host firms and industries, this means that it is not a direct
problem to them.
If the JI projects are not additional it will be much harder, and much more expensive, to the
annex 1 host to reach the emissions reduction targets it has committed itself to reach. If this
means that the annex 1 host country is unlikely to fulfil its obligations it wil I be a problem to
the environment — and to the international bodies which have allowed the JI arrangements
(therefore additionality may be an indirect problem to the international bodies). If the JI
projects are not additional, there may be distributional effects between donor and host and
between firms within the host country. It may be — and it seems very likely — that the donor
country will pay a too low price for the accreditation, if the projects are not additional. The
reason for that is that the extra JI financing% not needed in projects which would be carried out
any way. So, in principle there is no lower limit to the price of the accreditation in these
projects.
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Non additionality may be a distributional problem between host firms and/or host industries
because non additional JI projects enhance the differences in emissions reduction costs between
firms/industries.
Table 3: To whom is non additionalitu a nrohkm 7., .. -------- .
AMeX 1 host country Non amex I host country
International bodies No Yes
National governments
a) Donor No No
b) Host Yes and no. Additiona]ity of No
projects may be desirable, because
additionality secures the extra
emission reductions, which are
needed to reach the targets. Given
extra financing is needed to reach
. the target, additionality is a criteria
which help securing that JI financing
is given to emission reduction
projects which need extra money to
be realised.
Industries (Pool)
a) Donor No No
b) Host No. (Non additionality may be an No
advantage to industries with non
additional projects).
Plants
a) Donor No No
b) Host No. (Non additionality may be an No
advantage to firms with non
additional projects).
7. Who needs baselines
A baseline is a projection of the economy and the technologies into the fiture. The baseline is a
“business as usual” scenario and does not include additional JI projects. Therefore baselines are
important in deciding which potential JI projects are additional (they are not in the baseline).
But it is clear that the baselines technically must be very detailed if it should be possible to
identifi specific projects.
It is important to ask questions like: who precisely wants the baselines, is additionality the only
motivation to make baselines, who makes the baselines, who should make the baselines?
Baselines at which level of aggregation, how elaborated or detailed must the baselines be, who
wants which accuracy of the baseline.
If the baselines are used to define additional projects, will it then be necessary to give these
baselines international status. Will there be “official national baselines”, and can these
baselines be revised?
I
Table 3 shows who needs baselines for what reasons given fixed fllture emissions reductions
targets. (If, according to the table, a donor country needs baselines, it means baselines
11
pertaining the country itself. A donor country/firm/industry may often find it very informative
to know the host countries baselines, as it may tell something about the technical and
economical environment that the JI projects are placed in).
Table 3 shows that baselines are very usefidl tools, but only the international bodies need them
to control JI in non annex 1 countries. The international bodies need the baselines to control
additionality, accreditations and leakages in the non annex 1 countries.
The host governments may want to use baselines to help prioritizing JI projects, and to help the
host government prevent that individual firms or industries via JI-arrangements commit the host
country to reduce emissions more than these firms and industries themselves can be hold
responsible for. The tools may also be used to help control the actual emissions from the firms
and industries, and to take the interrelationship of projects (for example system effects and
macroeconomic effects) into account
The donor government may be interested in baselines, cost curves, plans, etc. pertaining the
host countries to evaluate the market, the prices and the potentials in the host countries for
emissions reductions and Joint Implementation. The donor governments — and the donor
plants and industries — may have special interests with respect to the particular (type of) JI
project (and the economic and technical environment to the project) that they want to engage
in. A macroeconomic projection of the host economy may give the donors some idea of for
example the uncertainties with respect to the emissions reductions connected to a particular
project
The donor governments may want these tools — baselines and cost curves for the donor
country itself — to help prioritizing between the amount of emissions reductions carried out at
home and abroad, and which emissions reductions projects should be carried out at home.
Host industries and plants need projections of the future markets for their products — and good
estimates of their likelihood of/ability to reduce emissions
------ ------ .-- ..,,-. ------- ----
Annex 1 host country Non annex 1 host country
International bodies No need Need (for control purposes etc.)
National governments
a) Donor Useful tool Useful tool
b) Host Need, self interest Obliged? (by international bodies)
Industries (Pool)
a) Donor Usefi.d tool. Partial baseline concer- Useful tool. Partial baseline concer-
ning own prospects ning own prospects
b) Host Useful tool. Partial baseline concer- Obliged? (by international bodies)
ning own prospects
Obliged ? (by national government)
Plants
a) Donor Usefid tool. Partial baseline concer- Useful tool. Partial baseline concer-
ning own prospects ning own prospects
b) Host Useful tool. Partial baseline concer- Obliged? (by international bodies)
ning own prospects.
Obliged ? (by national government)
It is necessary to make a distinction between baselines for your own use and information and
baselines for the use of others (control, planning, etc.). The two baselines may differ with
respect to evaluations of economic growth conditions etc.
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8. The need for control
Table 4 shows who needs control at with level for what reason? The table can be used to say
something about what should be controlled, and what kind of control is crucial to the JI
process.
To ease the burden of control it is important to design the institutional framework so the
incentives to “optimal” behavior, and the incentives to give correct inforrnations are right, or
more realistic, as good as possible. It is important to place the control on the JI agents which are
relatively best informed and, in who’s interest it is to reveal the information. The question is
whether it is possible to create a JI framework so either the donor country has an incentive to
invest only in additional projects in non annex 1 countries — or at least to reveal all relevant
information — or the non annex 1 country has the correct incentives.
Table 4 show that host countries, industries and firms in general have no need for any control.
An important exeption is the annex 1 host country, who want to control that the host plants and
industries do not sell more accreditations, than they themselves can be hold responsible for. If
the amount of JI accreditations sold are bigger than the amount of JI emissions reduced, and if
the price of the accreditations are too low, the host country can be in trouble if the international
bodies hold the country responsible for the JI contracts.
The international bodies need intensive and detailed control of the non annex 1 countries, but
only need control at an aggregated level of the annex 1 countries.
Unless the donors have got JI contracts which specifi fixed accreditations at fixed costs, they
need to control, that they get the amount of accreditations payed for. When engaging in JI
contracts with non annex 1 countries, both donor and host can have incentives to boost
accreditations.
Governments in donor countries control that their plan for emissions reductions are “on track”
— or if it is necessary to impose new regulations to get the emissions reductions targets.
,:., - . ..
Table4: Theneedfor control,,
Amex 1 host country Non annex 1 host country
International bodies Country level: Control of countries Country, industry and plant level: The
reduction commitments international bodies what to con-trol
the aditionality of the JI project, the
accreditation and leakages.
National governments
a) Donor The “JI contract level”: The donor The “JI contract level”: The donor
countries want either domestic countries want either domestic
emissions reductions or emissions reductions or accreditation
accreditation for foreign JI contracts. for foreign JI contracts. The donor
The donor countries want to be sure countries want to be sure or even to
or even to control that domestic control that domestic doners do get
doners do get the emission the emission reductions they (on
reductions they (on average) have average) have payed for (if not it may
payed for (if not it may be cheaper be cheaper to reduce at home). The
to reduce at home). The donor donor country may have specific
country may have specific demands demands to the type of contracts the
to the type of contracts the donor donor firms or industries are allowed
firms or industries are allowed to to engage in. If the JI contracts
engage in. If the .JI contracts speciQ speci& a fixed accreditation and a
a fixed accreditation and a fixed fixed transfer of money, the donor
transfer of money, the donor country country has no need for control.The
has no need for control. host has got no incentive to cheat the
donor with respect to accreditations.
b) Host The “JI contract level”: The host
countries want to control that JI No need for control.
accreditations are sold at prices
which are high enough to cover the
“relevant” costs. The host countries
may want to restrict the amount of JI
contracts, because it itself is
committed to reduce emissions.
Industries (Pool)
a) Donor The “JI contract level”: If forced to The “JI contract level”: If forced to
by domestic policies (taxes, quotas, by domestic policies (taxes, quotas,
pena[ties, etc.), the donor industries penalties, etc.), the donor industries
want to control that they get the want to control that they get the
emissions reductions and emissions reductions and
accreditation specified in the JI accreditation specified in the JI
contracts. contracts. But this should not be a
problem since the host has got no
incentives to cheat the donor).
b) Host No need for control.
No need for control
Plants
a) Donor The “JI contract level”: If forced to The “JI contract level”: If forced to
by domestic policies (taxes, quotas, by domestic policies (taxes, quotas,
penalties, etc.), the donor industries penalties, etc.), the donor industries
want to control that they get the want to control that they get the
emissions reductions and emissions reductions and
accreditation specified in the JI accreditation specified in the JI
contracts. contracts. But this should not be a
problem since the host has got no
incentives to cheat the donor).
b) Host No need for control.
No need for control
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9. Conclusions
The preceding sectors tell something about the pitfalls of JI. And something about the problems
that the institutional framework must solve. The main environmental problems are related to JI
contracts with non annex 1 countries. Therefore a very effective political stratee~ would be to
try to move all important non annex 1 countries into the group of annex 1 countries. If this can
not be done, the institutional framework concerning JI arrangements with non annex 1 countries
must be very specific. The analysis shows, that the non annex 1 host country (when considered
as a free rider), does not care about the environment, additionali~, leakage, baselines and
control. Therefore the institutional framework for JI must be designed in a way so it either
gives the non annex 1 host incentives to care about environment, additionality etc., or gives the
donor incentives to care about the same, or gives international bodies power to set conditions
for JI projects with non annex 1 countries and accept and reject projects.
If donors and annex 1 hosts acts rationally and if countries have got sufficient incentives to
fulfil their fixed reduction targets, the needs for regulations and restrictions on the JI contracts
are few. Maybe in this situation the most important contribution of the institutional framework
to cost effectiveness and additional emission reductions, is to make the market for JI mare
transparent.
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Comparing Joint Implementation with Tradable Permits
– what are the pros and cons
Lzke Niehen
Riso National Laboratory, Systems Analysis Department
Abstract
Joint Implementation and Tradable Permits are regarded as alternative instruments in the
post Kyoto debate on environmental regulation of the greenhouse gases. The paper provides
a platform for comparing and evaluating the two instruments. Key elements in the
comparison are: the environmental and economic efficiencies of the instruments. But also the
coordination of the instruments between countries, problems relating to initiating the
instruments (j$orexample the distribution of permits), the amount of monitoring and control
needed, and the problems relating to selecting the right proj-ectsfor Joint Implementation are
dealt with.
Introduction
Choosing the right instruments is a hot issue in the national and international debates on
environmental policy. Avoiding global warming, preserving the water resources, cleaning
polluted soil etc. may be very costly in terms of GDP growth rates and may require
substantial international cooperation and coordination. Therefore it is important to the
national governments and the international environmental authorities to single out the
environmental instruments which are the most effective with respect to environmental
protection and economic costs, and which are easy to coordinate. The more efficient the
environmental instrument the less the negative effects to the national economies.
The national and international authorities can choose between a hole range of environmental
instruments. The instruments will differ with respect to cost effectiveness, environmental
effectiveness, the administrative burden etc. Choosing a specific instrument may involve a
trade off between certain desirable properties, for example cost effectiveness and
environmental effectiveness.
This paper compares three instruments: Joint Implementation, Tradable Permits and
environmental taxes. The main focus is on Joint Implementation and Tradable Permits. These
instruments are regarded as alternative instruments in the post Kyoto debate on
environmental regulation of the greenhouse gases. Both instruments are -at least in their text
book versions – cost effective, and both instruments maybe interpreted as mechanisms to
impose exactly the environmental tax which will provide you a specific environmental goal.
These properties makes it relevant to incorporate environmental taxes in the comparison.
A comparisons of instruments may never be complete. But the paper tries to sort out and
categorise some important criteria. The paper also suggest a ranking of some of the criteria.
A problem related to a comparison of Joint Implementation and Tradable Permits is, that
these instruments may be implemented in actual policy in different ways – and these different
“setups” or ways to implement the instruments may affect the properties of the instrument –
for example the environmental effectiveness. This fact makes the comparison more difficult,
but does not however make the comparison superfluous: The comparison points to the forces
and weaknesses of the instruments – and in some cases indicates whether there are solutions
to problems.
Through out the paper it is assumed that TP and .JI are used to eliminate international cost
inefficiencies, because this is what is relevant in the post Kyoto debate. But both instruments
may be used as purely national instruments as well. The evaluation of the instruments, when
used in a national context, may however differ in some respects.
Joint Implementation may include countries without binding emission reduction
commitments, whereas the countries participating in a system with Tradable Permits all have
binding commitments. This difference may complicate a comparison of the two instruments.
As the evaluation of Joint Implementation is very much dependent on whether the
participating countries have binding commitments or not, it is relevant to compare TP with JI
in both situations.
In the following section 2 a list of criteria for comparing Joint Implementation and Tradable
Permits is set up. Section 3 describes how the instruments are initialised and section 4
describes how the cost efficiencies of the instruments are achieved. Section 5,6 and 7
evaluate Joint Implementation and Tradable Permits with respect to cost efficiency,
environmental et%ciency and administrative burdens and section 8 concludes the paper.
Comparing the instruments
Joint Implementation and Tradable Permits are in some respects very similar instruments.
Both instruments presuppose the coexistence of other cost ineffective instruments (in a green
house gas context, fixed reduction targets), and the aim of both instruments are to eliminate
these cost inefficiencies induced by the other instruments. The cost inefficiencies are
ei iminated by setting up markets, where the agents have mutual benefit in trading the cost
inefficiencies away.
The main characterizing differences between the two instruments are that Joint
. Implementation is related to concrete emissions reduction projects and, what is traded are
emissions reductions. The agents (directly) involved in Joint Implementation are those
involved in concrete reduction projects. Tradable Permits are permits to pollute, and these
permits must be distributed to – in principle - every single polluter, as Tradable Permits are
related to - in principle – every single emission of e.g. greenhouse gasses in the involved
countries. Thus the amount of trades on the markets for tradable permits and the amount of
players involved in these trades maybe substantial higher than is the case for Joint
Implementation.
Whereas the market for TP is a market setting a price on the externalities, the market for JI is
a kind of investors market: the agents invest in projects which will give - or are supposed to
give – the investor a later pay off in terms of emissions reductions. The differences with
respect to what is traded in a TP and JI regime give rise to significant differences in the
institutional setup between the two regimes. And give rise to the different properties of the
two instruments.
Comparisons and evaluations of the instruments may be done at a theoretical, a practical and
a political level, where the theoretical level describes the ideal conditions under which the
instrument can work, and the practical level includes the practical problems connected to the
functioning of the instruments. The paper summarises some of the main differences at each
level. Key elements in the comparison are: the environmental and economic efficiencies of
the instruments. But also problems relating to initiating the instruments (including the
distribution of permits), the amount of monitoring and control needed, and the problems
relating to selecting the right projects for Joint Implementation (including the problems of
creating baselines) are looked upon.
The criteria are summarised in table 1, which also indicates different rankings.
Table 1: Criteria for evaluating the instruments. and Dossible rankings of the criteria
Criteria Ranking from the perspective Ranking from the perspective
of a legislator of an individual agent
Environmental effectiveness 1 6 – if agents costs are not
tied to the environmental
effectiveness
3 – if agents costs are tied
to the environmental
effectiveness
Cost effectiveness 3 2
Initiating the instrument 2 1
Degree of coordination 2 5
between countries
Effectiveness of control 2 6
Administrative burden 2 3
Technology transfer 4 4
Table 1 does not list all relevant criteria for the comparison of the instruments, and there may
be lots of different rankings even from a legislators and an individual agents perspective. But
these criteria are some of the most important, and the rankings presented in the table may
i1Iustrate actual rankings:
The reasoning behind the rankings are the following: The legislators (the FCCC in case of
green house gasses) primary concern are the environmental efilciencies of the instruments,
because protecting the environment was the sole reason for the legislators to take action in
the first place. If there is reason to believe that allowing JI or TP will undermine the
environmental goals (for example undermine environmental goals expressed in international
reduction commitments) - this may be too high a price to pay to obtain cost efficiency. The
reason why JI and TP are interesting instruments are their cost efficiency property, but the
reason why the cost efficiencies of the instruments only rank third to the legislators is, that
the cost efficiency only is interesting to them if other criteria are fulfilled. The concern of the
legislators are to secure the environment and to create the right administrative and
institutional framework for the instruments. Given this, the individual agents (countries,
firms, and others) may be expected to secure the cost effectiveness of the instruments through
permits trading or joint implementation.
The individual agents primary concern is the cost ineffective instruments initiating J1 or TP.
How burdensom; are for exa-mple the initial quotas? And with respect to TP, how-is the
permits distributed. The distribution of permits and the “design” of the instruments working
as incentive for JI have great economic influence to the individual agents. Some of the
negative economic influence can be eliminated through the cost effectiveness of JI or TP – if
the administrative burden is not too large. The environmental effectiveness of JI and TP is
on] y interesting to the individual agent if costs are Iinked to the environmental effectiveness:
JI accreditations maybe directly linked to actual emissions reductions associated with
concrete JI projects.
Initiating the instruments
Both TP and JI presuppose other cost ineffective instruments, as indicated in table 2.
Tradable Permits presuppose quotas, and presuppose an initial distribution of permits. The
initial distribution of permits is one of the much discussed problems of TP, because of the
economic significance to the “polluters”. Different principles for distributing the permits –
for example “grand fathering” or auctioning – affect the distribution of costs and the
competitiveness of firms differently.
Joint Implementation may be initialised through several instruments. Table 3 describes
different environmental instruments, and indicates whether these instruments can be used as
incentives for JI and can coexist with JI. Table 3 shows that all the listed instruments can
coexist with - and be used as incentives for – Joint Implementation. The incentives may not
be equally strong though. The mechanism behind the incentives is that either taxes or
(investment) costs can be avoided if Joint Implementation secure emission reductions
elsewhere. If subsidies are given to specific emission reduction projects (for example within
firms), these subsidies may alternatively be spent on more cost effective Joint
Implementation projects. There is no need for coordination of the “initial instruments”
between countries.
Whereas Tradable Permits and Tradable Quotas presuppose that all the participating
countries have quotas, Joint Implementation can include in principle all countries.
A a“, G x.. “G%”uua, J v,, T 1, “,..,,..., .-. ,..”.. . . ...”...”
Secondary Short descriptions of the instruments Presuppose other
instruments instruments as
incentive?
Tradable Permits Every single emission within the system demands an Presuppose quotas at,
emission permit. Pennits are traded on markets. The for example, the country
instrument works like an endogenous tax rate on level and presuppose
emissions. initial distribution of
permits. The distribution
may follow different
principles, for example,
auctioning or “grand
fathering”.
Tradable Quotas Direct trade with quotas or reduction commitments Presuppose quotas
There is no system of permits (like in TP) and the
traded emissions reductions are not necessarily tied
to concrete projects (like in JI).
Joint Trade of emissions reductionslinvestments in foreign Those who are supposed
implementation cheaper emission reduction projects. As only to engage in JI contracts
emission reductions are traded on the market, the must have an economic
amount of trades may be far less the amount of trades incentive to do it.
on the market for Tradable Permits. Therefore the
governments must be
sure that the agents
supposed to engage in JI
are the agents that the
instruments working as
incentives for JI are
“hitting”.
Table 3: Primary environmental instruments and Joint Impleme
Primary I Short description of the instruments
instruments I
Taxes or fees Taxes on emissions, raw materials or the like
Subsidies Subsidies to for example emission reducing
investments, preferred raw materials or prefemed
technologies
Quotas Quotas speci~ing the maximum level of emissions
for for example firms, industries or countries
Norms Norms specifying for example the maximum
emissions per produced unit.
Technical standards Speci$ing technical demands to the production
technologies.
Public cleaning Public cleaning may bean option – if cleaning is
possible (this is not the case with respect to C02
emissions)
Voluntary Voluntary agreements are agreements between the
agreements government and for example polluting industries
about emission reductions, technologies, etc.
:ation
Can coexist with JI and
be used as an incentive
for JI?
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
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How the cost efficiencies of the instruments are achieved
Figure 1 illustrate how the cost effectiveness of Joint Implementation, Tradable Permits and
taxes are achieved. It shows, that in principle the three instruments may give the same cost
effective solution, but it also illustrates that the mechanisms behind the cost efllciencies are
different. The different mechanisms give rise to the different properties of the instruments.
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Figure 1: Cost effectiveness of Joint Implementation, Tradable Permits and taxes.
Figure 1 shows marginal abatement cost curves (MAC 1 and MAC2) for two countries (1 and
2) with international emission reduction commitments equal to OA and ABO. The countries
marginal abatement cost are higher the lower the level of emissions. The line OABO is the
sum of the national quotas. The (initia~) distribution of quotas implies marginal abatement
costs in country 1 and 2 equal to Pal and Pa2 respectively. This difference in marginal
abatement cost may be eliminated through coordinated taxes, or by allowing Joint
Implementation or Tradable Permits. In theory all three instruments will deliver the same cost
optimizing result, namely the price Pb and the distribution OAB and BO of emission levels
between country 1 and 2. But the mechanisms behind the cost optimizing results are as
previously mentioned different:
If the instrument is a coordinated tax on emissions, and the target level for total emissions are
equal to OABO, a tax rate equal to Pb will deliver the desired target. Every single emitter has
the opportunity of either investing in emission reductions and reduce his tax payments or to
continue to pollute and pay the (full) emission tax.
The equilibrium is reached where marginal abatement costs are equal to the tax rate. If the
marginal abatement cost curves are not known, it may be necessaLy to adjust the tax rate one
or more times to reach the target level for total emissions.
If the instrument is Tradable. Permits, country 1 and 2 distribute permits equal to their quota
OA and ABO to the (domestic) emitters. Every single emission demands a permit. Every
single emitter has the opportunities of buying and selling emission permits and either to
continue to pollute or to invest in emissions reductions. The choice of the rational emitter
will be to minimise costs/maximise profits. Cost minimisation will be reached where
marginal abatement costs are equai to the price of the emission permits.
If the instrument is Joint Implementation, emission reduction projects are traded between the
two countries. Lower marginal abatement costs in country 2 means that it is cheaper to invest
in emission reductions in country 2 than in country 1. In a system with JI, county 1 invest
directly in the concrete projects which lie behind county 2’s marginal abatement cost curve.
There may be different incentives to for example firms to engage in JI. But all who engage in
JI may have the opportunity to invest in emission reductions in for example their own firm. If
emission reduction projects are cheaper in other countries JI will be chosen.
Whereas Tradable Permits and the use of the tax instrument demands a coordination of the
instruments between country 1 and 2, Joint Implementation needs no coordination: Only
country 1 needs an incentive to engage in emission reduction projects in country 2.
In theory all tree instruments are cost efficient, and deliver the same distribution of emission
levels But in practise, the instruments may be very different as the following sections will
show.
Cost efficiency
If the tax payers behave rationally, the tax instrument must be efficient with respect to costs.
If the agents behave rationally, the cost efficiency of Tradable Permits depends on the market
structure for the permits - whether the competition on the market is perfect or monopolistic.
Given rational agents and given a perfect competitive market, the TP instrument will be cost
efficient.
The cost efficiency of joint implementation depends on choosing the right projects, i.e. the
projects which will equate marginal abatement costs. This may not be a quite simple task:
One of the problems about an international agreement on Joint Implementation is to limit the
amount of projects supplied to the JI market. There are huge numbers of projects which
involve reduced emissions, but all these projects cannot be financed through JI and all the
emission reductions cannot be assigned credit: Emissions reductions which are secondary
effects of normal investment practise are free, and will be carried out despite of the JI
financing. Therefore JI financing should not be given to this type of projects. There is no
additional environmental effect, and therefore no cost reducing elements, in financing JI
projects unless the JI projects are additional. But if the JI projects are additional the
environmental effects and the cost reducing effects of JI are maximised.
To sort out the additional projects baselines, cost curves, etc. pertaining the participating
countries may be needed.
Environmental effectiveness
Important problems relating to the environmental efilciency of taxes, TP and JI are: cheating,
behaviour which wili undermine the instrument, measurement problems (how big are the
emissions, or the emission reductions) and leakage effects. Leakage effects means that
emissions reduction in one place – firm, sector or county – are associated with higher
emissions somewhere else: Polluting processes may be exported to countries without
environmental regulations and the “polluting goods” be imported from these countries. The
net effect to the environment is zero, but the exporting country will experience an emission
reduction. Problems relating to the environmental effectiveness of each of the instruments are
described below.
Taxes
To obtain a specific environmental goal it may be necessary to adjust the tax instrument one
or more times.
It is the individual taxpayer who cheats. And therefore it is the individual taxpayer who must
be controlled, to secure the environmental effectiveness of the instrument.
The individual countries do not necessarily have an interest in controlling domestic tax
payers. Therefore the international environmental authorities may have an interest in holding
countries responsible for the environmental performance of the domestic polluters. But this
may not be an easy task.
Leakages - export of expensive polluting processes, and import of cheap “polluting goods” –
are results of the rational behaviour of the economic agents. And therefore leakages are a
general property of the instrument. Leakage effects can only be traced when big/important
firms are involved. Leakages are an environmental argument for international coordination of
the tax instrument. The larger the group of countries coordinating the tax, the less the leakage
problem. And the less foreign trade with countries outside the group of countries
coordinating the tax, maybe the less the leakage problems – but trade patterns may change as
a result of the common coordinated tax.
The coordination of the environmental tax is a way to reduce the individual countries free
riding and competitive advantage of not taking action. Once the tax is coordinated, the
individual countries may have an incentive to re-establish their original free rider or
competitive position by trying to undermine the national effects of the tax. For example by
t Addtional projects are projects which would not have been carried out without the JI fianansing.
paying subsidies to the environmental tax payers, lowering other taxes or lowering the price
of publicly regulated raw material prices. (A C02 tax on gasoline may for example partly be
undermined by lowering other taxes on vehicles (the C02 tax may still have an effect of the
marginal behaviour, but considering the economy of driving in own car to the alternative of
using public transportation - the relative “over all” prices have not been changed), C02 taxes
on the heavy ener=W intensive industries may be offset by heightening the subsidies for
labour, capital, cheap loans, etc. with the consequence of easing some of the economic
pressure for energy savings, and perhaps giving a competitive advantage to companies which
are inefficient in energy terms).
Tradable permits
Itis the individual polluter who cheats, and therefore it is the individual polluter who must be
control led. The individual countries do not necessarily have an interest in controlling the
domestic polluters.
Although the initial quotas was country specific, the individual countries can not be
evaluated at a national level with respect to these quotas, because once the permit market is a
reality the initial country specific distribution of the emission reductions will be changed.
The international environmental authorities may have an interest in holding countries
responsible for the environmental performance of the domestic polluters, but this may be
difficult.
A positive price on emission permits implies that the level of emissions under a system with
Tradable Permits will be equal to the total sum of quotas. This creates the “hot air” problem.
The “hot air” problem describes a situation where a country’s initial emission quota is not
binding, for example because of negative economic growth. Without tradable permits this
low emission level will benefit the environment, but in a system with tradable Permits,
countries with binding quotas will buy emission permits from the countries without binding
quotas and therefore the total level of emissions will equal the total level of quotas.
A dictator selling a substantial part of, or maybe all, emissions permits initially distributed to
his country (because he do care about the environment, and thinks his country must show that
there is a sustainable growth path) may undermine the system – unless this kind of behaviour
is minimised.
Leakages are results of the rational behaviour of the economic agents. And therefore leakages
are a general property of the instrument. Leakages can only be traced when big/important
firms are involved. Leakages are an environmental argument for international coordination of
the TP instrument.
Joint Implementation
The environmental effectiveness of JI is very much dependent on whether the participating
countries have binding commitments or not, and whether countries with binding
commitments take these commitments serious.
With respect to countries with binding commitments (annex 1 countries) the biggest
environmental problems are whether countries feel obliged to keep their international
reduction commitments or not, and leakage problems. If countries do not take their
commitments serious, or if some of the participating countries do not have binding
commitments (non annex 1 countries) the biggest environmental problems are undermining
the instrument, cheating, measurement problems and leakages.
If every JI contract implies the accept of the donor and host countries, and if these countries
feel obliged by their international reduction commitments, then there is no environmental
risks in opening up for JI arrangements: Some JI arrangements may give less emission
reduction than expected for example because of cheating. But as long as the donor and host
countries can be hold responsible for the emission reductions at the country level, then the
success or failure of individual JI projects will not affect the environmental effectiveness of
the JI instrument.
If one or more annex 1 countries do not feel obliged to keep their international reduction
commitments, and if the use of JI in these countries is “problematic” it should in principle be
possible to discover (by control at the country level) that something is wrong – at least after
some years. Measures against the problematic countries, might increase the likelihood of
these countries keeping their international commitments.
JI arrangements with countries which do not have international reduction commitments may
be a serious environmental problem, unless heavily regulated. To secure the environmental
efficiency of JI in these circumstances, it is necessary to sort out the additional projects by
using baselines, cost curves, etc. And to impose heavy control. If the institutional framework
for JI can be constructed in a way so the involved countries have incentives to secure the
environmental efficiency of the instrument, this off cause should be implemented.
Because JI is related to concrete emission reduction projects it should – in principle - be
possible to trace leakages back to specific JI projects. And to try to prevent accreditation of
leakage effects. But it maybe difficult in practice.
The administrative burden
The burden of administration may differ between JI and TP, but it is difllcult to make a
comparison. Firstly because the administrative burdens will be very much dependent on the
institutional setup of the two instruments, and secondly because there are many different
administrative elements to evaluate. The administrative burdens may fall on the international
environmental authorities, countries or individual agents. Some of the elements are: The
degree of coordination between countries, the amount of control, the transparencies of the
markets, the amount of information needed to trade on the markets, etc.
The administrative burdens in relation to JI may be very much dependent on whether JI
arrangement with countries without binding commitments are allowed or not, and whether
countries with binding commitments take their commitments serious or not.
Conclusion
Table 4 summarises some of the issues with respect to evaluating Joint Implementation and
Tradable permits as international environmental instruments. Both instruments use the
market mechanism to eliminate cost inefficiencies, Tradable Permits through markets for
emission permits, and Joint Implementation through markets for emission reductions. In
practice the instruments are very different, as the table suggests.
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;riteriaUssues Tradable Permits Joint Implementation
Environmental effectiveness “Hot air” Do countries take their
Leakage emission reduction
Cheating commitments serious?
(“Hot air”)
Leakage
Cost effectiveness Competitiveness of market Selecting the right projects
Competitiveness of market
[nitiating the instrument Presuppose quotas Presuppose cost ineffective
Distribution of permits instruments
Degree of coordination JHiu Low
bemveen countries All participants must have Countries which do not have
binding commitments binding commitment may
participate – but this
demands a high degree of
control
Effectiveness of control Control at the level of Control at project level
individual emitter. demands baselines etc.
Control at country level
possible if countries have
Do countries have an binding commitments.
incentive to control their own Countries do have an
citizens? incentive to control their own
citizens if countries have
binding commitments and
take these Serious.
Administrative burden The organisation of the The organisation of the
market. market.
Control. Selecting the right projects.
The accreditation procedure.
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JOINT IMPLEIWENTATION AS AN OPTION FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
TO IMPROVE BARGAINING POWER
Two bargaining games for a global regime of emission trading in the Climate
Convention.
Paper presented at the 22nd L4EE Conference Rome June 1999.
Abstract: An important purpose of the fourth meeting between the parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in Buenos Aires, November
1998, was to follow up on the so-called Kyoto mechanisms. These mechanisms
include emission trading among industrialised countries and Joint Implementation
between industrialised countries and developing countries - the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM is a first attempt to institutionalise
the participation of developing countries - it might not be the last. The USA,
among others, has from the beginning of the FCCC negotiations argued for the
need for developing countries participation and emission trading as an appropriate
instrument. Economic theory shows that an international regime of emission
trading may be in favour of the developing countries. This is due to this systems
ability to combine and solve the burden-sharing problem and the cost-efficiency
problem - in fact the developing countries might even obtain absolute gains from
emission trading if the right quota allocation principle is used. Nevertheless it is
the position of the G-77 to reject every step towards participation until the
industrialised countries has shown that they are able and willing to fulfil their
Kyoto targets on their own. This paper shows that while the CDM can be viewed
as a way to make industrialised countries’ commitments cheaper it could be used
by the developing countries as a way to strengthen their bargaining power in
quota-allocation negotiations. If the developing countries accept that they in the
future will have to participate in international e~ssion trading it would be
optimal for them to start negotiations on a quota allocation principle immediately.
This will enable them to use the supply of Joint Implementation projects to the
CDM as an punishment option; if the industrialised countries fail to accept the
developing countries quota allocation offer then they will be punished by a cut in
the supply of CDM projects. The paper uses simple game theoretic modelling to
show this relationship.
Lise Nielsen Kim Rose Olsen
Risoe National Laboratory Risoe National Laboratory
System Analysis Department System Analysis Department
Denmark Denmark
1. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was opened for
ratification at the Conference on Environment and Development (uNCED) in Rio,
1992. The Convention divides the worlds countries in two groups. The so caIIed
Annex I countries, identical to the OECD countries and the countries with
economies in transition (below denoted industrialised countries) are expected to
cut emissions relative to a fixed target point to meet the objectives of the
Convention. The non-annex countries, identical to a very broad definition of
developing countries, are not supposed to cut emissions.
At the Kyoto meeting in 1997 the parties to the Convention agreed on a Protocol
(the Kyoto Protocol) defining legally binding reduction commitments for the
industrialised countries. Despite a continuous pressure from the so-called
JUSCANZi group the developing countries have succeeded in sustaining their
unanimous no-commitment position. This position may not be everlasting. At the
latest meeting between the parties to the Convention, in November 1998, the Host
Country, Argentina, pronounced willingness to commit to a fixed emission target.
This departure from the unanimous no-commitment position undoubtedly
increases the pressure for participation from the rest of the group of developing
countries.
The Kyoto Protocol opens up for the use of flexible mechanisms as Joint
Implementation and emissions trading. In connection to participation from
developing countries, article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol defines a mechanism (the
Clean Development Mechanism, (CDM) for Joint Implementation between
industrialised and developing countries. This means that the industrialised
countries will be able to finance emission reductions in developing countries in
exchange for reduction credits. The advantage of Joint Implementation is that it,
under the assumption of relatively low abatement costs in the developing
countries, is a cost-efficient way for the industrialised countries to fi.dfil their
reduction commitments. The gains from the CDM, may be shared between the
donor (industrialised) countries and the host (developing) countries by negotiating
the amount of financial resources and emission credits transferred between the
countries.
If other non-annex countries follow the pronouncement by Argentina, a global
abatement regime may soon be implemented. A global regime of emission trading
is likely to be prefemed to other regimes such as command and control or
international emission taxes etc.. An emission trading regime starts from an initial
allocation of emission quotas that distributes the economic burdens connected to
the emissions trading regime.
How initially to allocate the quotas in an emission trading regime has been
discussed in the literature.ii The (non-tradable) emission quotas in the Kyoto
Protocol are based on a non-uniform percentage reduction from 1990 emission
levels. This means that the total emission quota, set to approximately 95% of the
industrialised countries total 1990 emission level, is allocated such that the quotas
for some countries only amounts to e.g. 92’?40of their 1990 emission level (for
example the EU) while other countries have quotas exceeding 100’%0of their 1990
emission level (Australia, Norway and Iceland). One of the advantages of a non-
uniform allocation rule is that h, at least in principle, can be cost-efficient. But
with respect to the desirability of a cost-efficient distribution of quotas, it is
important to notice that only the industrialised countries signed the Kyoto
Protocol. Developing countries can be expected to have other views on allocation
rules. The reason is that allocation rules based on cost efficiency would give them
low allocations because: a) their 1990 emission levels are very low due to low
economic development and b) their abatement costs are relatively low. The
position of developing countries can more likely be expected to be based on a per
capita view. The reason shall shortly be summarised.
One of the main arguments for developing countries participation is that these
countries relative share of global emissions is rapidly increasing and is expected to
exceed the emissions from industrialised countries within a range of 30 years time.
Estimates show that developing countries’ share of global annual emissions in
2025-2030 will be between 58~o and 64’34., i.e. larger ~~ fie industrialised
...
countnes.[ll Other estimates show that the developing countries at the same time
will be inhabited by more than 80°/0 of the world’s population. These fi=jges and
the need for economic development in the developing countries and their low
share of accumulated emissions are used against the pressure for commitment. It
would therefore be obvious that the developing countries would advocate for a per
capita quota allocation as the basis for international emissions trading.
It seems that there are several reasons why developing countries may be in a
potentially favorable bargaining position. The purpose of the following sections
is to explore how this bargaining position can be used by the developing countries
to increase their pay-off by looking at game theoretic descriptions of quota
bargaining.
2. TWO QUOTA ALLOCATION BARGAINING GAMES
There are three basic assumptions behind the analysis in this section. First it is
assumed that abatement costs are relatively low in the developing countries.
Second it is assumed that the developing countries are relatively patient with
respect to reaching an agreement on an allocation rule. And finally the developing
countries are assumed to make the first move in the negotiations. Given these
assumptions, we consider two bargaining games over the allocation of emission
quotas between industrialised- and developing countries in a global regime of
emission trading. The first two assumptions mentioned fits well into the
description of the developing countries above, whereas the last assumption maybe
considered as normative. We show that JI may improve the developing countries’
outcome of the bargaining.
. .
I. A simple quota bargaining game.
We will start by looking at a simple bargaining game where industrialised and
developing countries bargain over the allocation of quotas given the total amount
of emissions. There is no possibility of JI in this game. The two countries
alternately propose an allocation leaving x/c to the industrialised countries and XDr
to the developing countries. All the proposals must belong to the set of possible
quota allocations defined by X. For convenience the total amount of emissions
quotas are normalised to 1:
X= {(xm, x,c) = R2: xN+ x,C= 1 and x, >0 for i=IC, DC}
After each proposal the opponent can either accept or reject. An allocation, x,, at
time t gives player i more utility than the same allocation received at time [+1.
This time preference is incorporated in the utility finction by a constant discount
factor a= ]0; 1[. The utility fiction for player i is
~i(xti t) = ~t-’~i, for i=IC,DC
The assumption that the developing countries are relatively more patient with
respect to when an agreement on the quota allocations is reached implies that
&>& : developing countries value future utility relatively higher than
industrialised countries.
The structure of the bargaining game is Figure I: The simple bargaining game
shown in figure I.-The bargaining starts in DC
period 1 where the developing countries
propose an allocation x’ within the set of
~=I
possible allocations X. Figure I illustrates
the proposed allocation by the dashed line A
reaching the bottom of the triangle. The
bottom of the triangle illustrates X. z,
Immediately after the developing
DC
~=~
countries proposal the industrialised
countries shall either accept (A) or reject A
(R) the proposal. If they choose (A) the
game ends with an agreement on x‘ - if
I
~z
not the game proceeds to period 2. In
[=3
period 2 the industrialised countries
propose an allocation which the developing countries either accept (A) or reject
(R). Acceptance ends the game and rejection makes the game proceed to period 3.
ln principle the game can continue like this in infinity. In the very simple game -
given that each player knows everything about the other player and everything
about the game, and given no uncertainty - an agreement will be reached in the
first period of the game. This means that the allocation proposed by the
developing countries can be accepted by the industrialised countries. We use a non
co-operative solution concept where each player optimises his strategy given the
other players strategy and where each player is able to reconsider his action at
each point in the game. The game has a unique solution.iv Given perfect
information each negotiator is well aware of the opponents’ strategy. The unique
solution gives, with the chosen utility function, an allocation where the
developing- and industrialised countries receives
Two conclusions can be drawn from the simple bargaining game. First of all the
developing countries have an advantage of being the first to make a proposal, a
so-called first mover advantage. To see this assume that d&c51c =~such that there
is symmetry in everything except who starts the game. This invokes that xDC =
(1-8) 5(1- s)
and that Xfc = — which clearly show that xDC > x[c, indicating that the
(1-t?) (1-&)’
developing countries get the largest allocation solely because they start the game.
Secondly the developing countries has an advantage of being patient. This can be
verified by noticing that x~c is increasing- and Xlc is decreasing in &C. The
opposite is true for increases in ~fc. Thus the more patient developing countries
are (relative to industrialised countries) the larger the allocations they get.
Thus in the simple quota allocation game the developing countries will have the
largest share of the total emission quota because they are the first to propose
allocations and because they are relatively patient.
IL A quota bargaining game which include Joint Implementation (the CDM).
We will now enlarge the game structure in a way that firrther strengthens the
developing countries bargaining power. In the simple bargaining game above we
assumed that there was no possibility of Joint Implementation (CDM) between
developing- and industrialised countries. In what follows we will assume that
there prior to the quota bargaining exist an agreement which make Joint
Implementation (CDM) between the two negotiators possible, and that this
agreement is relevant for the bargaining. Even though an agreement of quota
allocations %11 not be reached there will be an agreement of Joint
Implementation, namely the CDM. The existence of an initial relationship, a
reference agreement, between the negotiators adds new perspectives to the game.
We will show that the reference agreement can improve the developing countries’
bargaining power. In other words we will show that the CDM can be used
strategically by the developing countries.
Denote the reference agreement (the CDM) by x“=(xo~c, X“lc) where xO~X. The
CDM involves cost-efficient reduction of the industrialised countries’ Kyoto
commitments. The gains from this shall be shared between the host and donor
countries by agreeing on the transfer of financial resources to the host and credits
to the donor. If the gains from the CDM are normalised to 1 we face the same
allocation problem as under the quota allocation bargaining. The share that the
reference agreement allocates to the developing countries, xODC, can now be
thought of as gains from the CDM expressed in units of quota allocations. The
developing countries utility from the CDM then exactly equals the utility from an
emission allocation equal to x“~c, in a regime of emission trading. The same holds
for the industrialised countries share of the reference agreement, X*IC.
The presence of a reference agreement in quota bargaining means that the
outcome is x“ instead of O whenever a proposal k rej edecl. What it further means
is that the negotiators can use the reference agreement as a potential threat because
they can punish the opponent by withdrawing from the reference agreement if a
proposal for a new agreement is rejected. This game structure is very common in
the literature on wage bargaining between Iabour unions and firms.’ In this
literature a union and a firm bargain over the share of the firms revenue. The
reference agreement is a wage W“for the union and a profit 1- W“ to the firm (the
firm’s total revenue is normalised to 1 in the same way as we normalise the total
amount of emission quotas). The union can now threat to withdraw from the
reference agreement by going on strike. In every period the union strikes the firm
will be restrained from obtaining the reference profit. An overall conclusion from
the wage literature is that the union is able to gain larger wage by being able to go
on strike. Basically it is the same idea that forms the ground for the game we are
about to develop. We give the developing countries the opportunity to” “go on
strike” by cutting the supply of projects to the CDM and thereby restrain the gains
from the reference agreement.
The outcome when the developing countries carries out the punishment is denoted
by x’ = (XSDC,,XSIC)- (O, O). The bargaining structure of the game is illustrated in
figure II below. The bargaining structure is essentially the same as in the simple
game. The only difference is that that the outcome in situations where a proposal
is rejected can either be X*= (x”~c, Xolc) or x’ = (0,0) depending on whether or not
the developing countries choose to use the punishment option. The negotiators
may on this background be thought of as maximizing the sum of future utility
Uj(Xi, t) = ~ df-ljXj
t=l
whereas the maximisation of U,(xi,t) = d ‘-]Xjwas sufficient for preference ordering
in the simple game. Figure 11 illustrates that when a proposal is rejected the
developing countries will make a choice of punishment strategy, where NP stands
for No Punishment and P stands for Punishment. It can be shown that the optimal
punishment strategy the developing countries can choose is to use the punishment
option only when their own proposal is rejected, and therefore it is this case which
is shown in the figure. The intuition for this asymmetric punishment strategy
being optimal is straightforward. If the developing countries use the punishment
option only when their own proposal is rejected and not when they reject the
opponents proposal, rejection of their own proposal is made relatively more
expensive. In this way they can force the industrialised countries to accept
proposals more favorable to the developing countries. The game can in principle
proceed in infinity, but like the simple game it turns out that optimal strategies
lead to immediate agreement the
developing countries forms a
strategy which results in their
proposal on quota allocations
being accepted in period 1. This
result rests again on the
assumption of petiect information
and no uncertainties.
Where the simple bargaining
game had a unique solution the
present game where Joint
Implementation (CDM) is a
possibility has multiple solutions.
Remember that the solution
concept is non co-operative so
that each negotiator takes the
opponents strategy as given but is
,,. . ..
Figure II: The enlarged quota allocation game.
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able to reassess his own strategy as the game
proceeds. The most interesting solutions to the game is i) that X“ - the Joint
Implementation allocation - can be an outcome of the bargaining ii) that the
agreement from the simple game x‘ - where Joint Implementation was not taken
into consideration - can be an outcome and finally that iii) it can be shown that
there is a maximal quota that the developing countries can get as an outcome in
the game structure. This maximal quota exceeds x“~c and x~c. We denote the
agreement leading to the maximal allocation to the developing countries by x*
‘(x”~c, X*IC).Obviously xODc(the Joint hnplementation outcome) is the minimum
allocation the developing countries can obtain because it is always possible to
sustain status quo. It should further be noticed that it can be shown that every
agreement leading to an allocation to the developing countries between the
reference agreement #Dc and X*DCcan be an outcome of the game. In other words,
every x= ]x”, x*[ is a possible outcome of non co-operative bargaining.
We will limit this paper to discuss the strategies leading to x* and will not go into
details in explaining the existence of a maximal zdlocation, x*Dc (for details see ‘i).
It can be proved that, given the specific utility function we use, the largest possible
quota allocation that the developing countries can achieve is expressed by:
l (H,,,) J, +(1-J (,)
“DC=[=)
‘+z%)-
Notice that the first part of x*Dc equals the allocation in the unique solution of the
simple game so that x*Dc obviously is kirger than x ‘De. To achieve the k.rgest
possible allocation, x*Dc, the developing countries’ strategy include the
punishment option previously mentioned, and a trigger strategy. The trigger
strategy involves a (tacit) agreement with the industrialised countries to let the
reference (Joint Implementation) agreement be an outcome in infinity if the
developing countries defect from their overall bargaining strategy. Their overall
..-”
bargaining strategy is to propose an allocation (X*DC)in the first period and make
it clear that they will use the punishment option to cut the supply of Joint
Implementation projects (CDM) if the industrialised countries rejects this offer.
Furthermore their strategy must be never to use the punishment option in periods
where industrialised countries are proposers. Remember that perfect information
is an underlying assumption so that the industrialised countries are filly aware of
the developing countries strategy and vice versa.
To summarise on the enbrged game we conclude that the developing countries
can use Joint Implementation (CDM) strategically to increase their fhture quota
allocation. By threatening the industrialised countries with a costly cut off of the
supply of Joint Implementation (CDM) projects they can increase their own
allocation on the expense of the industrialised countries.
3. DISCUSSION
In this section we will discuss the interpretation and plausibility of the maximal
quota.
In the introduction we argued that it would be in the developing countries interest
to take a per capita view on the responsibility pattern of the climate problem. In
the bargains over future quota allocations one could therefore expect that the
developing countries would propose to allocate the emission quotas on the basis of
population size. Taking our game literally it gives an indication of the size of
allocation the developing countries can expect to obtain in negotiation with the
industrialised countries. An interesting question is on this background whether or
not a population based allocation principle lies within the interval of possible
outcomes predicted by the bargaining game.
In 1993 the world population was about 5,5 billion people. vii The population of
the countries defined as developing countries in the Climate Convention was in
the same year amounting to 4,3 billion people. In other words approximately 80?40
of the worlds population lived in the developing countries. More recent estimates
of these numbers and projections of fiture world population levels will surely tend
to increase this percentage share of people living in developing countries. Thus if
the developing countries shall be able to obtain a quota allocation based on the
level of population they shall be able to negotiate a division of the global emission
quota that leaves more than 80% to themselves.
According to the equation above the maximal quota allocation X*LXdepends on
the factors of time discounting and the level of the reference agreement xf’~c.
Under what assumptions on these parameters will a population based allocation
proposal be obtainable as an outcome of negotiations? The table below calculates
some scenarios.
The two first scenarios illustrate the first mover advantage. Assuming that the
negotiators have identical time preferences the developing countries are able to
obtain the relative
largest allocation
even without the
existence of a Joint
Implementation
(CDM) reference
agreement and the
possibility of using
Joint
Implementation
(CDM) .as a
punishment option.
Table I: Scenarios for obtainable quota allocations.
Para’rneferi’ ,; ,scenario’~.:’;s@@@ .’scenagZo.s‘ scenario 4
& 0,90 0,90 0,90 0,90
d-~~ 0,90 0,90 0,99 0,99
x“~ 0,50 0,30 0,50 0,30
A1location-‘;,, ‘“scenario$I‘ :scetiariij.2 : %cenarfo,s scenario 4
....< .-.. ., -
Simplegame 0,53 ‘- 0,53 0,92 0,92
x’~
Enlargedgame 0,76 0,67 0,96 0,94
X*M;
This is shown by the fact that the allocation to developing countries in the simple
game, x ‘DC, is 0,53, leaving 0,47 to the industrialised countries. Scenario 1
assumes that the reference agreement are splitting the CDM gains on a fifty-fifty
basis while scenario 2 more realistically gives developing countries a lower share
of the CDM gains (3OO/O).Scenario 2 is more realistic regarding the reference
agreement because the main purpose of the CDM is cost-efficiency, which will be
lowered the larger the financial transfers the developing countries receives in
relation to the Joint Implementation projects. The industialised countries can
therefore be expected to have the largest share of the gains fi-om the projects
(above 50Yo). The enlarged scenario 1- given identical time preferences and given
the existence of a CDM reference agreement combined with the punishment
strategy - will according to the table give the developing countries a maximum of
76’?40of the total emission quota. If the reference agreement only gives developing
countries 30°/0 of the CDM-gains, scenario 2 show that the maximal obtainable
quota is 67Y0. Scenario 3 and 4 adds asymmetry in time discounting factor in
scenario 1 and 2. By letting the developing countries time discounting factor be
close to 1 it is assumed that these countries barely discount fiture utili~ and that
they are patient relatively to the industrialised countries. The simple bargaining
game now enables the developing countries to obtain 92% of the emission quota.
The table shows that the possibili~ of using a punishment strategy is less
important than in scenario 1 and 2, as it only raises the quota fi-om 92°/0 to 96°/0 in
scenario 3 where the reference agreement is equally split and from 92°/0 to 94°/0 in
scenario 4 where the developing countries only gets 30°/0of the CDM gains.
What table I show us is that asymmetry in the time discounting is the most
important aspect for the developing countries to obtain a large quota allocation.
The possibility of Joint Implementation (CDM) as a punishment option is most
important when the asymmetry in discounting factors is small or absent.
4. CONCLUS1ON
The present paper has discussed whether Joint Implementation between
developing- and industrialised countries can improve the bargaining position of
the developing countries in negotiations over quota allocations. The analysed
mechanism is simply that the CDM can be viewed as an reference agreement, that
enables the developing countries to form a punishment strategy. The conclusion is
that the CDM can improve the bargaining position of the developing countries. It
is worth noticing that this conclusion does not only apply to negotiations on quota
allocations but to allocation problems in general. This means that if the
international society (the FCCC) e.g. decides that the international abatement
regime should include an international tm system where the tax revenue should be
allocated between the countries the conclusion is still applicable.
ENDNOTES
i The JUSCANZgroupconsistsof Japan,US, Canada,Australia,New ZealandandNorwayjoined
in 1997.
“See e.g. Larsen,B.& A. Shah(1994)andRose,A.&B.Stevens(1993).
‘“Fenhann,J. (1998).
‘vFor a formaldescriptionand proofsee Femandez,R. &J. Glazer(1989)or Michelsen,M. B. &
K.R. Olsen(1999).
vSee e.g. Femandez,R. &J. Glazer(1989),Hailer& Holden(1990)and Shaked,A. &J. Sutton
(1984).
WFor a comprehensiveanalysiswe referto Michelsen, M.B. & K-R.Olsen(1999).
‘iiAll populationestimatesare fromFenham, J. (1998).
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WORKING PAPER
Developing Countries in the Climate Convention.
The Greenhouse Paradox
Abstract. The Developing Countries (DCS) has a special position in the Climate
Convention. While the Industrialised Countries (ICS) – following the Kyoto Protocol
—are committed to reduce their emission of green house gasses the DCS are not. The
DCS bene~t from the abatement undertaken by the ICS, and this formally leaves them
as free riders. The rationality behind free riding is the economic gain. But it is not
obvious, which strategy will give the DCS the largest gain: To j-oin the Climate
Convention or to ‘~ee ride”. The DCsj%ee riding position may be a paradox.
This paper analyses the DCS ‘j?ee riding’’ position in the Climate Convention and try
to explain this position in a theoretical context. The upstream - downstream anlysis,
and the Victim Pays Principle do not explain this position. The Polluter Pays
Principle and the H&vk-Dove game can explain the dl~erent positions of the DCS and
ICS. The Polluter Pays Principle may be based on moral rather than economic
rationali~.
Introduction.
Global warming is caused by the accumulation of so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs)
in the atmosphere. These gases hinder the earth from giving off the heat absorbed
from the sun. The concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere are popularly speaking
‘building a greenhouse’ around the earth. The consequence is that the mean
temperature of the earth’s surface is rising.
The stocks of the three most important GHGs – C02, Cl& and N20 – have, since pre-
industrial times (since about 1750), increased by about 30, 145 and 15 percent
respectively. The C02 concentration is by far the largest of the three. The earth’s
radiative budget is measured in watts per square metre (W m-2) and of the direct
radiative forcing of the long lived GHGs (total 2.45 W m-z) 1.56 W m-2 (60’Yo)is due
to C02, 0.47 W m-2 (20%)is due to CH4 and 0.14 W m-2 (6Yo) is due to NZO.
According to the IPCC the rise in the GHG concentrations is largely a consequence of
human activities. The main source of C02 emission is burning of fossil fuels. For CHQ
the main emission sources are rice paddies, animal husbandry, landfills, biomass
burning and for N20 the main sources are agriculture and biomass burning. (IPCC
1996a). Because the largest contribution to the rise in the concentration of GHGs
comes from industrial fossil fiel burning the industrialised countries are carrying the
main responsibility of the greenhouse effect.
-1-
The consequences of the greenhouse effect is projected in the climate models. Based
on the GHG concentrations reported by IPCC Working Group I and the range of
sensitivities of climate to increases in GHG concentrations, these models project an
increase in global mean surface temperature of about 1-3 .5°C and an associated
increase in sea level of about 15-95 cm. (IPCC 1996c). Climate change influences
eco-systems, agriculture and food production, human health, human infra structure
and water resources management. Regional vulnerability increases as the adaptive
capacity decreases. Because vulnerability of human health and socio-economic
systems firther depends upon economic circumstances and institutional infrastructure,
developing countries are typically more vulnerable than more developed countries
(ibid.).
The international society deals with the greenhouse problem in the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC was an outcome of the
Earth Summit in Rio 1992. The challenges it faces can be divided into the following
tree levels:
Level I: The first, most superior, challenge is about sustainable development and
intergenerational distribution of wealth - i.e. distribution of wealth between
generations. The question raised at this level is how much Greenhouse Gas emission
(GHGs) the current generation can emit without disabling fiture generation’s
possibilities to sustain at least the same level of wealth. This question is actually not a
main problem for social science but - maybe more for natural science. But the close
dependency between emission of GHGs, industrialisation and economic development
makes it to a problem that can be analysed by the tools from social science in general
and economic theory in particular.
ModeIs of economic growth have since the early 1970’s dealt with the problems of
sustainable development }. Comprehensive endogenous growth models, which make it
possible to analyse the effects of economic- and environmental policy to the long run
growth rates, have been developed.
Level II: The long run perspective at level I was the intergenerational distribution of
wealth. In the short run the intragenerationaI distribution of the abatement cost - i .e.
the distribution among countries in the current generation – is a problem of great
concern. At this level the main question is how to implement the abatement needed to
fhlfil the purpose of sustainable development at level I. International environmental
agreements like the Kyoto Protocol institutionalise these efforts for example by
coordinating, implementing and suggesting instruments such as command and
control, tradable quotas (TQs), joint implementation (JI), environmental investment
fimds and voluntary agreements.
The choice between these instruments is connected to issues such as cost efficiency,
participation and free riding, burden sharing and environmental efficiency. What is
wanted is a maximum of abatement at lowest possible cost (cost efficiency), but there
may be other important objectives or demands, for example that the countries, which
‘ See e.g. Solow R. 1978,DasghubtaP. and G. Heal 1978.For a comparativeanalysisof these two
papers,see RoseOlsen, 1993.
‘ See e.g. Smulders,S.A. (1995),Smulders,S.A.&A. Bovenberg(1995), LighartJ.E & F.vander
Ploeg 1994,1995.
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so far has been responsible for the increase in the concentration emission, must pay
the largest share of the abatement cost. Moreover, the special characteristics of the
greenhouse problem demand that as many countries as possible should participate in
the abatement efforts (see below). If not, there is a risk that the effect of abatement
from only a group of countries is being offset by increased emissions in other
countries. This is the so-called leakage effects.
Game theoretic models are leading in the literature on the participatiodfree rider
problems in international agrements3, but these models have also been used to explore
economic instruments such as JI and TQ4. Partial or simple general equilibrium
models are used to study the instruments - es ecially taxes, TQ and J15. Also applied
!
work has been done on economic instruments .
Level III: This level deals with the national implementation of the international
agreements’. The national governments have the same list of economic instruments
available as the international authorities, but here the actors are firms, consumers,
NGOS’, environmental organisations etc.. At level III the questions are more related
to the given country structural characteristics such as, level of economic development,
sector analysis, main emission sources, level of privatisation and political system’.
The present paper analyses level II. The diagram below summarises the ‘3 level-
approach’.
Level I Level II Global Level III
Global
reduction
ä
Sustainable äInternational instruments
AbatementNationalmitigation~
.w~l
Ldevelopment.
The figure shows
‘Fnviromnentalgreements IffortsL_l
that the outcome at level I is a global reduction goal that must be
institutionalised ;n an intemat;onal ;~ernent at level II. The outcome at level 11 is an
agreed set of instruments, which the international society will use to reach the goal.
Finally, these instruments must be implemented in mitigation efforts at the national
level (level III). At level III the de facto abatement is camied out. What is important
‘ See e.g.; BarrettS. 1991, 1994a, HealG. 1994,CarrarroC. and D. Siniscalco1993,Carraro,C. and
M. Botteon 1997a,1997bforgametheoreticanalysisof selfenforcinginternationalagrements.Heel M.
and K. Schneider 1997for a gametheoreticanalyseof free rider incentivesand JI.
‘ See e.g.;, BarrettS. 1993b, 1995for gameanalysisof JI. KaitalaV. & Pohjola,M. 1991,MalerK.G.
1989for gameanalysisof the acid rainproblem.Heel, M. 1997dfor gametheoreticexplorationof the
TQ and internationaltaxes in the Greenhouseproblem
‘ See e.g.; Baumoland Oates 1988for basictheory,Heel M. 1997a,b,c for internationaltaxes andTQ,
Bohm P. 1992, 1994a,1994b,1997b,Bohm,P & Car16n1997and Bohm, P.& Larsen 1994forTQ and
JI analysis.
‘ See e.g.; Rose and Stevens 1993,Larsen,B. and A. Shah 1994,Halsnm K. 1998for appliedanalysis
of TQ.
‘ See e.g. UNEP CollaboratingCentre 1998for guidelinesfor climatechangemitigationassessmentin
DC’S.Severalcountrystudieshaveemergedfromthese guidelines.
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from this ‘flow-figure’ is that even though our focus will be on level II, and the
economic instruments in international agrements, it must be keept in mind that these
instruments must fulfil the goals from level I, and have to be implemented at level III.
In other words the figure show that there is a large degree of interdependency between
the tree levels.
1. International transboundary pollution
Some of the problems to the UNFCCC can be explained by the theory of international
transboundary pollution. Because the Greenhouse Problem is caused by the
accumulated amount of GHGs, and because the GHGs are pollutants with a global
deposition, the economics of regulating emission of greenhouse gases may be seen as
a special case of the economics of regulating international transboundary pollution.
To see this, consider the following general equilibrium model (Based on Heel
1997a; 12-24)8.
Consider a set of N open economies where the consumption in country i is equal to
production plus rents from capital stock, i.e.
Ci =j(ki,ll,e~+r(ki* - k~
where the capital k, labour 1 and emissions e, are inputs in production, k* is domestic
owned capital - hence if ki*>ki country i earns rent. Domestic production is given by
where employment, 1, is assumed to be exogenously given. Emissions, e, are
considered as input in the production, meaning that environmental resources, such as
clean air, are used in the production. The fimction f is homogeneous of degree one and
the derivates, fk J and j~ are assumed to be positive. production increases when the
input of emissions increases. The derivative with respect to emissions, fe, is assumed
to be positive, if e<e0(7c,~, or zero. e“ is the emission level given by fe =0. Increasing
the emission level above e“ does not increase production.
Emissions increase production, but decrease the environmental standard. The
transboundary environmental problem is characterised by, the dependency of the
environmental standard in country i on emissions from other countries:
(Zi ‘Zi cl,..., ej,..., e,v) and z~>0.
where z, is the environmental variable and ej is the emission from country j. There are
as noted above N countries. Assume that the relationship between the vectors z and e
are linear so that z=zle, where A, is the so-called transportation matrix. An element of
the transportation matrix au refers to the amount of emission from country i that result
in environmental damage in countryj - hence an increase in emissions increases z and
decreases the environmental standard.
‘ Equationsare all taken fromHeels example.The modelwasoriginallystudiedby Oatesand Schwab
1988.
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A pareto optimal allocation of capital and emissions – from an international social
planners view – solves the following:
max ~i@Ui(Ci, &#?@h~, where UC>0, U= ~ O
k,e
s. t.
Whereul () istheutility function ofcountry i and aisaparameter larger tha zero.
The utility of country i, depends on the national level of consumption ci and on the
amount of pollution that influences its own environment. -&ehahi is the sum of the
pollution from other countries (and country i itself) that ends up in country i.
The maximisation problem represents a choise between consumption and
environmental standard.
Utility is maximised subject to appropriate limitations on consumption and capital;
the sum of the countries consumption cannot exceed the sum of production fifi, 1,e))
and the sum of capital used as input may not exceed the sum of domestic owned
capital k*. Assuming that k* and 1 are exogenously given, maximisation leads to the
Pareto conditions below:
(*)
(**)
fikfil,ll,el) = . ..= fNkfiN,IN,eN)
5efii,li)eJ = ~,ay(+) Vi
jc
The first equation (*) show that the marginal product of capital used within the
countries are equalised among countries. The second equation is more interesting. The
left hand side show the marginal product of emissions (remember it is positive). The
marginal product of emissions in country i can be interpreted as the marginal
abatement cost in that country i. This is a consequence of the way the production
function is constructed: removing (or abating) one unit of emissions will cause the
production to fall by& and this may be interpreted as the abatement -cost. On the
U,z
right hand side — the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
U,c ‘
environmental standard in countryj, can be interpreted as the marginal costs in utility
terms in country j, when consumption (and emissions) increases and the
environmental standard decreases (remember that UZ<O). av is the coefficient of
emission from country i to country j. The right hand side is equal to the sum of the
marginal costs in utility terms from one unit increase in emissions in country i.
The solution to the international social planners problem is hence that each country
uses emissions in the production up to the point, where the marginal product of
emissions are equal to the sum of the marginal costs. Or expressed in another way:
that each country abates until marginal abatement costs equals the sum of marginal
environmental benefit.
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The decentralised (or non-co-operative), national solution to the maximisation
problem is (see Heel 1997; 13):
(***)
which means that country i will choose to emit up to the point where the marginal
benefits are equal to the country’s own marginal costs. Or, the country will choose to
abate until the marginal abatement costs in country i equal the country’s own marginal
environmental benefit. Obviously the non co-operative abatement level is lower than
in (**).
The special characteristic of the GHG problem means that all elements in the
transportation matrix equals 1, because the environmental cost are the same no matter
the origin of the emissions (GHGs are uniform pollutants).
An optimal international agrement with respect to the climate problem would hence
involve the implementation of (**), where ay = 1. The international regulation needed
for that special vaIue of ay is relatively simple? because ao=l imply an optimal
abatement regime, where marginal abatement costs are the same in all countries.
An international optimal emission tax would be equal to:
which means that it should be a uniform tax rate. With respect to tradable emissions
permits it means that these can be traded on a one for one basis - i.e. the value of an
emission unit in country i is equal to the value of an emission unit in country j (see
e.g. Baumol and Oates 1988; ch. 12 for analysis of emission trading where permits
can not be traded on a 1:1 basis).
Regulating uniform pollutants is however a problem because it demands a global
agreement. Other transboundary environmental problems, as e.g. the acid rain
problem, can be solved by bilateral or regional agreements (but have the problem of
being caused by non uniform pollutants where transportation coefficients are not
equal to 1 9). The problem achieving the optimal solution given by (**) is that each
country would be better of if it enjoys the gains from other countries abatement, while
itself only abates according to (***). In other words each country has free rider
incentives. The major problem with free riding is that the abatement, undertaken by
the international agrement, will be lower than the optimal level indicated by (**),
because some countries (the free riders) will only undertake abatement as indicated
by (***) ’”.
“See e.g. Maler 1989and Katialaand Pohjola 1991for studiesof the acid rain problemwhereregional
and bilateralagreementsare used.
‘“Thereare of courseotherproblemsconnectedto reachingthe optimalsolution.For discussionson
secondbest solutionsSee e.g. Baumol& Oates(1988)or Hoe] 1997%14-15)
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Because climate change is caused by unljiorm pollutants an optimal agreement
demand global participation. As a consequence the climate problem is more exposed
and vulnerable to free riding.
Another problem connected to free riding is the already mentioned leakage effects.
Free riding arises when countries, that benefit from global abatement, do not
contribute to the abatement. Leakages arise when abatement by the co-operating
countries leads to increased emissions in the non co-operating countries. Leakage
effects reduce, and maybe offset, the environmental impacts of the cooperating
countries abatement. Leakage effects most often arise through trade effects – for
example shifts in prices, comparative advantages and world demand on carbon
intensive products – and may therefore be reduced through trade policies. Leakages
based on co-operating countries net-import of carbon intensive goods from non
cooperative countries, may be reduced through appropriate tariffs (positive or
negative) (Heel 1994, 1997a; 30-34, Barret 1994b; 12-23). It may, however, be a
problem to use trade policies to reduce leakages. First of all, because it might be in
conflict with WTO rules, and second because it might be undesirable to use this
policy, because the non-participating countries are DCS, who are especially vulnerable
to trade restrictions.
The evidence on leakage effects are rather blurred, and while some studies result in
leakage rates of 70-80% (Pezzey 1992), other result in leakage rates of only 1,4-
11,9Y0 (Oliveira-Ma.rtins et al. 1992). Nevertheless, the IPCC determines leakage as a
potential serious problem (IPCC 1996b; 425).
The Kyoto Protocol is subject to free riding, or limited participation, because the so-
called annex I countries, which are identical to the Industrialised Countries (ICS), are
committed to fixed emission reduction targets and abatement, while the so-called non-
annex I countries, which are identical to the Developing Countries (DCS), are not
committed.
Free riding in international environmental agreements (IEA) is a situation where a
country: ‘receive the benefit of the other countryh abatement without having to incur
abatement costs itselj’ (Barrett, 1992a; 73). Relating this definition to the Kyoto
Protocol, where only ICS are committed, and where the benefits from the abatement
efforts is a “global public good”, leaves the non-committed DCS as de facto free
riders. The problem with free riding is that it results in less than optimal abatement, a)
because the free riding countries are not intemalising the externalities, and b) because
leakage effects may arise.
The term ‘Limited participation’ is often used to define the situation that not all
countries join an international agreement and therefore this definition more directly
covers the DCS position in the UNFCCC because these countries do not join the
Kyoto Protocol. The problem with limited participation is again that it results in less
than optimal abatement and leakage effects. The above definition of free riding is thus
identical to the definition of limited participation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will describe the free riding
situation in the UIJFCCC. The current free rider situation is defined as a paradox; the
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greenhouse paradox. Section 3 will analyse free riding in connection to the theoretic
frameworks most often used to analyse this phenomenon.
2. Free rider incentives in the UNFCCC
This section specify the different aspects of the free riding situation in the UNFCCC.
By illustrating the responsibility asymmetries resulting from differences in past,
current and fbture emissions, section 2.1 analyse the moral aspect. Section 2.2
describes the political split between the ICS and DCS by sketching the negotiation
history of the UNFCCC, the implicit inclusion of the polluter pays principle in the
convention text and the main standpoints of the most critical DC actors. Section 2.3
determines the free rider situation in a game theoretic context and argue that this
situation cannot be a stable equilibrium unless specific assumptions are made.
2.1 UNFCCC and responsibility.
The greenhouse effect is caused by the accumulation of GHG’s - therefore
responsibility measures have to look at cumulated GHG emission. This section will
make clear that the responsibility pattern change over time, by looking at past, current
and future emission from the ICS and the DCS.
Past emission.
Estimates of past C02 emission show a ciear tendency. First of all the emission data
show a sharp rise in emissions after the industrial revolution. Since then a large
proportion of the increase in emissions originated from the burning of fossil fiels. As
a consequence it is the industrialised countries that are responsible for the largest
proportion of the GHG accumulation. Estimates of the cumulated COZ emissions
from 1860-1986 show that ICS are responsible for 86’% of the increased emissions,
and DCS for 16°/0– if only energy sources are looked at. If biota are included, the ICS
are responsible for 68-80°/0 of the cumulated COZ emissions, and DCS for the
remaining 20-32°/0 (Subak, 1994;59). In this perspective there is no doubt that the
historic responsibility lies on the shoulders of the industrialised countries. This clear
historic responsibility of the ICS means that the UNFCCC address the need for IC
leadership. More will be said about this in the section 2.2.
Current emission
Estimates of current emissions are much more comprehensive than past emissions,
and it is possible to include other GHG’s than C02. The commitments of the annex I
countries cover (according to article 3 and annex A of the Kyoto Protocol) emissions
of 6 GHG’s from 5 sectors. The 6 GHGs are the following of which we will limit the
analysis to the first 3.
~ Carbon Dioxide (COZ)
~ lMethane (CH4)
o Nitrous oxide (N20)
o Hydrofluorcarbons (HFCS)
o Perfluorocarbons (PFCS)
o Sulphur hexafluonde (SF6)
When more than 1 GHG is included in emission estimates one needs to convert the
different gases to a common unit. Working group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on
-8-
,..
Climate Change (IPCC) calculate the so-called Global Warming Potentials (GWP)
which can be used to convert emission estimates into COZ equivalents. Throughout
the section we use the 100 years time horizon which means that Cm estimates shall
be multiplied with 21 GWP and NzO shall be multiplied with310 (IPCC 1995a; table
2.9)
As an indication of some of the consequences of including more than C02 in the
estimates we can look at the distribution of emission beween DC’ and ICS in 1993 in
table 2.1.1.
If oniy carbon dioxide is included, the distribution is 49’%0for DCS and 5 l% for ICS. If
we include CH4 and N20, this allocation will be reversed so that DCS now account for
51 ‘Yoof total emission. This is mostly due to a relatively large emission of methane
from the agricultural sector in the DCS. In a responsibility perspective it therefore
does not seem favorable for the DCS that all three GHG’s are included. This is
because the DCS responsibility is larger, and because it could give arguments for more
comprehensive commitments to the DCS (or lower initial quota allocations in a TQ
regime). (What is favorable to the DCS is also dependent on the future development
of each of the tree gasses).
As seen from table 2.1.1 the exclusion of landuse change and forestry is crucial to the
distribution of emission between ICS and DCS. If we extract landuse change and
forestry from the pure C02 case, the DCS only account for 36’%0of global emission
compared to 49°/0 when it is included. If we do the same extraction from the case with
three GHG’s the DCS share falls from 510/0 to 410/O. This indicates that it ceteris
paribus could be in the interest of the DCS that forestry is excluded in emission
estimates, and that only C02 is included, because this would give them relatively low
responsibility, and therefore low commitments or large initial quotas.
Table 2.1.1 Relative share of emission in 1993
1993
Non-annex countries (DC) Annex I countries (IC),
C02 49’% 51 0/0
CO1,NZO,CHd 51’?40 dgyo
COZexcl. forestry 360/0 64’XO
COI, NzO, CH.4excl. forestry dlyo 59’%0
Source:calculationsbased on Fenhann(1998)
The table indicates that there is a significant degree of convergence in current
emissions compared to past, but it is much affected by the choice of GHG’s and
sectors. Still it should be remembered that it is the accumulated emissions that reflect
the responsibility pattern, and that the DCS need allowances to higher emission rates
to converge to the same level of wealth as the ICS.
Emissions per capita has been proposed as another responsibility measure. In 1993 the
world population were about 5,5 billions of which the 4,3 billion lived in the DCS.
This means that almost 80’% of the world population lives in the DCS and leaves the
reduction responsibility on the ICS. 11
‘‘The populationestimatesare takenfromFenhann(1998)
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Future emissions.
It must be expected that DCS emissions, because of increasing economic growth rates,
will rise in the fiture. At the same time the emissions from the ICS will tend to fall
because of the efforts to fidfil their commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. Fenhann
(1998) has estimated fiture emissions of COZ, NzO, and CH4 from ICS and DCS
respectively 12.The DCS’ and ICS’ relative share of emissions are shown in table 2.1.2
below.
Table 2.1.2 Relative share of emission in 2020-25
., 2020-25
.,.. . .
. . Non-annex countries (DC) Annex I countries (IC)
C02 64% 360/0
COZ, NZO, CH4 64% 360/0
COZ excl. forestry 58’%0 42%
COZ,NZO,CH.jexcl.forestry 58% 42V0
Source:calculationsbasedon Fenhann(1998)
The table shows that no matter which of GHG’s and sectors that is included, the DCS
has the largest share of total emission. At the same time there is no longer a difference
between the case where only COZ is included and the case where alI three GHG’s are
included. This is largely due to a convergence of emission patterns.
The convergence pattern is explained by the facts that compared to the 1993 emission
pattern the DCS has increased the share of C02 emission from the energy sector while
the share of Cl& emissions from the agricultural sector, which is the second largest,
has fallen. The opposite is true for the ICS; falling importance of COZ emissions from
the energy and risen importance of CH4 from the agricultural sector (see Fenhann
1998 figure 2-4).
Excluding forestry still lowers the DCS share of total emission but again it does not
matter whether only C02 or all three GHG’s are included. The 2020-25 emissions are
part[y due to the expected rise in world population of 2,4 billion people of which the
2,1 billion in the DCS13. In a per capita view the responsibility therefore still rests on
the ICS.
Responsible for more than 50% of annual global emissions, it is however inevitable
that the DCS will have to participate in fiture emission reduction efforts, if the
greenhouse problem is to be solved.
2.2 The Free riding situation in the UNFCCC
This section summarises the negotiation history of the UNFCCC, and summarises the
climate policies of some of the important DC actors.
The UiVFCCC history
The UNFCCC where opened for ratification on the Earth Summit in Rio 1992. In
1994 it was ratified by fifty nations and was then taken in to force. Basically the
UNFCCC consists of ‘one objective for emission reduction, three principles for
‘2The estimatesare basedon a assumptionof mediumpopulationgrowth(Fenhann 1998; 13)
“ These populationestimatesare fromFenhann(1998)and is used in his estimatesof futureemissions.
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climate policy, five permanent institutions and the recently agreed Kyoto Protocol’
(Bmsting, G. and G. Fermann, 1997).
The objective of the UNFCCC is stated in article 2 of the convention as: ‘stabilisation
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that WOUMprevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time-j?ame suflcient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’ (UNFCCC 1997a; art. 2
). In the Kyoto Protocol this objective has been made operational by binding reduction
commitments.
Article 3 of the convention defines three principles for the global action against
climate change: Firstly the precautionary principle, which defend taking action
despite the uncertainty comected to the greenhouse effect. Secondly the principle of
cost-effectiveness take ‘into account that policies and measures to deal with climate
change should .... ensure global bene@ts at lowest possible cost’ (ibid. ; art. 3.3).
Thirdly the principle of equity is addressed to secure awareness of the different
responsibilities and capabilities among parties. In this way paragraph 1 in article 3
states that ‘Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the Ieai# (ibid. ;
art. 3.1 ) and paragraph 2 defines the vulnerable situation for DCS by ‘especially those
(countries) that are particular vulnerable to the adverse eflects of climate change,
and those Parties, especially developing Parties, that would have to bear a
disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full
consideration.’ (ibid. ; art. 3.2).
The five permanent institutions are i) The Conference of the Parties (COP) which is
the decision making body of he Convention. ii) The Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) made responsible for the provision of timely
information and advice on scientific and technological matters. iii) The Subsidiary
Body for Implementation (SBI) with the purpose of assisting the COP in its
assessment and review of the implementation of the Convention. iv) The UNFCCC
Secretariat made permanent by the COP-1 session and, finally, v) a financial
mechanism for the provision of financial resources based on grants or concessionaire
financing working through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
Since ratification in 1994 four sessions in the decision making body, COP, has been
undertaken. The COP- 1 meeting took place in Berlin in 1995. The most important
outcome of this session was the Berlin mandate. With the Berlin mandate it was
agreed that the current emissions reductions were inadequate if the greenhouse effect
were to be stabilised - commitment were found to be needed. Furthermore it was
agreed that developing countries should be free from obligations to reduce emissions.
A negotiation group; the Ad hoc Group of the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), were
established with the purpose of finishing the negotiations of reduction commitments
before the end of 1997.
The COP-2 meeting took place in Geneva in 1996 and may be seen as an interim
negotiation. In Geneva the main outcome were the ‘Geneva declaration’, where it was
confirmed that the AGBM should aim at a legally binding protocol or another legal
instrument pursuing objectives for emission limitations within certain time frames.
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The success with agreeing on the aim at legally binding commitments came through
due to the shift in position from the USA. USA supported for the first time legally
binding commitment on the conditions that ‘activities implemented jointly’ and
emission trading were to be part of any future regime (Bmsting, G. and G. Fermanrt;
1997).
The 8th meeting in the AGBM were held in October 1997 and this was the final call
for the parties to set out negotiation objectives for binding emission reductions. The
main bargaining arose among the EU and the USA which started out with very
different ambitions. The EU proposal was to reduce emission 15% below 1990 level
in 2010, while the USA proposal were less ambiguous; only to stabilise emissions at
1990 level in 2008-2012. Furthermore the USA demanded that the DCS should
commit as well. Just before the COP-3 session in Kyoto a negotiation text where
agreed upon in the AGBM and hard negotiation followed.
The COP-3 session in Kyoto in November 1997 succeeded in reaching an agreement
on a protocol defining legally binding commitments for the annex I countries. The
ambition were however not that compelling: to reach an emission level 5°/0 below
1990 level within 2008-2012. The obligations were distributed non-uniformly among
the annex I countries, such that some countries should reduce by e.g. 8% below 1990
level (e.g. the EU) while others were allowed to increase their emission (e.g.
Norway). The discussions on joint implementation and emission trading were largely
removed to be solved in the COP-4 session in Buenos Aires, but by a proposal by
USA and Brazil the Clean Development Mechanism were defined in article 12 of the
Protocol.
The COP-4 meeting in Buenos Aires laid down an action plan for the negotiations
leading to definition of rules for the flexible mechanisms. Negotiations has to be
completed before the COP-6 meeting in 2000. In this way it could be argued that the
COP-4 meeting share the interim negotiation perspective with the COP-2 meeting. The
political willingness to flexible mechanisms may be seen as strengthened during the
COP-4 sessions, but final decisions were as noted moved to 2000.
The DCS’ political posi~ion.
To further describe the free riding position of the DCS the political positions on
climate change for some of the leading countries in the G-77 will shortly be
summarised.
The group of non-annex countries is covering countries at very different levels of
economic development. In connection to the free rider deterrence perspective three
non annex developing countries are obvious candidates for individual investigation;
China, India and Brazil. This is first of all because they individually are relatively
large emitters and second because they have all played a central role in shaping the
position of the group of DCs - the G-77.
The developing countries are formally united in the so called G-77 grouping formed
in 1960 in preparation for the UN Conference on Trade and Development. Even
though China is not formally a member of this group drafts from the group has, due to
China’s huge size and influence in world politics, typically been on the behalf of’ G-
77 and China’. In practice however the G-77 grouping is divided into subgroups such
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as semi-industrialised-, oil producing- and small island countries because of the
relatively large differences among the member countries. The semi-industrialised
group included initially the three large countries: Chin% lndia and Brazil, but (luring
the negotiations of the International Negotiating Committee preparing for the UNCED
in Rio 1992 the group was split because of leadership-struggles. Still China and India
is combating on the question of who should lead the group (Beuermann, C. 1997).
China
Before the Rio 1992 meeting China hosted a Ministerial Conference of Developing
Countries on Environment and Development that resulted in the Beijing declaration.
This declaration stated the need for differentiated responsibilities between developing
and developed countries, and stated that the latter must provide adequate technology
transfer and financing (IEA 1995/96; 43). In the Climate negotiation as well as in
negotiations of other international environmental problems China is thus one of the
leading developing countries advocating the need for diversified responsibility.
The climate change characteristics of China can shortly be defined by 6 factors:
. very high total emission level and very low emission level per capita
l ‘no commitment’ policy
. extremely low energy efficiency partly because relatively low energy prices
. coal as the current main source and because of huge reserves also in the fiiture
. political awareness of the responsibility of the industrialised world and ambitions
to lead the group of developing countries
. relatively high vulnerability to global warming, but with regional differences.
The ‘no commitment’ policy is a key factor and can be explained mainly by the
Chinese awareness and focus on the responsibility of the industrialised world
(grounded in a polluter pays awareness) and on the Chinese goal of using the
country’s natural resources in promoting economic development and environmental
goals as stated in the Beijing declaration. Commitments is, in this perspective, seen as
conflicting with national sovereignty and is because of this - and because of lack of
financial resources - neglected (ibid.).
India
India can be characterised as a country with relatively high emissions of greenhouse
gasses but very low per capita emissions. The Indian position on climate change is
extremely based on the awareness of the ICS responsibility, and on the need for a per
capita view on burden sharing. But because the most dominant national concerns are
owpoverty alleviation, population growth and employment a national climate strategy
is rather absent. (Jacobsen, S. 1998).
Brazil.
In the greenhouse deb~te in the 1980’s, Brazil was thought of as the really ‘bad guy’
because of the deforestation of the amazon jungle. The amazon was largely regarded
as the ‘lounges of the earth’ and as the factual cause of the greenhouse effect. It later
appeared that the consequences of the Brazilian deforestation was largely exaggerated
(Kasa, S., 1997), but this old debate continues to be one of the main characteristic of
the Brazilian position in the global warming problem.
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It has been argued that there has been a clear-cut shift in the Brazilian position on
climate change (ibid.), but nevertheless focus has always been on the responsibility of
the industrialised countries. During the last decades the Brazilian position on climate
change has been softened, both because of shifting governments, but also because of
the ongoing democratisation process that shifts the power away from the military that
have a strong interest in the Amazon region. The military see deforestation of the
amazon as a security factor because cutting forest in the border regions is the only
way to monitor the borders. As a consequence they are strong opponents of
limitations in the rights to cut forests.
2.3 Defining Free riding in the UNFCCC
Dividing the parties of the UNFCCC into two main groups, the annex I countries –
identical with the Ics – and the non-annex I countries – identical to the DCS – leaves
the last as free riders in a limited participation definition.
One free rider argument is that the DCS are not responsible of the current problem of
global warming and hence are not morally obliged to undertake abatement. This
position could be justified from section 2.1 on responsibility – at least if the per capita
perspective was taken. It could also be justified from the text of the UNFCCC quoted
in section 2.2. Especially article 3 in the Climate Convention stated a clear awareness
of the ICS responsibility to take the lead. The article actually indicates an implicit
adoption of the polluter pays principle in the UNFCCC. In the climate case, this
principle states that the actors who emits GHG’s, must finance the abatement needed
to slow down the accumulation of GHGs. The polluter pays principle (PPP) was first
indicated in the Stockhoim Cotierence in 1972 and adopted by the OECD as a
guideline for domestic environmental policies the same year (Maler 1992; 409). The
application to international environmental problems is straightforward and the
principle has been presumed in most international environmental conventions since
(ibid.; 41 O). Article 3 in the UNFCCC and the free rider ‘allowances’ in the Kyoto
Protocol indicates that the PPP also is presumed in the Climate Convention.
Another reason for DCS to free ride is connected to the large asymmetry among ICS
and DCS. Because the DCS economies are less developed and hence more vulnerable
to the cost of undertaking abatement, participation in the Kyoto Protocol might
weaken their ability to improve their level of development, or even their possibility to
fidfil basic human needs.
Studies of free riding are often modelled in a game theoretic context and for later use
we find it convenient to define the free riding situation in the UNFCCC by the
following game theoretic illustration. Figure 2.3.1 show a strategic game box where
the two players are the ICS and the DCS. There are two possible policy actions: Abate
(a) or pollute (p). Acting strategically, each of the two players will try to maximise
his/her own payoff taken the opponents strategy for given. The outcome of such
strategic interaction is the so-called Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 2.3.1 The Greenhouse Paradox.
IC
(a) (P)
DC
(a)
(P)
According to the analysis in this paperr the current negotiation situation is to be found
in the lowest left hand box (shaded). This defines a situation where the ICS are abating
and the DCS are polluting. Because the DCS enjoy the gains from ICS abatement they
can be defined as free riders. To solve the free riding (limited participation) problem
is to induce the DCS to participate in abatement efforts. In figure 2.3.1 this is indicated
by the arrow - i.e. a movement from the present situation where DCS play ~) and ICS
play (a) to a situation where both play (a).
The problem is that such a movement seems to be impossible because of the political
and moral factors defting the DCS position. In traditional game theoretic studies a
movement to the (a,a) situation can fail to incur, either because it will not be pareto
improving or because it is an unstable situation. With respect to the UNFCCC (a,a)
could indeed be unstable, because both parties would be better off (in economic
terms) if s/he polluted, and at the same time gained from the other parts abatement
efforts.
But how do we explain the fact that the ICS seem to accept the present (@ situation?
The situation can hardly be an equilibrium based on economic rationality arguments
because ICS are characterised by both relatively high cost and low damage? The (p,a)
situation may be defined as a paradox, that cannot be explained without including the
PPP in the economic analysis.
The definition of a Pareto improvement is: A movement that leaves at least one part
better off and no-one worse off (compared to the initial situation).
According to the DCS political standpoint, they find themselves worse off if they at
present are forced to abate – hence this cannot be pareto improving. But according to
findings in many studies, a global regime of tradable quotas would give absolute gains
to the DCS (Bohm, 1994b), (Larsen and Shah, 1994). A global regime of tradable
quotas will be equal to the (a,a) regime in figure 2.3.1 because DCS would be
committed by the allocated emission quotas.
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—In the remaining of the paper the UNFCCC situation illustrated by the shaded area in
figure 2.3.1 will be referred to as the Greenhouse paradox, because of the seemingly
paradox that ICS accept to abate, and the DCS reject moving to (a,a), even if this could
give them absolute gains. In other words there is a conflict between conventional,
economic rational free rider analysis and the fact that most international conventions
presume the PPP, which is not based on equity considerations.
2 Theoretic explanations.
This section analyse the Greenhouse Paradox defined above. It is analysed whether
the Greenhouse Paradox can be explained by one of the two well known games, the
Prisoners Dilemma and the Hawk-Dove games. Section 3.1 analyses the Prisoners
Dilemma and section 3.2 the Hawk-Dove game.
3.1 Free riding and the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) - considerations on moral and
asymmetry.
Because global warming is connected to the global accumulation of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere, an optimal solution will demand that each country undertakes
abatement until its marginal abatement cost equals the sum of global marginaI
environmental costs as shown by (**) section 1. Because all elements in the transport
matrix equals 1 in the GHG case, the result is equalisation of marginal abatement
costs among countries;
If a country decides to free ride, it is only concerned about individual optimality and
not about world optimality, therefore it chooses either; to equalise marginal cost to its
own marginal damage or not to abate at all. With respect to global warming there is a
huge possibilitythat free riding countries will choose not to abate at all because the
main environmental damages incur in the future. This means that abatement policies
might be overshadowed by more short run policies.
The PD game is shown in figure 3.1.1.
Figure 3.1.1: the prisoners dilemma
B
(a) (P)
A
(a)
(P)
3,3 1,4
4,1 2,2
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The payoffs in figure 3.1.1 are symmetric. The left hand payoff belongs to country A
and the right hand payoff belongs to country B. NOW each country will try to
maximise its own payoff, given the strategy of the other country. In this way countrY
A’s best reaction, if country B chooses abatement (a), is to choose pollute (p) and get
payoff 4 instead of 3. If country B chooses pollute (p), it will still be optimal for
country A to choose pollute (p) and get 2 instead of 1. Hence, pollute is dominant
strategy for country A and because of symmetry also for country B. This means that
(P, P) is an equilibri~ – forrnally knOVVIIas the Nash equilibriwn – because no
country can be better off given the other country’s strategy.
However, if the two countries could agee on choosing abatement and also be sure
that none of them will defect, then both will get an even higher payoff (3 instead of
2). Moving from (p,p) to (a,a) is therefore Pareto improving. The problem is that (a,a)
is not stable because the incentives to defect from such an agreement is very large.
Both countries would get the largest payoff by defecting and joining the benefits from
the other country’s abatement, while it itself pollute – i.e. by free riding (a pay-off of
4 instead of 3). In a one shot game the Nash equilibrium will, as described above, be
(p) P) while the ~FCCC equilibrium according to the greenhouse paradox in figure
2.3.1 is (a,p). This game cannot explain the free riding situation in the UNFCCC as
defined in section 2.
There is however one important discussion that can be extracted from the PD game -
namely the discussion of free rider deterrence. This discussion will shortly be
introduced before moving to the inclusion of asymmetries in the PD.
Trigger strategies or binding commitments?
If allowed for repeated games it might be possible to sustain the pareto optimal
outcome (a,a). This could be done by using the so-called ‘grim strategy’ illustrated
below (Osborne & Rubinstein 1996; 141).
Figure 3.1.2: ‘the grim strategy>.
{(a,a)} all outcomes
a; a
all outcomesexcept {(a,a)}
In this strategy the (a,a) situation can be sustained because (p,p) will be played in all
following periods if one of the players defect from the abatement strategy. Hence only
if the benefit from defecting in one period exceeds the loss from playing (p,p) ever
after it will be optimal to defect from the abatement agreement. Other strategies where
punishment force the players to stick to the (a,a) agreement or legally binding
commitments may also make the agreement stable.
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The grim ‘strategy’ is a so-called trigger strategy and the literature on International
Environmental Agreements (IEA) has a debate over whether trigger strategies or
binding commitments are the most appropriate mechanism to deter free riding. The
debate will shortly be summarised in the following. Barrett (1994a) uses the trigger
approach because he does not bel~ that commitments are possible in the
international society. He argues, that m every international agreement or convention
on the environment, there is an article or paragraph stating the possibility that a
country is allowed to leave the agreement. Therefore commitments are never more
binding than, if a country wishes to pull out, it can do S014.
Barrett (1992; 83-86) argues that commitments will hardly be credible because no
legal authority exists to make sure that sovereign states stick to their commitments
and because commitment will seldom be individually rational, To keep countries from
free riding, the agreement has instead to be made selfenforcing (ibid.; 86 and Barrett
1994a). This can be done through a reward/punishment strategy as follows: ‘When a
country joins the international agrement, the other signatories increase their
abatement levels, and hence reward the country for acceding to the agreement,- when
a country withdraws , the remaining signatories reduce their abatement levels, and
hence punish the country for withdrawingfiom the agreement. ‘ (ibid.; 1).
This trigger strategy involves use of abatement and pollution measures as reward and
punishment instruments, but although it might be a credible way to make a coalition
self-enforcing, abatement measures might not be persuasive enough. The reason is
that the environmental darnage is expected to incur in the future and that more short
run perspectives often motivate governments. Most analyses of self-enforcing
agreements (including Barrett’s own) also show that stable coalitions will only
contain a small number of countries (less than 4) 15.The intuitive explanation for the
low participation is simpIe; as the size of the coalition increases the gains from free
riding increases - hence only small coalitions with small free rider gains can ‘survive’.
Carraro, C. and D. Siniscalco (1993) challenges the above ‘trigger-view’ by arguing
that using abatement/poI1ution as rewardlpunishment is not very advantageous. Most
environmental agreements can on the contrary be characterised by ‘co-operative
behaviour among the individual countries involved; they usually have only a sub-
group of the negotiating countries as signatories @artial co-operation); and they tend
to use various forms of transfers, typically to the developing countries, as a key
instrument for increasing the number of signatories.’ (ibid.; 310). Instead of trigger
strategies, transfers are argued to increase participation, reduce free riding and keep
coalitions stable. Their analyses show that, only together with binding commitments
transfers are able to lead to co-operation. With binding commitments it is possibIe to
sustain co-operation by all countries.
To sum up on the above., It is possible to move from the Nash equilibrium (p,p) in the
PD to a pareto improving situation (a,a), if trigger strategies or binding commitments
are used. The ‘equilibrium’ in the greenhouse paradox is @,a) and moving to (a,a) is
not expected (by the DCS themselves) to be pareto improving. From this it appears
that the PD cannot explain ICS and DCS behaviour in the climate convention.
“ On a PhD seminarin September1998,arrangedby the Danishnetworkof environmentaleconomists,
Barretthimselfstatedthis viewseveraltimes.
“ See Barrett 1992a,1994a,1995and Carraro& Siniscalco1993.
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Remember however that the PD is a symmetric game. Below asymmetries are
incorporated.
Incorporating asymmetries - the upstream downstream scenario.
The payoffs inserted in figure 3.1.1 are results of underlying payoff fimctions
consisting of parameters affected by the abatement policies. If we look more closely
at country i’s payoff function, for example the one given below, we can see that
symmetry involves identical production fictions, cost functions and benefit
functions ‘b.
(3.1.1) Pi(at A) = Bi(A) - (Yi(aj + Ci(aJ , i=IC, DC
Bi(A) is country i’s benefit from abatement (avoiding environmental damages). This
factor is effected by the global abatement level A, equal to aDc + arc. yi(a~ is country
i‘s decrease in production as a consequence of abatement and finally Ci(a) is country
i‘s abatement costs.
Notice that ai = O describe the situation where country i plays pollute. Country i‘s
payoff in this situation is equal to the benefit obtained from other countries abatement
efforts.
The following asymmetries can for various reasons be expected between ICS and
DCS;
BDC@)>B@)
(3.1.2) YDC(a~> ‘IC(a~
CDC(a~<CIC(a~
First of all the benefits from abatement can be expected to be largest in the DCS. This
is, as explained in the introduction, partly due to the DCS low adaptation capacity. As
an example both Bangladesh and the Netherlands have low lying coastal regions, but
while the Netherlands can be- expected to have -resources to prevent damages from
rising sea level, Bangladesh might not. Another reason is that many DCS are
extremely dependent on the agricultural sector and this sector is supposed to be the
one most hurt by global warming. Second, the DCS must be expected to suffer
relatively more from a loss in production because their level of production is
relatively low. And thirdly, the abatement costs are expected to be lower in DCS for
example due to inefficient energy supplies and energy use.
These asymmetries makes it possible to define the DCS as the victims of the climate
problem. Adding the responsibility pattern from section 2 the ICS can be thought of as
causing the climate problem. A situation like this is often analysed in the so-called up
stream down stream scenario (Maler 1992). In this scenario, if a polluting country has
low environmental darnages, it will be characterised as an upstream country, referring
to a country that is located at a place where its pollution flows downstream, and
thereby does not affect itself. A cohtry with high darnage would be characterised as
“ See Dasgupta(1982)for a similaranalysisin an dynamiccontextwith an infinitetime horizon.
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a downstream country referring to a country located where the emission from the
upstream country accumulates. On this background the DC may be downstream- and
the IC upstream countries with respect to emission of GHGs.
Assume a situation where the upstream country (ICS) emits d. The abatement cost of
reducing emissions from E“ to E* equal c = C(R). And R = & - E* is the emission
reduction (abatement). Assume the extreme situation that this country has no damage
from its emission, whereas the downstream country (DCS) has damages defined by D
= D@). The downstream country’s benefits from emission reductions can be defined
as B(R) = D(d) - D(@ - R) (ibid. ;4 12). In this situation the downstream country will
have an interest in persuading the upstream country to undertake abatement and may
even be willing to pay the upstream for abating as long as the sidepayment, call it S, is
smaller than B(R). There are no economic interest for the upstream country to
undertake abatement and it would have strong incentives to “free ride”. As a
consequence the pollution problem can only be solved by payments from the
downstream to the upstream country.
If the two countries negotiate on R and S it is possible that they will reach and
agreement leaving them the following payoff (ibid.; 412):
P(upstream) = S - C(R)
(3.1.3)
P(downstream) = B(R) - S
This example indicates the opposite of the polluter pays principle - the victim pays
principle (VPP). This principle is based on economic rationality because it is
economically rational for the downstream country to pay17. When the downstream
country is identical to the DCS, as it is concerning global warming, the payment S may
however be a threat to the development process in these countries.
Maler (ibid.; 412-413) refers to Cease’s theorem on propetiy rights and argues that if
the upstream country has a right to pollute (property rights on the atmosphere), then
the VPP will be a result of negotiations, while the PPP will incur if the downstream
country has a right to clean air. However there is no property rights defined for the
atmosphere, and the Cease theorem therefore does not hold with respec to GHG
concentration. The main problem with the adoption of the PPP in the climate
convention is that although this principle is appealing on moral and political grounds,
the VPP is more in line with economic rationality, which is often the basic incentives
in international negotiations.
The adoption of the VPP in cases where no property rights are defined are underlined
in an analysis of the acid rain problem by Kaitala, V. and M. Pohj ola (199 1). Their
analysis concludes that the victim pays principle would be an optimal solution in a
bilateral agreement on S02 reductions between Finland and the Soviet Union.
In a later paper Kaitala, V. and M. Pohjola (1997) uses the upstream downstream
approach in an analysis of the global warming problem in a differential game set-up.
They argue that there is a ‘winning’ part (upstream) with small damages from global
“ Notice that the economicrationalityin the VPP makesit necessarythat environmentaldama:e is
valuableand incorporatedby thedecisionsmakersin environmentalnegotiations.
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warming and a ‘loosing’ part (downstream) with large damages from global warming.
The VPP is also suggested as solution to this problem by assuming that the loosing
part is putting pressure on reaching an agreement and eventually use sidepayments to
persuade the winning part to take action. As a consequence Kaitala and Pohjola
analysis implicitly assumes that the DCS are willing to pay the ICS to cut GHG
emissions, which is completely the reverse of the suggestions in the Climate
Convention text.
The core of this problem is that in the absence of property rights on the atmosphere
the PPP is based on moral concerns, while the VPP is based on economic rational
concerns. Because nations incentives are basically bound in economic interests the
VPP can be expected to be the most obvious outcome of international environmental
negotiation. Even though the text in the Climate Convention presume the PPP there is
a great chance that negotiations will lead to the VPP being adopted.
We can illustrate the asymmetric PD by letting player A be DCS and player B be ICS.
Because DCS are relatively vulnerable to global warming 1 unit of payoff is
subtracted every time (p) is played. This means that in (a,p) DCS payoff is now O
instead of 1, in @,p) the payoff is O instead of 2 and in (p,a) the payoff is 3 instead of
4. DCS relatively low abatement costs would tend to increase their payoff relative to
the ICS in situations where they play abate, but this effect is neutralised because they
also are relatively more hurt by the loss from foregone production. The asymmetric
PD are shown in figure 3.3.1 below.
Playing (p) is still the dominant strategy for ICS, but now the DCS are totally
indifferent between playing (a) or (p). This can be explained be the fact that they are
both hurt by undertaking abatement and by not doing so - the latter however demands
that damages are valuable and incorporated in decision making. The outcome is two
possible Nash equilibria where one of them (a,p) is pareto prefened to the other @,p).
Figure 3.1.3 show that DCS will gain 3 unit payoff if they move to the (a,a)
equilibrium while IC will loose 1. If however DCS transfer for example 1?4 of the 3
units payoff to the ICS (indicating the VPP), then moving to (a,a) would be pareto
improving. This situation will not be stable because DCS will have incentives to
defect.
DCS
a
P
Figure 3.1.3: the asymmetric PD
ICS
a P
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To summarise we can characterise the two groups of countries as shown in tabIe
3.1.1.
Table 3.1.1 free rider incentivesand asymmetries.
Abatements cost GDP level Environmental Emission level Willingness to take
damage by action
climate change
IC High* High Low* Hiuh High
DC Low Low* Hi.h Low* Low*
Note: * refersto the presenceof freerider incentive
These characteristics, together with the above analysis, give the following free rider
incentives. Column 1 shows that IC, ceteris paribus, has an incentive to free ride when
world cost effectiveness is in focus because more abatement could be undertaken in
the DCS for a given amount of resources. Column 2 show that DCS would have an
incentive not to participate because the production foregone when undertaking
abatement is relatively large. Column 3 indicates that ICS can be characterised as
upstream- and DCS as downstream countries. Hence column 3 indicates that ICS
might have incentives to free ride. Together column 1-3 might give the situation
illustrated in figure 3.1.3. The two last column’s gives two free rider incentives to the
DCS because of relatively low responsibility (column 4) and low political willingness
(column 5). These two columns are based on moral concerns and not on economic
rationality. These characteristics have not been incorporated in the PD.
3.2 Free riding and the Hawk-Dove game - consideration of a sequential
bargaining structure.
Another game can be used to describe the UNFCCC situation - this is the Hawk-Dove
game.’8 This game originally described two animals fighting over some prey. Each
animal can behave like a dove or a hawk. The dove behaviour can be characterised as
the abatement behaviour in the UNFCCC game, while the hawk behaviour can be
characterised as the pollute behaviour.
The best outcome to each of the players is the situation, where he or she pollutes (play
hawk), while the other p~ayer abates (pIay dove). So fa the game is equal to the PD.
But where the worst outcome for each player in the PD game is the situation where
the other pollutes and s/he abates, the worst situation in the Hawk-Dove game is that
both players pollute @lay hawk). The game is illustrated in figure 3.2.1 below.
“ Seee.g. Carraroand Siniscalco1993
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Figure 3.2.1 The hawk-dove game
ICS
a P
a
DCS
P
1
There are two Nash equilibria (a,p) and @,a) in the game, and (a,a) is not a pareto
improving option.
Which of these two possible Nash equilibria will result? If applied to the UNFCCC
game, it might be the case that the responsibility pattern, as explained above, will
institutionalise a norm that favours (p,a) in relation to (a,p). Heel and Schneider
(1997) use this type of norms and conventions in an analysis of side payments and
participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA). They conclude that
given the possibility that non-participating countries receive side payments, they
might have an incentive to stay out, because they know that they then will be offered
side payments to participate later.
Just like the introduction of norms and conventions might lead to favouring one of the
Nash equilibria, a dynamic framework, for example whith a sequential structure, may
lead to the (p,a) solution. Assume that there are 2 stages in the game, that the DCS in
the first stage can choose between abate (a) and pollute (p), and that ICS afterwards
can choose between (a) and (p). This is illustrated in figure 3.2.2 below.
Figure 3.2.2: the sequential Hawk-Dove game.
DCS
(1 ,4)
a
ICS
P
(3,3)
a
(4,1) (0,0)
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The game can be solved by backwards induction, and we start by defining the ICS’
behaviour in the second stage. In the subgame where DCS have chosen (p) ICS will
prefer to play (a), because it gives payoff 1 instead of 0. In the other subgame where
DCS have played (a) ICS will prefer to play (p) instead of (a) because this gives payoff
4 instead of 3. In stage 1 DCS know ICS preferences in stage 2, and they therefore
foresee that playing (p) in stage one will give them the highest payoff (4 instead of 1).
A subgame perfect equilibrium is thus an equilibrium that survives when each player
is required to reassess his plans as the game proceeds19. DCS, actually gains from
being the first to move. This situation can explain how to choose among the two Nash
equilibria in the Hawk-Dove game. If the Hawk-Dove game is supposed to explain
international environmental bargaining then the fact that DCS, due to the awareness of
differentiated responsibilities, are allowed to move first this can explain the outcome
of the UNFCCC negotiations (the greenhouse paradox).
Barrett (1998) uses a similar game theoretic set-up to explain the effect of transfers on
the coalition formation in the case of the Montreal Protocol. He infers from the low
development level of the DCS that they are pre-committed to non participation. In this
way free riding can be deterred because of the presence of pre-commitment. As
explained in section 2.2, Ca.mro assumes that commitments are due to political
willingness while Barrett asumes that commitments are due to asymmetries.
Starting from the Hawk-Dove game, the Greenhouse paradox can be a Nash
equilibrium either if norms and conventions favour the DCS or if a sequential bargain
structure is added, such as to allow DCS to initiate negotiations.
Conclusions.
This paper has analysed the economic and moral rationality behind the different
positions of the Developing and Industrialised Countries with respect to the Climate
Convention. The upstream - downstream anlysis, and the Victim Pays Principle do not
explain the different positions. The Polluter Pays Principle and the Hawk-Dove game
can explain the different positions. The Polluter Pays Principle may be based on moral
rather than economic rationality.
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WORKING PAPER
Will CDM be an Obstacle to Later Commitment by Non
Annex B Countries to Fixed Reduction Targets
Abstract: The Clean Development Mechanism (CD~ de~ned by the Kyoto
Protocolj article 12, gives Annex B countries a possibility to substitute part of
their national emission reduction obligations for abatement projects in the non
committed countries.” The industrialised Annex B countries finance abatement
projects in the developing, Non Annex B, countries and will be credited the
emission reduction on their own emission budget.
The main purpose of the CDM is to undertake the Annex B countries abatement in
a cost efficient way. But the CDM may also be seen as an initialisation of the
developing countries (DCS) participation in policies to reduce clobal warming.
In the literature, for example Bohm (1994b), it has been argued that CDM is an
obstacle for Non Annex B countries to later commitment to fixed reduction targets
— and thereby an obstacle to the development of a broad system of Tradable
Permits (TP). The present paper analyses the formalised arguments in Bohm
(1994b) and shows how the arguments depend on the spectfzc assumptions made.
The paper widens Bohms analysis with leakage efiects and other more dynamic
aspects of CDM which support the conclusion that initial CDM will not
necessarily be an obstacle for the non annex B countries to later commitment to
fixed reduction targets.
Introduction.
Bohm (Bohm, 1994a, 1994b) comes to the conclusion that JI will reduce
Developing Countries’ (DCS’) incentives to join a system of tradable permits, by
reducing what he, in his analysis, calls tradability gains. Also Heel () puts this
argument forward. The present paper analyses the formalised arguments in Bohm
(1994b) and shows how the arguments depend on the specific assumptions made.
The paper widens Bohms analysis with leakage effects and other more dynamic
aspects of CDM, which support the conclusion that initial CDM will not
necessarily be an obstacle for the non annex B countries to later commitment to
fixed reduction targets.
Section 1 presents Bohm’s analysis and discuses his assumptions. Section 2
analyse tradability gains in a more general framework. Section 3 concludes.
Because the
analyse the
1. Bohm’s analysis of “tradability gains”
global warming problem is a long run probIem it is important to
long run consequences of policy instruments. JI is primary an
instrument to improve cost efficiency. But how does JI affect the Developing
Countries incentives to commit to fixed reduction targets?. The developing
countries – which are identical to the non Annex B countries – may be said to free
ride against the Kyoto Protocol, because the non Annex B countries are not
committed to reduce emissions, but enjoy the emission reductions of the
committed Annex B countries. Will JI enhance the DCS’ free rider incentives and
make the DCS’ fiture commitment more unlikely? Or will the oppersite be true;
that JI will DCS’ fiture commitment to fixed reduction targets more likely. Will JI
between annex B (ICS) and non-annex B countries (DCS) affect the DCS’ free rider
incentives?
On the one hand it could be that because JI in many ways are identical to a TQ
regime then it could develop into a TQ regimel. On the other hand DCS could
argue that if they participate in JI the additional gains from going to a more
comprehensive TQ regime would diminish. This chapter departs from one of the
most quoted analysis of the question: Peter Bohrn’s 1994 paper to the IPCC WG
III (Bohm 1994a) and his later paper on tradability gains (Bohm, P., 1994b).
Bohrn (1994a) assumes that a tradable quota (TQ) regime including the DCS will
be established and ask if JI will reduce DCS’ incentives to join this regime. It is
assumed that quota allocations to DCS in the TQ regime are based on baseline2
emission so that abatement from initial JI projects will not be underrnined3. Bohm
then uses a figure equal to figure 1 below to argue that JI will reduce the DCS’
incentives to j oin a TQ regime.
The figure shows that the DCS’ gains from trade in the absence of JI is equal to the
triangle OEP. This triangle equals the export revenue (quota unit price times quota
export) OPEe* minus abatement costs OEe*. If, however, JI is implemented prior
to the TQ regime and e.g. the two projects marked by the shaded areas are carried
out in JI operations, then the DCS’ gains from entering the TQ regime will be
lowered by the amount of the shaded areas. This is because the DCS are now
unable to sell these ‘projects’ at the TQ price. Hence Bohm concludes that: ‘If the
DCS’ willingness to join the TQ trea~ depends on the expected benefits from
joining, the DC may now decline to co-operate’ (Bohm, P., 1994a; 13).
,.
Figure 1: Tradability gains and Joint Implementation.
P
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Source:Bohm 1994a;figure4
His formulation indicates that it is possible that JI will make DCS to sustain their
free riding position. In a later paper, however, Bohm uses the conclusion to say
that JI prior to a TQ regime will reduce the DCS’ incentives to join a TQ regime
and show instead that DCS’ gains from joining the TQ regime, in the first place,
will be positive (Bohm, P., 1994b; 195-196).
This paper will re-investigate the ambiguity actually found in the conclusion in
Bohm’s first paper. First we argue that the question whether JI reduces DCS’
incentives or not is indeed ambiguous. This is done in section 2. Second we
discuss the assumptions of allocation based on baselines and the possibility that it
may not be a realistic allocation rule for the UNFCCC case. This is done in
section 3. Finally, in section 2, we set up Bohm’s model in a more general
framework and show that JIs’ effect on tradability gains may be changed if this
allocation principle is changed. we find that the effect depends on the
relationships between the countries MAC curves and on the relationship between
baseline emission and quota allocation. Initially we will summarise Bohm’s
analysis of tradability gains (Bohm, P., 1994b).
Tradability gains.
DCS are provided with an initial quota allocation equal to their baseline so that
reductions from previous JI-projects will not be undermined. ICS are committed to
reductions by a quota less than baseline. Using Bohrn’s notation EiO equals
country i’s baseline emission (i=I, D where I refers to IC and D refers to DC), E?
equals country i’s initial emission allocation and Ei’ equals country i’s emission
after trade. This means that;
E~O= E~J > E~* and
(1.1)
Elo > El+ > E?
.—
. .
Because of the absence of abatement requirements on the DCS, ail abatement
undertaken are exported.
While DCS’ tradability gains (OEP in figure 3.1.1) can be defined as quota sales
minus abatement costs they are expressed by:
(1.2) G~ =p (ED”-ED> - %CD(EDo-ED>2
where p is the quota-unit price and CDis the slope of the DCS marginal abatement
cost curve. The second part on the right hand side is thus the total abatement cost
function. A word should be added to its specification.
This specification is often used (besides Bohm see e.g. also Carraro, C., 1993,
1997a, 1997b and Barrett, S. 1994a), but it has several implications that needs to
be addressed. First of all, the form of.the total abatement fimction implies rising
marginal abatement costs (CD(EDO-ED)), and second of all it implies that leakage
is neglected. The first implication is rather conventional and does not cause any
inconvenience. But because the cost function is static, it cannot capture the fact
that MACS increase over time because of the historic accumulation of abatement.
Therefore it relates more to a flow pollutant than to a stock pollutant such as
GHGs.
Opposite Bohm who agues for the absence of leakage by assuming that ‘carbon
tar~ffs or similar actions are taken by signatories to prevent any signl~cant
carbon leakage through trade’ (Bohm, P., 1994b; 198), we will argue in section
3.2 that absence of leakage actually should be identified with a JI regime. The no-
leakage assumption is furthermore rather determinative for the conclusions.
The quota unit price and the level of trade are determined by the equalisation of
MACS between ICS and DCS and the limitation of the total quota allocation:
(1.3) p = cd(EDO-ED> = cl(EIO-E;) = CD(E~- E;) given,
(1.4) ED*+ E;= ET
where ET is the total quota allocations. The last equalisation in equation (1.3) rests
on the assumption that DCS quota allocation equals their baseline so that total
abatement equals its exports and thereby also the ICS imports.
Bohm now inserts the last expression ofp in (1 .2) and gets:
(1.5) GD = ?4cD(E~- Et)2 >0
Thus, given (1. 1) the DCS tradability gains are positive in the analysed situation.
Furthermore, it shows that the gains are rising in cL3and if we use equation (1.1)
we can rewrite (1.5):
..J-
and see that GD is also rising in CI.
Notice that some argues, that because JI exhausts the cheapest abatement projects
in DCS, their MACS will rise and as a consequence of this the cost for fiture
commitments will rise. Here Bohm’s result actually shows the opposite - namely
that tradability gains increase as MACS increases. This could be explained by the
fact that no abatement commitments are laid on the DCS’ shoulders as long as they
are given allocations equal to baseline and while the rise in MACS increases the
quota unit price their gains will increase.
JI and DCS incentives to join a TQ regime.
From the summary of 130hm’s analysis it could be concluded that if allocations are
based on baseline emissions then i) JI will reduce DCS gains fi-om joining a TQ
regime and hence it could involve free riding to be sustained ii) if DCS joined a
TQ regime in the first place their gains would be positive and positive related to
the slope of both ICS and DCS MAC curve.
If this is the correct description of the connection between JI and free rider
incentives, then the cost efficiency gained from JI is not much worth in a long run
perspective. Bohm’s conclusions are based on; figure 3.1.1 and the assumption of
baseline allocation (i.e. EDO= EDti). We will assess these in turn.
Comments on figure 1.
Now what can be said about figure 1 ? Well, first of all it must be noticed that the
DCS still have gains from entering the TQ regime even though they are reduced
because of the JI projects - they still have an incentive to join the TQ regime. If
the DCS could be sure that a TQ regime would be implemented in the future, then
it would ceteris paribus not be rational for the DCS to engage in JI. But if the DCS
are uncertain about the establishment of TQ, then the scenario could be more
sequential. It could then be rational to engage in JI if this gives positive gains, and
then again later if joining a TQ regime has positive gains, it would be rational at
that time to join this regime.
The loss from initial JI illustrated by the shaded areas might fi-u-therrnore not be as
large as postulated. It is not given that DCS will only receive the MAC in
exchange for the JI projects and hence the loss might not be so large. Because of
cost efficiency the ICS total abatement costs are lower compared to a situation
where they would have to undertake all of the abatement ‘unilaterally’. Therefore
the DCS might be able to ‘sell’ the JI projects at a price higher than the DCS’
MAC as long as the ICS will experience some degree of cost efficiency.
There could also be some additional gains from JI following fi-om the technology
transfers that are not shown in the figure. These gains could be an incentive for the
DCS to join JI projects, even though they are aware, that joining JI now may
reduce their gains from joining a TQ regime later. ln fact, a situation where the
DCS are indifferent between having a JI regime prior to a TQ regime and not
having JI prior to a TQ regime could arise. If the DCS could succeed in obtaining
a price for the J1 projects that is larger than MAC, the loss from JI is maybe only
half of the shaded area in figure 3.1.1. If the additional gains from technology
.transfers at least equals the rest of the shaded areas, the DCS’ gains would not be
affected of the initiaI JI regime.
Another situation that was shortly noted above is neglected in Bohrn’s analysis. If
the framework where more sequential, 2 periods could arise. In period 1 IC had
committed to emission reductions that either could be undertaken through JI or
unilaterally. In period 2 new commitments will be made and these are allowed to
be traded in a global TQ regime. Then if the commitments in period 1 could be
undertaken through JI, then ICS might be willing to commit to larger reductions in
period 2. This could be strengthened if JI reduces leakage because ICS abatement
effort would then be more effective and hence they wouid be more willing to
accept more ambitious reduction targets. This could result in more trade and hence
more gains to the DCS. Part III will take up this perspective by modelling the
JI/TQ relationship in a sequential bargaining model.
The problem, claimed by Bohrn, that net abatement is reduced when allocations
are not based on baselines and JI is implemented prior to the TQ regime, may be
exaggerated. This is because JI could be supposed to reduce leakage and hence
improve the effectiveness of ICS’ abatement. The rise in ICS’ net abatement due to
reduced leakage could outnumber the loss in emission due to JI followed by
allocations not based on baseline. But can we be sure that leakage is reduced
because of JI? Below we try to find arguments for this.
The free rider problem discussed so far is connected to the social inoptimality that
arises when not all countries participate. Free riding means that world marginal
benefits are greater than marginal costs, with a too low abatement level as a
consequence. Another problem which we already has referred to several times has
yet to be assessed. This problem is in the literature described as ‘leakage’ and
arises when increasing emission in the free riding countries offsets abatement
measures undertaken by co-operating countries.
Leakage arises mainly through trade effects and therefore trade restrictions are
often suggested as a way to reduce leakage. This kind of policy is, however, not
always fair. If for example the non-participating countries free ride because of low
economic development, the economic loss from undertaking abatement could be
threatening their ability to fidfil basic human needs. Trade restrictions could be
holding these countries trapped in poverty, and this is not in the interest of any of
the countries.
If trade restrictions are called the ‘stock’ policy, JI could in this connection be
thought of as a possible so-called ‘carrot’ policy to reduce leakage (See Barrett,
S., 1994b; 25 and Barrett, S., 1995; 18). This mechanism does not reduce the
leakage effect by punishing the free riders through trade restrictions, but by
making them join abatement implementation by transferring new technology.
There is four obvious ways in which abatement undertaken by a group of
countries can be undermined by increased emission in free riding countries. We
will try to assess how JI can reduce these effects.
First of all abatement measures raise the cost for the participating countries’
industry and hence comparative advantages shift to non-participating countries.
,..
This means that when participating countries reduce their fiel intensive
production because of rising cost, non participating countries will raise their fiel
intensive production and hence their emission. This effect, however, depends on
the trade volume between participating and non-participating countries and on the
degree of substitution between IC and DC tradable’s. What JI now does to this
leakage effect is that it tends to equalise the marginal abatement cost and hence
reduce the level of the shift in comparative advantage. Non-participating
countries’ emission levels are therefore not affected by participating countries’
abatement measures.
The second channel through which leakage is working is also connected to trade
effects. It could be expected that abatement undertaken by annex I countries
would make the world demand for fossil fuels to fall and hence reduce the price
on fossil fiels. This would make the non annex countries increase their use of
fossil fiels and hence undermine the abatement undertaken. When transferring
new technology, with less fossil fuel consumption, to the non-annex countries
through JI projects, their demand for fossil fuels would fall and thereby lower the
described leakage effect.
Thirdly if we assume that free riding countries only undertake abatement such as
to equalise their marginal costs to their own marginal benefits - that is MACD =
MBD - we can expect that they will reduce this abatement when participating
countries increase their abatement measures. If we assume that MB positive but
decreasing when abatement increases, this leakage effect is effectuated through
the reduction in marginal benefit when abatement rises. It is not obvious how JI
will affect this mechanism, but with the free riding incentives in focus here this
mechanism might not be that substantial. Both because the free riding countries
are hardly undertaking abatement at all and because abatement benefits are not
very likely to be used as policy indicator.
Finally it can be expected that IC industries, that are subject to environmental
regulation (e.g. C02 taxes), will move their ‘dirty industries’ to DCS with no
regulation. The empirical evidence on this issue show that environmental
regulation is a less important factor when industries choose location (Jaffe et. al
1995). It is not obvious how (if at all) JI will affect this situation.
Comments on the assumption ofquota allocations
When Bohm concludes that JI will reduce DCS’ incentives to join a TQ regime, it
is based on the assumption that DCS are given quotas equal to their baseline
emissions. There is, however, no guarantee that this allocation principle will be
used in a TQ regime in the UNFCCC case. What are the alternative allocation
principles and which will most likely be used in the UIJFCCC case? The purpose
of this section is to answer this question.
Allocations involve welfare changes and might therefore affect the countries’
incentives to join a TQ regime. Barrett expresses the importance of initial
allocations by; “ the initial allocation ofpermits creates wealth. The issue is not
purely distributive, for the initial allocation will determine which countries sign
an international agreement “ (Barrett, S., 1991; 90).
... -’
Thus when analysing free rider incentives, in relation to a TQ regime, a discussion
on allocation principles is extremely relevant. Bohm only takes the view as to
which allocation principle is the most optimal according to environmental goals,
but in the negotiations bargaining will also be on the distributive and participation
perspectives.
Larsen and Shah show in an interesting study how different allocation principle
might change different countries’ (regions) gains from entering a TQ regime. It is
supposed that emission should be reduced to 1987 level in year 2000. Their
analysis shows that allocation principles do change the post trading costs and
thereby also the participation incentives. Furthermore they show some interesting
results in connection to the questions raised in this paper (Larsen, B. and A. Shah,
1994).
In the scenario Larsen and Shah investigate the allocation principle based on
population involves DCS to revieve quotas that are larger than their baseline. Their
analysis shows that if allocations are based on countries share of world
population, then decreasing baseline emission per capita will increase the benefits
from quota tradability. This conclusion is interesting because it indicates that JI
through decreased baseline could increase DCS’ benefits. Later we will show that
if Bohm’s analysis of tradability gains are set up in a more general framework,
then the same conclusion regarding JI can be reached; if MACS are uniform and
allocations are based on population, then reduced baseline (JI) will increase DCS’
gains.
Larsen and Shah fbrther show, in empirical simulations, that if allocations are
based on population then all DCS will gain fi-om quota trade. OECD countries will
have lower costs than if they were to undertake all abatement ‘unilaterally’, but
middle income countries such as the economies in transition may have relatively
high costs. The last may as a consequence decline to participate (ibid.; 846).
Remember from section 2 in chapter 1 that the DCS in general and India in
particular argue for a population based responsibility perspective. If forced to
negotiate emission allocation, India’s position would obviously be to argue for
population based allocations.
Finally they show that if allocation is formed so that non-OECD countries are
filly compensated, then OECD countries still have lower costs than if they were
to undertake all the abatement unilaterally and all non-OECD countries and
countries in transition have positive gains from trade. Therefore it is concluded
that this allocation principle is the most appropriate for inducing all countries to
participate (ibid.; 850).
One can think on the allocation debate in another way by Iooking at the GHG
accumulation as a global externality with the characteristics of a public good; no
one can be excluded from the damage of the externality. Then by following Cease
(1960), if i) property rights are defined and ii) there is a small number of involved
parties and iii) no transaction costs, then negotiation and/or trade will secure an
optimal use of the externality, no matter how the property rights are distributed.
The problem with global warming is, however, the large number of agents
involved - all human beings now and in the fiture. This means that the bargaining
process first of all is comected to huge transaction costs and second of all
,..
bargaining among the involved agents is not even possible if one take the
intergenerational view on the problem. Baumol and Oates state that the Cease
theorem might hold true only for the case where a small number of agents are
involved and hence not for the global warming case (Baumol and Oates, 1988;
35). It could though be argued that the distribution of property rights (emission
quotas) does matter in the global warming case.
Anyway, Rose and Stevens show that the welfare effects of allowing for quota
trade are not effected by the initial distribution of quotas. Their empirical results
show that post trading abatement cost for any country will always be the same for
a given C02 reduction target no matter what the initial allocation of permits may
be (Rose and Stevens, 1993). The conclusion of their analyses is hence indicating
that the Cease Theorem holds in the sense that no matter how quotas are
distributed, the outcome will be the same.
In the Kyoto protocol which is a non-tradable quota (NTQ) regime, the quotas are
based on base year emissions - 1990 in most cases. The committed Annex I
countries are however obligated to reduce emission with a different percentage
under 1990 emission level. The EU have for example committed to reduce
emissions to 8°/0less than 1990 emission while Australia has committed to reduce
emissions to 8°/0 above 1990 emission level. This may be called a modified
grandfathering principle.
Every signatory has different gains and losses from using exactly this base year
and it would be painfid to re-negotiate which base year to use. The G-77 and
China have posed a list of questions regarding the flexibility mechanisms in the
Kyoto protocol. In article 17 on International emission trading, it is asked how the
emission rights of developed country parties are to be determined. In a shared
answer by a group of the largest ICS including USA, Australia, Japan and Russia
but excluding EU it is stated that while the ‘assigned amounts in the Kyoto
Pi-otocol were negotiated so as to re~ect enhanced developed country
responsibilities (in that they do not apply to developing countries) and to re~ect
equity the allocations from which international emission trading among ICS
begins are the assigned amounts rejlected in the Kyoto Protocol’ (UNFCCC,
1998b; 43-44).
It is therefore likely that quotas in a later TQ regime also would be based on 1990
emission levels. A fiu-ther advantage with base year allocations compared to
baseline allocations, is that it is well known for almost all countries. This cannot
be said about baseline emissions, which could be extremely difficult to estimate.
Indeed DCS would have an incentive to overestimate their baseline such as to get
larger quotas - hence if incomplete information is incorporated, even baseline
allocations could lead to ineffective abatement measures.
The allocation principle where quotas are based on historic emissions is discussed
in the literature as the grandfathering principle and is stated by Pearce as: “the
only initial allocation that will meet with agreement” but he fiu-ther states that:
“The sheer newness of tradable permits on the international scene may in any
event militate against them totally. If so, one essential message for international
negotiators is that they should ‘mimic’ as best they can the efficiency of market
based approaches” (Pearce, D., 1990; 385). In this statement a recommendation to
. .
JI might be hidden, while this system in many respects mimic the workings of a
TQ regime.
To sum up on the above it can be related to equity concerns. Table 1 lists various
equity principles and related allocation rules.
Table 1: Quota allocations and equity principles.
Equity p rinciple Allocation rule Relatively largest share to:
Abilhy to pay Allocateby total cost relativeto GDP DC
Rawls(maxmin) Largestquotasto DCS DC
Sovereignty Currentor baselineemission IC
Egalitarian Populationbasedallocation DC
Polluterpays Allocationbasedon the inverseof DC
historicemissions(grandfathering)
Consensus Grandfathering IC
Source:discussionaboveand Roseand Stevens1993
The table shows that DCS would have relatively high allocations if ability to pay,
Rawlsian, egalitarian and polluter pays principles are used. This rests on the fact
that even though DCS may have low MACS, their total abatement cost might
involve a large share of GDP and hence abiIity to pay would be low. If Rawls
criteria of maximizing the benefits of the countries with the lowest total benefits is
chosen it would also require relatively large quotas to the DCS. Egalitarianism
would view the atmosphere as a global common that every human being should
hold an equal property right to use - hence allocations would be based on
population which would again result in large quotas to DCS. Finally the polluter
pays principle catches the historic responsibility of the ICS and in this way
demands large quotas to DCS.
The only equity principle covering baseline allocation is the sovereignty principle,
but while it is clear that not all countries can be given allocations equal to baseline
because this would involve no abatement to be undertaken, this principle cannot
be working aione.
On the background of the above discussion it is our opinion that the most likely
allocation rule will be a modification of the grandfathering principle also used in
the Kyoto protocol. It may be the case that allocations to the DCS will be equal to
a base year emission level (e.g. 1990) while the ICS’ allocations then are equal to
this base year emission level minus a percentage reduction. Rejecting Bohm’s
allocation projection also means that we reject his conclusion that JI reduces DCS’
incentives to participate in a fhture TQ. To see this we will set up Bohrn’s analysis
in a more general framework.
2. Tradability gains - a more general set-up.
Assume that E~J #-E~O and that DCS are assumed to be net exporters of quotas in
a TQ regime hence: ‘
EDA> ED*
(2.1)
E,*> E;
.,. .
The tradability analysis is a partial analyse where the ICS need not be modelled. In
this way the asymmetries are not very clear, but the assumption that DCS are net
exporters implicitly assumes that DCS has the lowest MACS. Later we will assume
that ICS prior to the TQ regime have had reduction commitments that could have
been undertaken through JI. This incorporates the fact that DCS prior to the TQ
regime have been free riders.
By definition exports must equal imports and total emission must be no larger that
total quotas allocated, hence the following must hold:
(2.2) (E~A - ED>= (E; - Et)
(2.3) E~* + E; = ET
The DCS tradability gains are still quota sales minus abatement cost:
(2.4) G~ =p(EDA- E*D) - %CD(ED*-ED>2
Notice that because EDA # EDO, the tradability gains can not be written as (1.2).
The quota unit price is, however, still found by equalisation of MACS, but the last
part of (2.3) no longer holds - that is:
(2.5) p = CD(EDO- ED> = C1(E~- E;)
Inserting pin (2.4) no longer helps us to get as simple an expression of tradability
gains as (1.5) because DCS’ total abatement no longer necessarily equals DCS’
total exports or total imports by ICS. Only if DCS are allocated quotas equal to
their baseline this will be the case. Inserting p gets:
(2.6) GD = cD(EDO-ED>(EDA-E*D)- %CD(EDO-ED~2
by re-arranging:
(2.6’) GD = CD(EL)O-ED>“[(EDA- %(EDO+ED>] >0
for EDA > %(EDO+ED)
EDA > Z(EDO+ ED> is a sufficient condition for positive tradability gains because
the term outside the brackets is positive by definition. 7
Where Bohm assumes that EDA equals EDo, we will assume that EDA is a given
constant (e.g. equal to the 1990 emission level) and therefore reductions in
baseline will increase the chance that EDA > fi(EDO + ED). But we cannot be sure
that decreasing baseline will increase tradability gains because as shown below
dEDO/dED*<1- hence the first part of (2.6’) (CD(EDO-ED’)) will fall when baseline
falls. The net effect is therefore ambiguous.
Remember that we are interested in the effect of decreasing baseline because this
is an effect of JI. Under Bohrns’s assumption decreasing baseline will result in
decreasing allocation and less gains, but when allocations are given decreased
baseline could either increase or decrease gains. If JI reduces leakage, as we
assume, DCS’ baseline would fall by more than just the abatement undertaken in JI
projects, which will strengthen our argument.
In order to assess how JI affects tradability gains, we will calculate the derivative
of (2.6’) with respect to ED* and CD, because JI is causing reductions in EDOand
higher MACS which can be approximated by higher CD.
If ye differentiate (2.6’) with respect to CDye get: (ED*- ED) *[(EDA- %(EDo+
ED)] which is positive for EDA > fi(EDo+ ED). Hence only if allocations secure
that DCS are equally well off, an increase in cD will lead to rising gains. The
reason is that the rise in MAC increases the quota unit price and hence exports
revenue. In the case where DCS are equally well off, the increase in export
revenues are not undermined by abatement costs.
To calculate the derivative, with respect to baseline, some initial calculations are
necessary. Using (2.3) and (2.5) DCS emission after trade can be calculated as8:
(2.7) E;= c~E: +C, (E7 –E;)
CD+ c,
and it shows that ED*is a fimction of EDO,EIO,ET, CD and cr..
From (2.5) we know that the quota unit price p is a 11-mction of EDO- hence
differentiating (2.4) with respect to EDOresults in:
If JI shall improve tradability gains, this equation has to be less than zero. From
(2.5) and (2.7) dp/dtiD and dE*&d~D can be calculated:
(2.9) #= c“
dE~ _
<1 to simpli~ notation — =
D CD+ c, dE: y
(2.10) ~= c~(l–y)>O given y<l.
[)
There are three effects on gains from reduced baseline emission that can be seen
from (2.8), (2.9) and (2. 10). First (2.9) shows that reductions in baseline emission
by 1 unit will reduce actual emission by less than one. This has two consequences:
i) total abatement (EO- E*) will decrease and hence reduce total abatement costs,
ii) the export level (EA - Eo) will increase and hence raise revenue from exports.
But in (4.4.10) the reduced baseline makes the quota unit price fall and hence
pulls in the opposite direction of ii). Obviously then further analyses of the
equations are needed to learn more about the sign of (2.8)
.. - ..
Inserting (2.9) and (2.1 O) in (2.8) determines that the following must hold if (2.S)
should be less than zero:
(2.1 1) CD(l -~)(@ - .E~) < ((c~ - l)Y + 1)(E: - E;)
To start with the case where allocations are set equal to 1990 emission level, this
case may involve allocation to be less than baseline. Given that allocations are
smaller than baseline, we have that (EDo-ED> > (EDA-ED> and hence a sufficient
condition to satisfi (2.11) is when inserting for y
CD )<(CD-l)-+l(2.12) cD(l-—
CD+ c1
re-arranging results in:
(2.13) -(C~)2 +C~C, -c, <0
This is a sufficient condition for negativity of (2.8) if EA < Eo, and it shows that
the effect of reduced baselines - and hence also JI - in the present setup rests
solely on the relative relationship between the slope of the countries’ MAC curves.
It is difficult to make a firm conclusion from (2.13), but figure 4.1.1 illustrates
equation (2. 13) in a diagram with cD on the x-axis and c1on the y-axis.
Figure 2 Equation (2.13)
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Lying below the full line in figure 2 secures that (2.13) holds and hence that
tradability gains are increasing when baseline emissions decrease - that is when JI
is implemented prior to the TQ regime. The dashed line shows the 45-degree line.
Figure 4.1.1 shows that DCS’ gains will increase when their baselines fall, even if
their MACS are slightly larger than ICS - the difference can, however, not be
-. ... ,. ,. .. .. . . . ,.. .,
arbitrary since the slope on ICS MAC curve cannot be larger than the line
indicates.
For an arbitrary allocation rule a more general (sufficient) condition to satis~
(2. 11) leads by re-arranging (2. 11) to the following;
(2.12) # < CD2+ C,CD+ c,
D CDC1
As long as this equation is satisfied then decreasing baseline, due to e.g. JI, will
raise DCS’ gains from trade given the cost function. This function enables me to
show the inconsistency between Bohm’s graphic illustration (figure 3.1.1) and his
choice of cost fimction. If we denote the right hand side of (2.12) L then assuming
that allocations are equal baseIine the Ieft-hand side of (2.12) equals 1- hence if 2
is larger than 1, JI can increase DCS’ tradability gains. This is a contradiction to
figure 3.1.1, where baseline reduction involves decreasing gains. Using the
present cost finction actually allows DCS’ gains to increase if JI is implemented
prior to a TQ regime. The reason is that the dynamic perspective of accumulated
abatement is not captured in the cost fimction.
Recalling the conclusions in Larsen, B and A. Shah (1994) it can also be verified
by (2.12) that it is possible to have a situation where baseline reductions raise
gains when allocations are based on population. If allocations are based on
population Larsen, B and A. Shah (1994) show that allocations are likely to be
larger than baseline for the DCS. This involves EA A!? to be larger than 1. But
given their assumption that MACS are equal for all countries; c1 = CD= c, then 1
becomes:
(2.13) A = l/c +2
which is also likely to be greater than 1. It is then possible to filfil (2.12) with
population based allocations – i.e. it is possible to reproduce the result in Larsen
and Shah (1994).
Finally if DCS are given allocation so that trade will make them equally well off
fi@DO+ E~3. Inserting this in (2.12) shows that JIthen as noted above E~A = .
could have a positive effect on DCS’ tradability gains if:
(2.13) (E* +EO) <A
~EO
These analyses indicate that the effects of JI prior to a TQ regime are rather
ambiguous and that quota allocation principles and differences in marginal
abatement cost curves largely determine the results. The firm conclusion in
Bohrn’s graphic illustration is inconsistent with his later analysis of tradability
gains because this does not incorporate dynamics.
. .
3. Estimates of tradability gains -an example.
Now if cost curves and allocation principles are the sole determinants of the effect
of JI on DCS’ incentives to join a TQ regime, then the true incentives could be
calculated if data for cost curves and for allocation principle were available.
So far only rather rough estimates of the cost curves have been published and the
quota allocation principle to be used if TQ are incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol
has not yet been agreed upon. It is, however, our opinion that quota allocations
are likely to be based on 1990 emission level, also if DCS - or at least some of the
largest DCS like China and India- are included in the regime.
It may seem political unacceptable for the DCS to participate in a TQ regime with
allocations based on 1990 emission level (see chapter 2) but what if it can be
showed that they actually will gain from such a regime and furthermore that they
might even improve their gains if JI is implemented prior to the TQ regime?
Musgrave (1994) has published data relevant for the cost function used in the
above analysis, and we will use these to run simulations of China and India’s gains
in a TQ regime where allocations are based on 1990 emission level - both with
and without JI prior to the regime. Table 2 show the data set.
Table 2; data set
baseline slopeonMAC
Japan 238 4.89
US&Canada 1320 0.54
EU 815 1.02
EasternEurope
andRussia 1263 0.44
1
Totnl 3636 6.89
average 909 I.72
Chinaand
India 722 0.62
Source: Musgrave (1994)
To simulate a TQ regime we need cost functions, allocation rules and rules for
quota unit price determination and trade determination. Above the cost fhnctions
were; C{DC) = %CD(EDo- ED>2 , the quota unit price and trade were determined
through equalisation of MACS. The target for the TQ regime is to return to 1990
emission level. To keep from mixing emission estimates we simply assume that
the 1990 level can be set to 15% below the baseline level in Musgrave’s data.
Global 1990 emission is thus 3.704 mill. T or 614 mio T for India and China and
3.091 mio. T for the ICS. It is further assumed that countries are given allocations
equal to their 1990 level, and the data in the first to columns of table 3 show the
emission and allocation data set.
... -
Table 3: Tradability gains with 1990allocations.
non-trading trading
Quota baseline Abatement tradabiiity
country allocation demand cost abatement price trade gains
(cost)
India and 613.7 722.0 108.3 3,636.0 480.5 297.9 -372.2 -39,308.6
China
ICS 3,090.6 3,636.0 545.4 255,816.6 173.2 297.9 372.2 136,680.0
TOTAL 3,704.3 4,358.0 653.7 259,452.6 653.7 97,371.4
The allocation rule involves abatement demand on the two groups of countries, as
shown in column 3, and if these were to be abated unilaterally, the cost would be
as indicated in column 49. Now if the quotas are allowed to be traded, the involved
price will lead India and China wanting to abate 480,5 mio T and hence to supply
372,2 mio T for export. The ICS will be willing to demand the 372,2 mio T
because the price is still lower than their MACS, and the result is that the total
costs are more than half the non-trading case. India and China have even negative
costs because the export revenue exceeds the abatement costs. The table thus
illustrates the total individual gains fi-om trade for both groups of countries. India
and China actually have positive tradability gains (negative costs) and may
therefore be induced to participation (For a similar set up of tradability gains see
Barrett, S., 1992).
So far so good, but what will happen if JI had been implemented prior to the
opening of trade? First of all India and China’s baseline would be smaller and
assuming that the emission reduction from JI projects in absence of JI would have
been carried out in the ICS these countries’ baseline will increase by the same
amount. To show this effect we can shift 22 mio T from India and China’s
baseline to the ICS’ baseline. Second JI could involve host countries MAC’s to rise
and donor countries’ MACS to fall. This effect can be estimated by reducing the
slope of ICS’ MAC curve to 1,5 and increase India and China’s to 0,8. The result is
shown in figure 4 below.
Table 4: Tradability gains with 1990 allocations and initial JI.
non-trading trading
I Quota baseline abatement tradability
gains
country allocation demand cost abatement price trade (cost)
lIndia and 613.7 700.0 86.3 2,979.1 426.3 341.1 -340.0 -43,268.0
China
ICS 3,090.6 3,658.0 567.4 241,457.I 227.4 341.1 340.0 154,743.8
,TOTAL 3,704.3 4,358.0 653.7 244,436.1 653.7 I 11,475.7
The last 4 columns are the most interesting and they actually show that India and
China’s gains have increased compared to the situation without JI. This is a result
of an increased price that outnumbers a decrease in trade.
Of course this example is constructed more or less arbitrary, but it is though quite
interesting that we can departure from a situation with absolute abatement demand
put on the DCS’ shoulders and end up with absolute gains that are larger for the JI
case than for the case without JI.
The primary lesson from this chapter is that JIs’ influence on the free rider
problem is ambiguous. Bohrn’s indication that DCS incentives to join a TQ regime
decrease when JI is implemented in advance is inconsistent with the analysis of
tradability gains. If the question, however, is analysed in the model of tradability
gains, we find that the answer rests on the relationship between DCS’ and lCS’
MAC curves and on the relationship between DCS’ quota allocation and baseline
emission.
A major restriction on the tradability analysis is that it does not capture the
dynamic characteristics of the problem or the sequential negotiation pattern. A
model to take this into consideration could be based on an extensive form game
theoretic model. The purpose of the next chapter is to build a model within this
context.
Concluding remarks
The main force of the tradability analysis is that it is rather simple and therefore
applicable to empirical analysis. Applied analysis guarantees that all relevant
asymmetries are incorporated. The fact that a hJTQ regime only including the ICS,
has been in operation prior to a TQ regime has to be modelled. We did this by
assuming that two different NTQ regimes could have been in operation; one
without JI and one with JI. Shifts in baselines and MACS had to be modelled on as
ad hoc basis.
More work on the empirical data in our example such as to model the Kyoto
Protocol and make estimates of the JI level under different assumptions of the
CDM, could make very interesting studies, but lies outside the scope of this paper.
The main disadvantage of the model is that it is static and that the cost fi.mction
applies to a case without leakage. The large interdependence between countries’
emissions can only be incorporated ‘manually’ by making assumptions of changes
in baseline etc. A more comprehensive model would define the interdependence
implicitly such as to reflect leakage effects and shifts in baseline due to JI 10.
Furthermore the model does not explain which quota allocation will be chosen or
how the ICS’ commitment ambitions could be affected through the opening of the
CDM.
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Endnotes.
‘ Bohm (1994a) rejects that this could be the case for JI between committed and non-committed
countries because this situation is actually very different fi-oma TQ regime.
‘ Baseline emissions are projected emissions in the absence of the relevant emission reductions.
‘ This assumption is discussed in the next section.
“The function captures increasing MACS in the sense that the larger current abatement the larger
the MAC, but if there has been some abatements earlier, the MACSwould be even larger.Bohm’s
figure (figure 3.1. 1) actually shows the dynamic perspective because it considers movements on
the MAC curve; when the cheap projects have been undertaken you move upwards on the MAC
curve. There is therefore a missing link between the graphic illustration and his later model.
s This principle distributes a quantity POPiWOP~of a global emission quota to country i. POP, is
the level of country i’spopulation and P~is the global level of population.
“see Hanley et al 1997 chapter 2.
7This condition is exactly what Bohm uses in his case 2 and shows in figure 9.4 but he makes a
mistake in stating that the term should be Eti’ = fi(E~O- Eel. The above calculations show that E#
and Eo”should be added and not subtracted which is also clear tlom Bohm’s graphic illustration
,..
(Bohm 1994). Where Bohm concludes that gains are positive the present more general set Up
shows that this is only the case ifEti’ > %(ED”+ED).
HFrom (2.3) we have: E.”= 1? - E;. From (4.3.5) we have E; = E! – c~(E~ - E;) insetiinoD
c1
these equations in each other, an isolating ED”gives (2.7).
‘ The average MAC curve slope according to table 3.5.1 are used for the IC’S.
‘“This would involve that the connection between the emission of country’ i’ and country ‘j’
would be arguments in the payoff fi.mction.
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Chapter 8. Quota prices
8 Quota prices
How high or how low will the C02 quota prices be if a system of tradable permits is agreed
on? What are the costs to society of COZreductions under alternative assumptions on quota
trade (or Joint Implementation and CDM)? These are important questions to politicians,
power producers, energy intensive firms and consumers.
A number of model based studies have estimated quota prices and costs to society of
conducting CO? reduction policies. The estimated prices and costs vary so much that it is
difficult to extract any clear message. The variance in results suggests that researchers (and
model users) even disagree on assumptions of importance to the magnitude of quota prices
and costs. In some of the studies there seem to be confhsion with respect to the use of
different cost concepts: It is not at all clear what is meant by “costs of COZ reduction”,
“costs to society”, “quota prices”. Ofien “costs” are presented as “costs per ton COZ
reduced” and interpreted as an estimate of quota prices, but the cost concept include macro
economic effects of quota prices.
Section 8.3 illustrates that estimates how costs to society and estimates of quota prices can
vary from one study to another. At least estimates of costs to society seem to vary in a
systematic way, dependent on the type of model used.
The present analysis briefly discusses the use of different types of models to estimate quota
prices, emission reductions and costs to society of reducing emissions (cf. Sections 8.1 and
8.2).
The main focus is on the limitations of the models with respect to estimating quota prices.
It is obvious that national models cannot be used to derive quota prices on an international
market. Estimates for example of EU quota prices require EU models. If CO? reductions
outside the EU are cheaper than within the EU, and if it is possible to buy these COZ
reductions for example through JI or CDM - this will affect the EU COZ quota prices. If
countries conduct policies, which support renewable within power production, or support
other initiatives, which reduce greenhouse gases, this will have an effect on the quota
prices (cf. Nielsen, 1999). If there are important backstop technologies with respect to COZ
reduction, and reductions of other greenhouse gasses, this may have an effect on quota
prices.
The analysis demonstrates that there are important backstop technologies with respect to
COZ reduction. If a backstop technology is the marginal COZ reduction technique on the
market, the quota price will be equal to the COZ reduction cost of that backstop technology.
If the models used to estimate quota prices do not model the relevant backstop
technologies, the estimated quota prices may be too high.
The analysis demonstrates that in Denmark and in the EU the power-producing sector is
significant with respect to COZ reductions; and f[mthermore that there are important
backstop technologies with large emission reduction potentials. Knowledge of the backstop
technologies and their COZ reduction costs (under given assumptions) can be used to infer
upper limits to the COZ quota prices. This is done for Denmark and the EU, given a number
of assumptions.
The present analysis stresses the importance of attention on backstop technologies – their
emission reduction potentials and the prices at which they become profitable – in studies of
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quota prices and costs of C02 reductions. The present analysis indicates that failure to
include backstop technologies may give quota price estimates that are too high and of
limited value.
8.1 The cost of C02 reduction
Different types of models have been used to evaluate the cost of reducing COZemissions to
a given level. The models differ with respect to their foundation in the technical sciences,
macroeconomics or macroeconomics.
The technical models focus on energy producing techniques (especially within the power-
producing sector) and the techniques associated with energy consumption. The models
evaluate emission reduction efforts and the costs of changing the existing technologies
with new and less C02 intensive techniques. The technical optimisation models describing
the power producing sector optimise the power producing techniques for given prices on
electricity, taxes, quota prices, etc.
The macroeconomic models evaluate the macroeconomic responses to COZ quotas, COZ
taxes, TP, TQ, JI or other instruments. They focus on the effects on aggregate energy
consumption, international competitiveness, industrial output, the macroeconomic activity
level, etc.
The assumptions forming the models and the cost concepts used differ. But both ~pes of
models have relevance.
In Denmark and internationally both types of models have been used to analyse the same
questions concerning costs to society of reducing greenhouse gasses. But there seems to be
a systematic difference between the models with respect to the estimated cost: The
technical models seem to estimate lower costs to society than the macroeconomic costs (cf.
Jacobsen et al., 1996, chapter 2). Much effort has been done to integrate the models.
The present and the following section relates the concepts of quota prices, COZ reduction
costs and costs to society of reducing COZ with the different types of models. It is
important to be aware that these concepts do not cover the same.
The quota price k formed on a market where supply and demand for quotas are presented.
The quota price is equal to the marginal CO? reduction cost on the market.
The macroeconomic C02 reduction costs – the costs to society – are the direct and indirect
economic consequences of firms and consumers being forced to reduce emissions or to buy
or sel I quotas. CO? quota prices can be interpreted as CO~ taxes on firms and comurners,
and the wider economic consequences of these taxes can be analysed in the
macroeconomic models.
For given quota prices the national macroeconomic models estimate the macroeconomic
costs of the quotas. But if the national and international macroeconomic models are
sufficient specific with respect to techniques and emissions, it is in principle possible to
estimate the COZ tax – or the quota – which will imply that the COZ reduction target is
reached.
National macroeconomic and technical models cannot estimate quota prices on quota
markets, which include more countries.
Macroeconomic estimates of national and international quota prices have the advantage
that there are feed backs between the quota market (prices) and enerag consumption,
econoim ic activity, foreign competitiveness, etc. These feed back mechanisms are the more
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important the higher the quota prices and the larger the effects on energy consumption
behaviour and macro economic activi~. The amount of data needed for the international
analysis may be considerable.
Marginal COZ abatement costs and COZ abatement costs curves can be estimated from
technical tnodels. Cost curves for all the countries participating in a quota system
combined with country specific emission reduction targets will say something about the
quota market, the amount of trades and the quota price. Cost curves are estimated for given
activity level, prices and technological development. It is obvious that quota prices
estimated by technical models reflect the assumptions of the technical cost curves.
It is typical that output from the one ~pe of model is used as input in the other type of
model. The technical models use activi~ levels, prices and perhaps elasticities from the
macroeconomic models and the macroeconomic model use emission reduction potentials
and macroeconomic COZ reduction costs from the technical models.
8.2 Relations between quota prices and macroeconomic costs
of C02 reductions
This section shows that there is no “one to one” relation between the size of quota prices
and the macroeconomic costs of CO? reductions. And demonstrate why it is important to
distinguish between quota prices and macroeconomic costs.
The higher the economic activity in a country, the more emissions (in general) and the
more emission reductions needed to reach a fixed emission target for the country. On a
national quota market higher economic activity may increase quota prices, because the
price of the marginal emission reduction increases. But it is not at all obvious that an
international quota price is affected. Even if the quota price is unaffected of an increased
activi~ level, the macro economic costs may be higher.
Along the same lines, changes in the fixed emission target for the country do not
necessarily lead to changes in quota prices. But the macroeconomic cost change.
A higher quota price may be less damaging to the macro economy, if the high quota price
is coordinated between countries and the low quota price is not.
A given quota price will have different macroeconomic implications dependent on for
example the structure of a country’s industry. The extremes could be an economy, which
produce emission-reducing technologies, and therefore would have an economic advantage
of international policies towards emission reductions. Or an economy where firms and
processes are exported to countries without environmental regulation.
Studies of macroeconomic costs of CO? reductions reflect that the time horizon analysed is
short. The reason why policies to reduce the greenhouse gasses are conducted are that there
are positive welfare gains in the long run. And that these gains are bigger than short-term
economic costs.
The time perspective is also important with respect to the quota price: Investments in COZ
reductions can be very expensive if the C02 investments are not coordinated with other
investments or not planned properly.
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8.3 Quota prices in selected empirical studies
Estimates of quota prices are important as measures of the costs of climate policy to the
individual emitters of COZ. Summing up to the national level estimates of quota prices are
important as input in macroeconomic analysis of the costs to society.
The following presentation of a few estimates of the quota price is very brief. The purpose
is to show that estimates differ a lot. All the different estimates of the quota prices may be
“correct” given the different assumptions. But it leaves the reader rather confused – and
with a need for a method or guidelines to evaluate the quota prices. The following sections
tries to develop such a method or guidelines concerning reductions of emissions.
A recent article by Criqui et al. (1999) use the POLES and EPPA models to estimate both
costs of fulfilling the Kyoto agreement in different regions of the world and quota prices
for these regions. Estimated quota prices are listed in Table 8.1. All prices are in constant
1990 US dollars or constant 1990 Danish currency (DKK). EPPA is a general equilibrium
macroeconomic model and POLES is an energy system model with some common features
with the “top-down” models. The abatement costs calculated by the POLES model are
“sectoral cost”, whereas the EPPA model takes the “fill range of impacts of reduction
policies” into account (Criqui et al., 1999, p 588). The size of the quota prices are much
dependent on the model: According to Table 8.1 the EPPA model estimate prices twice the
size of the POLES model prices for the Annex B market and EU market. In the article it is
said that these differences are due to different reference scenarios: If the POLES reference
scenario is used in the EPPA model, quota prices will be almost the same.
In 2010 the C02 reduction needed in the EU to go from the reference to the Kyoto target is
20 YOin the POLES model and 29 % in the EPPA model. The quota prices are, following
Table 8.1, 166 and 330 $/ton C respectively. Comparing the two models gives that
reducing emissions 9 0/0more (to reach the same target) gives a quota price increase of
100 VO! Will that be credible? It is difficult to say, without having anything to evaluate it
against. (The amounts of emissions reduced are 204 and 308 million ton C in the two
models).
Table 8.1. Quota prices Jor year 2010
Region/Model POLES EPPA
World* 21.3 $/ton C (41.9 DKKAonCOJ 24 $/ton C (47 DKKAonCO,)
AnnexB 63 $/ton C (~24 DKK/tonCO?) 127$/ton C (250 D.KK/tonCOZ)
EU 166 $/ton C (326 DKK/tonCOJ 330 $/ton C (650 DKK/tonCOZ)
Source: Criqui et al. 1999.
Notes: All prices are in constant 1990 US dollars or constant 1990 DKK.
Non amex B countries are assumed to have reduction target equal to their baseline.
A special issue of the Energy Journal (1999) is dealing with “The costs of the Kyoto
Protocol: A multimodal evaluation”. Thirteen different modelling teams use their particular
model to analyse some standard questions:
“First, each team was asked to run a “modellers reference” scenario, with modeller chosen
GDP, population, energy prices, etc. This scenario was to assume no new policies other
than those currently in effect (e.g., nothing new from Kyoto).
Second, the modelling teams were asked to run a number of stylised Kyoto scenarios
varying on three dimensions: (i) The amount of international emissions trading assumed,
(ii) The availability of sinks and “other greenhouse gas” emission reductions to satisfi the
Protocol’s requirement, and (iii) The required emission reduction beyond 2010.”
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The modelling teams estimate emission quota prices (carbon taxes) for different areas.
With respect to the European Union the results are summarised in the following Figure 8.1
showing four different emission trading scenarios: 1. No international trade, 2. Annex 1
trading, 3. “Double Bubble”, i.e. separate EU and separate “rest of Annex 1” trade, and 4.
Global trading.
The EU carbon tax in the no international trade scenario is equal to the quota price in the
“Double bubble” EU emission trading scenario (there may be minor differences). It is seen
that there is an extreme variance between the most optimistic (<20 $/t C = 5 $/ton C02)
and most pessimistic price estimates (>900 $/t C = 245 $/ton COZ). Apart from the most
optimistic model study, all the quota prices exceed 300 DKK/ton COZ (175 $/ton C,
exchange rate 6.19 DKK/$). The Annex 1 trading scenario in most cases more than half the
model based quota prices. This is to a large extent due to Russian “hot air”.
The different quota prices of course reflect the different reference scenarios, assumptions
and models. In principle all the quota prices can be equally relevant, but it could be very
convenient to have a method or guidelines to evaluate the empirical relevance of the
different outcomes.
(b) Euopean Union
12C0 I
Figure 8.1. Year 2010 Carbon Tizz Comparisons
Table 8.2 describes the results of three Nordic model based studies of quota prices on a
Nordic or a national market. Again the quota prices reflect the assumptions and models.
What could be interesting to evaluate is the development of quota prices over time, and the
very high quota price in 2020 in the Delmark study: According to Hauch (1999) an
important difference between his own analysis of Sweden and Delmark’s is that Hauch
assumes that Sweden import electricity from the other Nordic countries. But why can
Sweden not invest in the same power producing technologies as the other Nordic countries
and bring the quota price down?
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Table 8.2. Quota prices in three Nordic studies
Analysis Amundsen Delmark Hauch Hauch
Model type Partial General equilibrium General equilibrium General equilibrium
equilibrium
Market Nordicl Sweden Sweden Nordic’
Sectors Power sector Power sector All All
Reduction relative Swedish nuclear Swedish nuclear Swedish nuclear Swedish nuclear
to target power phase out, power phase out, power phase out, power phase out,
1990 emission 1990 emission level Kyoto (EU) targetsl Kyoto (EIJ) targets’
level
Year for quota
price(s) 2000 2000,2020 2000,2020 2000,2010,2020
reduction in pet. year 2010:26 ‘Yo
of reference year 2020:38 0/0
Quota price3 65 DKK/ton COZ Year 2000: Year 2000: Year 2000:
125 DKIMon COZ 62 DKK/ton COZ 75 DKK/ton COZ
Year 2020: Year 2020: Year 2010:
1045 DKK/ton C02 680 DKWton COZ 340 DKWton COZ
Year 2020:
600 DKK/ton COZ
.---,. . . . . ------
SOUrCeS: ArMMClSe13( YYYJ,HfiUCtI[1YYYJ
Notes: 1) Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. 2) The EU distribution of the Kyoto target implies
that Denmark reduces emissions by 21 V. compared to a revised 1990 level. The other Nordic
countries have reduction targets close to their 1990 emission level. 3) Prices are constant 1990
prices.
8.4 A method to evaluate the size of quota prices
Quota prices are results of supply and demand for emission quotas and indirectly results of
sLlpply and demand for emission reductions. Estimates of a future COZ quota price may be
given by the intersection of supply and demand curves for COZ reductions. But supply and
demand curves are difficult to construct because of the amount of data needed.
With respect to the power producing sector estimates of future quota prices are oflen based
on technical optimisation or simulation models describing the existing power producing
system and a number of alternative investment possibilities. A model based supply curve
for C02 reductions can be constructed from registering the changes in the models
emissions following different levels of quota prices. Of cause the supply curve reflects the
alternative investment possibilities given in the model, fbel input prices, prices on
electricity, and all the other assumptions of the model.
The method used in this section to evaluate the size of quota prices is to analyse important
backstop technologies with respect to COZ reductions. These backstop technologies may
Jorm a maximum-price supply curve Jor C02 emission reductions. Given that these
backstop technologies have large emission reduction potentials this supply curve may have
large flat segments. The cheaper the backstop technologies – with respect to CO?
reductions – the more likely it will be that the backstop supply curve will be close to, or
even equal to, the “real” supply curve for COZ reductions.
The idea is illustrated in Figure 8.2, which shows prices and emission reduction potentials
for three backstop technologies. At a price equal of P(b3) there is a reduction potential of
z-y. y-x is the reduction potential for a backstop technoloe~, b2, with COZ reduction costs
equal of P(b2), and x-v is the potential at a quota price equal of P(b 1). Figures are
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constructed so that the reduction potentials can be added. Together the tree backstop
technologies have a reduction potential of (z-v).
Assume a tradable emission quota system. Then, 1~the “demand” for emission reductions
is between z-y, the quota price can never exceed P(b3), which k the price of the cheapest
backstop technology. If the required level of emissions are between x and y the price will
not exceed P(b2), and given a required emission level between v and x the price wi1I not
exceed P(b 1).
If the emissions reduction potentials for the three backstop technologies are significant
compared to the total reduction requirements, and if the C02 reduction costs are relatively
low compared to other possibilities, one of these prices could be a good estimate for the
emissions quota price. At least the prices of the backstop technologies will form maximum
quota prices within different ranges of the total level of emission reductions.
Backstop technologies
Emission level
r the whole economy
+ emissions
Fi&me 8.2. Backstop technologies, prices andpotentials
The method can be motivated by at least two different arguments:
Knowledge of the emission reduction costs for backstop technologies with a large
reduction potential (relative to the required reductions) can be used to question for example
model based quota prices, which are either much higher or much lower than costs for the
relevant backstop technology.
Part of the explanation why prices of American SOZ quotas fell much below the predicted
level was the presence of cheap backstop technologies with a huge emission reduction
potential. But also investments in high cost emission reductions options’s based on false
expectations of high SOZ quota prices (partly justified on the predicted high SOZ quota
price) played a role (Ellerman, 1998). The irreversibility of the investment decisions
increased the supply of quotas at sunk costs (implying an outward shift in the supply
curve). Because of the ‘over-investment’ in high cost emission reduction methods, the
78The backstop technology in question is “scrubbers”, which clean SOZemissions to air.
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marginal S02 reduction technique was a low cost technique. Table 8.3 copied from
Ellerman (1998) summarises reduction costs and emission reductions in the American Soz
market. “..early studies of compliance cost estimated (prices) at about $300 per ton,
although it was possible to find even higher estimates” In 1993 the auction clearing price
was $131, in 1996 allowance prices were slightly below $70 and in 1998 again around
$130 (Ellerman, 1998).
Table 8.3 Reduction and compliance costs in 1995 (1995$)
Method of compliance Emission reduction Avg. cost Min. cost Max. cost Total cost
ton S02 Percentage $/ton $/ton $Iton Million $
Title IV Scrubbers 1,733,743 45 ‘%0 267 186 773 463.1
Non-Title IV Scrubbers 20,698 1 ‘%0 65 65 65 1.3
Coal Switching 1,707,819 44% 153 60 297 X61.3
Non-cost Switching 425,242 1I% o 0 0 0.0
Total 3,887,502 100% 187 0 773 725.7
Source: Ellerman, 1998.
The preceding section showed wide differences among predicted future C02 quota prices.
Of course these differences reflect the different models and the different assumptions.
Some of them may be compatible. But if there are important backstop technologies with
large emission reduction potentials, and if the investment costs of these are well known, all
the studies must be able to relate to this information. The intention behind the next sections
is to develop, or demonstrate, a method that can be used to evaluate predicted quota prices
and the assumptions of the models used. Section 8.5 describes C02 reduction costs and
potentials within the Danish power producing sector. These reduction costs are used to say
something about maximum quota prices in a purely Danish COZ quota system. The analysis
is broadened to the whole EU in Section 8.6.
8.5 COZ reduction costs for the case of Denmark
Table 8.4 gives a brief impression of alternative costs of reducing COZ within the Danish
electricity sector. Figures are calculated based on a number of assumptions as to for
example the interest rate, which type of power production is substituted, and which level of
capacity the new and substituted plant is run at. The sizes of the figures are highly
dependent on the assumptions, which are therefore relevant in evaluating the figures:
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Table 8.4. Costs for CO1-redzictions in Denmark in 1996
Country/ Denmark
Technology DKK/ton COZ
Electricity export reduced by 50 % 40
Electrici& export reduced by 100 ‘%. 100
Fue[ conversion
– coal to gas 76
– coal to straw, 10 0/0 275
– coal to straw, 10 0/0 in separate boiler 446
New capacity
Industrial CHP, gas 326
Central KAD, coal
Central GAD, gas 129
Central CC, gas 93
Wind mills, placed at land 241
Wind mills, offshore 282
Source: Elsam, 1997.
The higher the interest rate the more expensive are new investments in C02 reductions.
A given investment in C02 reductions will reduce more COZ – and the COZ reduction costs
per ton COZ will be cheaper – if the substituted plant is very inefficient and emits a lot of
COZ. Therefore, if figures are based on the assumption that the substituted plant is always
the highest C02 emitter, the figures may be valid only at the margin and have little or no
relevance with respect to large scale emission reductions: One should notice that the CO?
reduction costs are dependent on the reference scenario and which investments have
already been carried out.
If the calculations assume that the new investments are always operating at full capacity
(irrespective of whether it is profitable or not), it is likely that the amount of CO?
reductions will be higher, compared to a situation where the investments are run below full
capacity: The larger the COZ reductions, the cheaper these may be.
For a detailed list of assumptions behind Table 8.4, readers are referred to ELSAM, 1997.
Some of the important general assumptions are: An interest rate at 5 ?40 pa., market prices
of electricity (implying less than full capacity use) and market prices on input fuels. All
costs are measured in constant 1996 prices. One implication of this is that improvements in
technologies compared to the 1996 “levels”, or more intense price competition in markets
for certain technologies (wind mills) are not taken into consideration. But these factors
may be significant for certain technologies and may press investment costs – and the COZ
reduction costs – down. Real fuel prices are kept constant at their 1997 level. (This
assumption is in line with projections for 1997 – 2010 in World Energy Outlook, IEA,
1998). Electricity prices are close to variable costs in conventional electricity production,
meaning that there are no incentives in the electricity prices to invest in new capaci~. This
price assumption may be very realistic in a ‘strategic’ market, or a market with excess
capacity, but increases the C02 reduction costs because investments in general are. less
profitable.
The general impression of the costs for CO? reduction given in Table 8.4 is that the
magnitudes of costs are valid within a relevant Danish COZ reduction range. The interest
rate may be too low for private investors. Table 8.4 is further commented in the following
subsections.
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8.5.1 Reducing export
The level of the Danish electrici~ production has traditionally been closely related to
electricity production in Sweden and Norway, and in particular to the Norwegian
hydropower production. In some years Denmark is a net importer of Norwegian
hydropower (wet years in Norway) and in other years Denmark is a net exporter of coal
produced electricity.
The new Danish electrici~ act from May 1999 introduces a COZ emission quota (on an
annual basis) on the Danish electricity producers. If this quota is violated the producers has
to pay a fee of 40 DKK per ton COZ. This fee will make it less profitable to produce
electricity at marginal Danish coal fired power plants (it will not make coal fired power
plants unprofitable in general). It is estimated (see chapter 6) that the fee will reduce
Danish exports of electricity by around 50 %, given constant prices on electricity and
constant export prices. Under the same assumption of constant export prices, and therefore
sufficient international supply of electricity at that prices and sul%cient cable capacity, a
100 DKK pr ton C02 fee will reduce Danish electricity exports to zero.
The new electricity law does not necessarily squeeze the marginal coal fired power plants
out: If the international electricity prices are sufficiently high, production at these plants
may still be profitable.
A Danish fee will reduce Danish emissions, but not necessarily reduce global emissions: if
the Danish electricity export to for example Norway is substituted by Norwegian import of
electricity produced by a technoloa~ which also emits COZ, and maybe emits the same
amount of COZ, the global COZ reductions may be limited or be zero. On the other hand, if
Norway instead of importing from Denmark import electricity from Germany, the German
emissions will rise and put pressure on the German government to take measures to reduce
emissions in order to fulfil the German Kyoto emission reduction target.
8.5.2 Fuel conversion
The economics behind fuel conversion depends on the technology of the power plant in
question, and on the prices and emission factors of the substituted and substituting ftlels.
Fuel conversion may be very cheap or very expensive. In Table 8.4 a typical Danish coal
fired condensing power plant is converted to either gas or straw. Conversion to gas is
relatively cheap – around 80 DKK per ton COZ – whereas conversion to straw, for. both
technologies, is relatively expensive. The reason why conversion to straw – which is often
a waste product in the agricultural production – is so expensive is the transportation costs,
and the more complicated technology needed to make the straw fired power plant ftmction
properly (for example to avoid Dioxin and dangerous emissions other than COZ).
Back pressure or extraction power plants have higher fuel efllciency than the condensing
power plants, and of course the technical properties are different. But fuel conversion does
not change the basic technical functionalities of the power plants. And assuming that the
investments needed for fuel conversion are the same irrespective of the condensing or
combined heat and power technoloaq – we further assume that the COZ reduction cost of
condensing power plants apply to combined heat and power79.
79The intuitive reasoning behind this assumption is that fiel conversion is related to the input into the
power plant, whereas the question of condensing, back pressure or extraction is related to the energy
output of the plants.
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Waste from households and biomass other than straw (for example wood chops and energy
crops) have zero C02 emissions factors and may be used as fuels in the heat and power
production. The table does not cover conversion to these fuels. But compared to the C02
reduction prices for the two straw technologies, wood chop prices will be lower and enera~
crop prices probably higher. This relation reflects relative prices of tree chop, straw and
enera~ crop, and reflects that using straw in the power production is technical Iy more
difficult than using wood chops and energy crops.
8.5.3 Building of new capacity
The fuel efficiency of power plants has much to say regarding emissions. Even substituting
old coal fired power plants with new coal fired may reduce emissions. Therefore building
new power plants with a) high fuel efficiency and b) a low emission fuel type may be the
cheapest way to reduce emissions. Alternatively new renewable capacity may be built. For
example wind-mills or solar cells. In Denmark windmills are relatively cheap because of
good wind conditions.
The table refers to a relatively new coal fired power plant with relatively high efficiency as
reference. Therefore it makes no economic sense to substitute this type of power plant with
another coal -fired power plant. The chosen reference gives the C02 reduction costs in the
table more credit, as these numbers are applicable beyond the margin.
The relatively high COZ reduction price of industrial combined heat and power is due to the
Danish industrial structure with many relatively small firms and few very energy intensive
firms. Investments in the cheapest industrial combined heat and power plants have already
been carried out.
The COZ reduction cost related to windmills may be exaggerated as the investment cost are
declining due to falling prices of windmills. Falling prices are a result of the size of the
markets for wind-mills, increased competition and improved technology. Included in the
investment costs are investments needed to cope with the fluctuating nature of power
production from windmills. These costs may be smaller the larger the electricity net and
the more dispersed the wind conditions.
Building new power production capacity will in practice be a much slower way to reduce
emissions than fuel conversion. Investments, risks and losses are far bigger – and the
planning horizon is longer.
8.5.4 Prices in a national COZ quota market
At the national level the Danish total costs of reducing CO? will be at a maximum if no
international trade is assumed. Given international – for example European trade – the
Danish national costs of C02 reductions will be lower. That is, quota trade reduces costs at
the national level.
An international – for example European – quota price may be higher or lower than a
purely national – for example Danish – quota price. If the international quota price is
higher Denmark will be net exporter of quotas, and if it is lower Denmark will be a net
importer.
If emission reductions are cheaper abroad, and if it is possible to substitute international
emission reductions for national, the international price of emission reductions will also be
the price of quotas on a domestic market. If foreign emission reductions are cheaper than
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the cheapest domestic emission reduction, no emission reductions will be carried out
domestically. And there will be no quota trade on the national market.
There have been several attempts to prognosticise quota prices using different methods and
assumptions.
The method used in this paper may be usefid when only limited information about
emission reduction curves is available. The method used has got the advantage that it tries
to identifi the lowest upper limit to the quota price. And this information may be very
valuable to planners and firms – especially if the quota price identified in this way is
relatively low.
In short the method is to focus on already known backstop technologies. That is, to select a
few technologies, with great emission reduction potentials within the analysed area, and
see at which quota prices these technologies
combined with estimates on emission reduction
price ranges for emission quotas.
The European Union must follow the Kyoto
compared with the 1990 emissions level.
will be profitable, The price estimates
potentials can tell something about likely
protocol in reducing emissions by 8 %
Within the European bubble Denmark has agreed to reduce emissions by 21 % compared
to an adjusted 1990 level. .
The question analysed in this section is what will the quota price be on a purely national
COZ quota market? Denmark is taken as an example, but exactly the same analysis could be
carried out for all the EU countries.
Assume no substitution of foreign emission reduction for national. That is, only emission
reductions carried out nationally will be accounted for, and the national emissions must not
exceed the Kyoto targets.
The energy sector is by far the most important emitter of greenhouse gasses. According to
the table below 68 0/0of Danish emissions of greenhouse gasses in 1994 originated from
the energy sector and around 16% from transport (Fenhann et al., 1997 and NEIU, 1997, p.
40).
So, even though electricity production and export in 1994 was considerable and the table
may therefore overestimate the contribution from the enerag sector, emission reductions in
the energy sector are important factors in a national Danish stratea~ to reach the Kyoto and
EU emission targets.
Table 8.5. Greenhouse gas emissions in 1994 apportioned by sector in percent of total
emissions.
Sector Percent of total emissions
Energy 68
Transport 16
Agriculture 16
Waste 3
Forestry -6
Industry 2
Source: Fenhann et al., 1997.
Assume a national Danish COZ quota market within the electrici~ sector alone. And
assume the extreme situation that this sector is the only sector to reduce emissions. If
Denmark has to fldfil the EU reduction target, the COZ reduction target in 2010 for the
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power producing sector should then, given the assumptions
62%
below, be in the range of31 to
The electricity sector reduction target of31 % is calculated in the following way: total
national emissions are the same in 2010 as in 1990 and the share of the enerb~ sector is
68 % in 2010. The national reduction target of 21 ‘XOk fulfilled by the electricity sector
alone.; (100-79)* 100/68 = 31 ‘/o The 62 0/0 is calculated under the assumption that total
national emissions have increased by 15 0/0.80in 2010 as compared to 1990, and the share
of the ener=~ sector is 50 ‘%oin 2010; (115-79)*100/(.5*115) = 62 0/0
How can these reduction targets be reached, and at what prices?
Following Table 8.7 what happens within the power producing sector, when quota prices
rise (or a fee is introduced), is that the Danish electricity export diminish. This effect is of
course only seen in years with electrici~ export, and presupposes that no other countries
relevant for the electricity import or export introduces COZ taxes, quotas or emission
trading. So production on marginal Danish coal fired power plants decrease. By how much
emissions are reduced by reducing exports is difficult to say, but Danish electrici~ export
was in the period 1984-1997 7 0/0 of total Danish electricity production (Statistisk
Tii?u-soversigt, 1996 og 1999). Given this average, if the Danish electricity export vanished
this would reduce emissions by at least 7 0/0 (the marginal electricity production is more
CO? emitting than the average).
At a quota price of 80 DKWton Co? fuel conversion will be profitable (cf. Table 8.4).
Assuming that approximately 60 % of Danish power production, in a “normal” year
without electricity export, is coal based (cf. Table 8.6), conversion from coal (95 ton
COZ/TJ) to natural gas (57 ton CWTJ) would reduce emissions by 28% (.6”(95-57)/79,
where 79 is the average ton C02 emission/TJ in Danish electricity production. Converting
orimulsion (80 ton COZ/TJ) to natural gas would further reduce emission by 3.5 0/0
Table 8.6. Total eIectricip generation by energy source, net export and import in 1997.
Energy source TWh Percent of total excl. export
Import 0.0
Export (assumed coal based) 7.3
Coal 27.2 58.0
Oil 1.0 2.9
Natural gas 7.0 ~().1
Wind 1.9 5.5
Biotiel 0.5 1.4
Orimulsion 4.2 12.0
Danish electricity generation 41.8
- excluding (coal based export) 34.8 100.0
Summing the emission reductions from the decrease in exports (a fee of 100 kr/ton COZ)
and fuel conversions (there is no double counting) gives a total of 38.5 O/O. of total
emissions within the electricity sector. This reduction should in principle – and given 1997
market prices for coal, natural gas and oil – be obtainable at a quota price below 100
DKK/ton C02.
At a quota price around 100 DKWton @ (93 DKK. in Table 8.4) it will be Profitable tO
substitute even relatively new coal fired power plants with new combined cycle natural gas
‘0 The EU assumes an increase in emissions of 14 pet. over the same period in European Economy,
no. 51, 1992.
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power plants. New power plants have the advantage (compared to fuel conversion) of
higher fuel efficiency. So if for example gas prices rise, this will make the construction of
new power plants relatively more attractive compared to fiel conversion.
A COZ quota price of 100 DKK/ton COZ increases electrici~ prices and reduces electricity
demand. The price increase depends on how COZ polluting the power sector is, and to what
extent the quota price is reflected in electricity price increases. If the average Coz
emissions from Danish electricity production in 1999 was equal to 0.8 ton/MWh a fully
reflected quota price of 100 DKK/ton COZ would raise electrici~ prices in Danish industry
and households by approximately 20 ‘io and 6 0/0(differences are due to different tax levels
and price discrimination). Table 8.7 assumes that consumer prices of electricity increase by
on average 10 O/O.
A demand elasticity equal to -0.27 (as estimated in the Indus III model (1998), modelling
energy consumption within Danish indust~) means that if electricity prices rises by 1 0/0,
electricity demand will fall by 27 O/O.If electrici~ demand and production fall by 27 0/0,
emissions will fall by at least this percentage.
Included in the CO? reduction costs for windmills are cost to compensate for the
fluctuating nature of wind power production. Therefore the windmills in the table in
principle can substitute conventional power production.
Table 8.7. Emission reductions at quota prices below 250 kr/ton C02. D@erent scenarios.
Denmark
Quota price Decrease in Decrease in Decrease in
per ton C02. exports marginal co?
Approxi- production emissions
mately within
electricity
sector
Change in demand for electricity
Decrease in foreign demand (average year) 100 DKK 100 Yo 7 ‘%0 ~ 7 0/0
Decrease in domestic demand for given elasticity 100 DKK 2.5 ‘%,** > 2.j ‘/o**
Decrease in domestic demand for given elasticity 250 DKK 6.3 ‘XO** >6.3 o/o.**
Change in power production
75 ‘%0coal substituted by renewables***
25 VO coal converted to gas <300 DKK o 60 ~0*
50 ‘Acoal substituted by renewable***
50 ‘Acoal converted to gas < 25(3DKK
100 OAcoalconverted to gas
o 49 Ye.”
<100” DKK o 28 ‘/O.*
* The decrease in foreign electricity demand is subtracted before calculating the emission reduction.
Therefore the decrease in exports may be added to this figure. The decrease in domestic electricity
demand is not subtracted before calculating the emission reduction. Therefore the decrease in
domestic demand cannot be added to this figure.
** Numbers are calculated for a demand elasticity in electricity consumption equal to -.27. Feed back
effects are not taken into account, which it should be especially when considering big quota prices.
Elasticities may be smaller when more than marginal changes in consumption prices are considered.
*** It is ~sumed that wind power substitutes coal fired condensing power production (i-e- up to a
maximum of 55 percent of total Danish electricity production).
At quota prices of around 250 DKK/ton CO? wind mills will be profitable. As the reference
to the wind mills is a relatively new coal fired condensing power plant, it is in principle
possible, at this price, to SLlbStitLlteall the coal fired condensing power plants with wind
power production (provided that the wind conditions where the new mills
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good enough). Coal fired back pressure and extraction power plants can not directly be
substituted by wind power, but may be substituted by straw, waste, wood chops or other
renewable. In the table above different alternatives are shown.
It may seem relatively extreme to let the coal based electriciw production be substituted by
50 or even 75 % renewable. But remember that even if coal was 100% substituted by
renewable there would still be 35 0/0oil, natural gas and orimulsion based electricity
production. The examples suggest a different mix of fuel conversion and renewable and
give a maximum quota price. But it is important to note that if a quota price of for example
300 DKK was settled on the market, the investors and their investment behaviors would
decide the optimal mix of COZ reducing technologies.
Taking the 50 % fuel conversion/50 % wind mill (renewable) production as an example,
the table may be read in the following way: The stop of electrici~ export reduce emissions
by at least 7 % in an average year (1984-1997). The specified changes in the power
production structure adds 49 % reduction to this figure. So emissions within the sector will
fall by at least 56 % But higher electricity prices will cause domestic electricity demand to
fall. A very rough estimate of electrici~ price increases, a rough use of elasticities, and no
use of feed back mechanisms, would suggest a 6 0/0 decrease in domestic electricity
demand and a higher decrease in emissions. Given the 6 ‘%0 decrease, total emissions will
fall by 59 ‘?Aoinstead of 56 % (avoiding double counting). The quota price is below 300
DKK/ton C02.
Looking at the emission reduction costs and potentials in the rest of the economy – not just
the electricity sector – complicates the analysis: Technologies are more diverse, potentials
are smaller and consumption patterns differ. Macroeconomic demand elasticities may be a
very easy way to represent aggregated responses of other sectors to a given quota price.
Car driver’s response to increased gasoline prices, consumer’s response to increased oil
and gas prices etc. tell how drivers and consumers reacted to price increases in the past,
and tell something of past potentials for enera~ savings. One of the problems using demand
elasticities is whether these elasticities are valid for very large price changes.
A quota price of 100 DKK/ton CO? raises the price of gasoline by 0.24 DKK/1 or 3-4 ‘Yo.
Given a demand elastici~ of approximately -0.5 as estimated in the ADAM model
(Danmarks Statistik, 1996), this quota price will reduce emissions from private cars by 1.5-
2 0/0.
According the ADAM and Indus models the fuel price elasticity within Danish industry,
the primary sectors and transport industry is approximately -0.25. If this elasticity holds
true fuel consumption may fall by as much as 10 percent following a COZ quota price of
100 DKK/ton CO?.
The macroeconomic responses and costs of Danish quota prices at for example 100
DKK/ton CO? depend on the design of the system.
To conclude on a national Danish COZ quota price:
As the main emitter of Coz, the power sector has to reduce emissions considerably. At
quota prices below 300 DKK per ton COZ, the power generating sector is capable of
reducing by far the largest part of the Danish COZ reductions needed to fhlfil the Danish
reduction commitments. Even at a quota price of 100 DKK per ton COZ emissions within
the power generating sector can be reduced significantly. This is due to in- and external
decrease in electricity demand, fuel conversion and substitution of old capacity with new.
If wind power in large scale is promoted by policies other than COZ emission quotas, the
price of COZ emission quotas will almost certainly not be hi:her than the COZ costs of fiel
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conversion as this is a technology with a very large emission reduction potential. It is likely
that the quota price for the power sector, and the whole economy, will be equal to the Coz
costs of fuel conversion.
8.6 Estimated price range for EU C02 emission quotas
An exact estimate of fhture quota prices on a European COz emission quota market is
impossible to give. The price will be dependent on COZ reduction costs within and outside
the EU-countries, the country specific levels of economic activities and how much to be
reduced. Below we try to give price ranges within which the quota price alternatively will
be – under different conditions. Of course the more narrow these price ranges, the more
informative the analysis.
The analysis is very similar to the analysis above of a national Danish C02 quota system.
But of course the uncertainties with respect to the quota price are bigger. It may be easier
to overlook important country-specific emission reduction potentials. Liberalizing
European energy (especially electricity) markets may have great emission reduction
potentials and implications for a quota price. Fuel prices may be sensitive to for example
large-scale fuel conversion from coal to gas.
The C02 quota prices will be extremely dependent on the possibilities of buying emission
reductions outside the EU: Prices at an EU quota market will not be higher than alternative,
comparable prices on emission reductions outside the EU.
To limit the analysis it is assumed in what follows that only emission reductions within the
EU will be accredited. It will be highly relevant later to loosen this assumption to analyse
whether the European quota market will survive “competition” from outside, and to
analyse the price implications.
Two “areas” are especially interesting with respect to CO? emission reductions, because of
a considerable contribution to the overall problem: The power generating sector and CO?
emissions from transport. Within the EU the power generating sector contributed with
31 % of total C02 emissions in 1990, and this percent is expected to increase to around 38
in 2010 (cf. European Economy, No 51, May 1992). According to the same source, COZ
emissions from European transport contributed with around 24 ‘io in 1990 and this share is
expected to remain constant. Total CO? emissions are expected to increase 14 0/0over the
years 1990-2010. So if the EU, following the Kyoto target, must reach a reduction in its
emissions by 8 0/0before 2010 (compared to the 1990 emission level), this reduction could
be achieved by either:
l reducing C02 emissions from the power generating sector by 51 0/0,or
. reducing C02 emissions from cars with 80 0/0,or
l reducing COZ emissions from cars and the electricity sector by 31 O/O.
These three extreme alternatives assume that no other sectors reduce their COZ emission
compared to the reference scenario, and the other greenhouse gases mentioned in the Kyoto
protocol are reduced to their 1990 level.
If k is possible to find a minimum marginal COZ reduction price of one or more of these
reduction strategies, the minimum price will be the maximum price of Etlropean COZ
quotas.
The following analysis focuses on the power-generating sector. But it is worth noting that
consumer prices on energy – electricity prices, prices on gasoline, etc. – differs widely
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within the EU (see for example statistics in Enerav Prices and Taxes from the IEA), and so
does ener=g intensi~ in for example private consumption. price differences are due to
monopolised energy markets, taxation, countries endowments with primary fuels,
environmental considerations, competitiveness of domestic industries etc., etc. According
to main stream economics it is reasonable to believe that these price differentials has
resulted in different energy consumption patterns among the EU countries. Therefore
narrowing the price differentials by rising the lowest enerb~ prices may have large
emission reduction potentials. This effect may be reflected in different sizes of price
elasticities amongst EU countries. (Effects on energy consumption of very low enerb~
prices are seen in the former Eastern Europe).
8.6.1 Reducing C02 emissions from the power generating sector
Table 8.8 shows by which fuel electricity is produced within the EU.
Table 8.8. Electricip generation in the EU by fiel. Year 2000.
Fuel Fuel input, ‘Yo Electricity production, 0/0
Solids 20.7
Oil (including refinery gas) 11.4
Gas 16.9
Biomass – Waste 3.5
Thermal incl. biomass 52.5 52.5
Hydro and wind 13.2
Nuclear 34.3
Source: Shared Analysis Project, VOI.5.Appendix.
Very rough estimates suggest that: If we assume that the main part of emissions from the
power generating sector originates from coal fired power plants, fuel switch to natural gas
will reduce emissions by around 40 0/0 (Coal is assumed to have an emission factor of 95
tonne COz/TJ and natural gas 56.9 tonne COZ/TJ. ((95-56.9)*100/95=40. 1)). If 50 ‘Yoof the
emissions stem from coa181, the reduction will be 20 % (95-
56.9)*20.7* 100/(20.7*95+1 1.4*74+1 6.9*56.9)= 20.8 (Remember that nuclear power,
biomass, renewable and hydro power has got no emissions). If both oil and coal fired
power plants fuel switch to natural gas emissions will be reduced by 26 ‘Yo.
Alternatively, if an extra 10 % of the total electricity production is supplied by renewable
(compared to the reference), and this production substitutes coal fired power plants, this
would reduce emissions by 20 ‘/o if coal fired electricity production is 50 0/0 of total
electricity production and coal is the main cause of C02 emissions within the EU power
producing sector ((95-O)*. 1*100/(.5*95)). Emission reductions would be 26 % if coal fired
electricity production was 20 0/0 (and the percentages for gas and oil was 16.9 and 11.4) of
total electricity production (cf. Table 8.8).
The following Table 8.9 is almost identical to Table 8.4 It shows prices on C02 reductions
within the European power-producing sector under the same assumptions as in Table 8.1.
The question is whether fkel conversion prices and investments in new capacity are the
same in the rest of EU as in Denmark.
S1This assumption is in line with table xx and fhel input shares to solids (coal), oil and gas at 20.7,
I I.4 and 16.9 V. 52 ‘X. of emissions will stem fi-om solids (coal), 22 ‘Z. from oil and 26 YO ffom
natural gas.
RismR-1 184 (DRAFT 10 May 2000) 191
,..
Chapter 8. Quota prices
Of course there are differences between the EU countries. The power producing sectors
differs much with respect to the share of hydro, nuclear, wind and thermal power. But from
a C02 reduction point of view it is only the thermal power production, which is interesting
to look at either to fuel convertor to substitute by more efficient power plants or renewable
energy.
The efficiency of Danish power plants is high compared to the average efficiency within
the EU. This is an argument for low EU COZ reductions costs compared to the Danish
costs. Maybe the potentials in fuel witch to wood chops are higher in the EU than in
Denmark. Prices on waste, straw and wood chops may be determined on local markets and
may differ widely between the EU. But otherwise, given the same fiel input prices,
electricity prices and prices on investments, and given the relative efficient reference coal
fired power plants, the COZ reduction costs in the table should be the same in the different
EU countries.
Effects on C02 reduction costs from different price assumptions are shown in column 3 in
Table 8.9. Coal prices are the same as in column 2. Prices on gas and electricity are higher,
27 and 66 %, and prices on straw are lower, 56 ‘%oThe relative price of electricity is much
higher in colum 3 than in colum 2, because it in comum 3 is assumed that the electricity
prices increases to a level where it is profitable to invest in new power plant capacity. The
market prices in column 2 are near variable costs for conventional electricity production.
Higher relative gas prices make fuel conversion from coal to gas more expensive and Coz
reduction costs higher. Lower prises on straw, lowers the COZ reduction costs. Q
reduction costs on new gas fired power plants increase with increasing gas prices and fall
with increasing electricity prices. The net effect is falling C02 reduction costs. Investments
in windmills are more profitable – also from a COZ reduction point of view - the higher the
electricity prices.
The changed fuel and electricity prices change the ranking of technologies with respect to
the cheapest C02 reduction costs. But fuel substitution from coal to gas, and investments in
an increased share of renewable, are still possible at relatively low costs. All COZ
reduction prices in column 3 are below 307 DKK/ton COZ.
Table 8.9. Prices for CO1-reductions in EU
Country/ EU EU
Technology DKK/ton C02 DKKAon CO?
Market prices 1997 level Changed relative fiel prices
FueI conversion
– coal to gas 76 190’
– coal to straw, 10 0/0 275 ~362
- coal to straw, 10 0/0 in separate. boiler 446 3072
New capacity
Industrial CHP, gas
Central KAD, coal o 0
Central GAD, gas 129 -70;
Central CC, gas 93 -903
Wind mills, placed at land 241 1433
Wind mills, offshore 282 1845
Source: Elsam, 1997.
Notes: 1) Coal prices are the same as in column 2. Gas prices are 27 % higher. 2) Coal prices are the
same as in column 2. Prices on straw are 56 0/0 of the prices in column 2. 3) Coal prices are the same
as in column 2. Gas prices are 27 0/0 higher. Prices on electricity are 66 0/0 higher.
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Table 8.1 () combine the Cc)z reduction prices in Table 8.8 with very rough estimates of the
EU potentials for COZ reductions. The Q reduction costs are based on market prices for
fuels. A quota price equal to 100 DKK is assumed to increase electricity prices with 6 ‘Yo
But this price increase is highly uncertain82. Given demand elasticities equal to -0.25 this
price increase will result in a 1.5 % decrease in electricity demand (and production) and a
more than 3 0/0 decrease in COZ emissions from the electricity sector (if the marginal
productions is assumed to be coal based).
A hundred percent fuel conversion from coal to gas gives a decrease in emissions from the
power producing industry by 20 % The quota prise inducing this conversion would be
under 100 DKK/ton COZ. If an extra 10 percent of the electricity production were based on
renewable this would reduce emissions by 26 ‘/o, if the marginal electricity production
were coal based. The quota price inducing this would be below 300 DKK
The quota price giving incentives to extra 10% renewable will also bean incentive to fuel
conversion and maybe a higher percent of renewable. Fuel conversion may be very
profitable at a quota price well above 100 DKK To the existing conventional power plant
owners fuel conversion may be much more profitable than investments in renewable, for
example wind mills. But to other investors windmills will be profitable and they will
invest.
If capacity in the power-producing sector increases and electrici~ prices fall – quota prices
may rise to compensate the electricity price fall and induce further investments.
Following the table, COZ emissions will be reduced by 33 % if quota prices induced extra
10 YO renewable and 50 YO fuel substitution from coal to gas Taking the demand effects
into account would add an extra 5 ‘%o(if the marginal production is oil based).
Halving emissions from the EU power sector, which is what is needed to fulfil the Kyoto
target (if the power sector is the only sector to reduce emissions, and if emission
projections are as previously mentioned) imply heavy reliance on renewable energy. The
“halving” could be implemented in the following way:
o Substituting coal based power production (20 ‘XO of total EU production) with (17 ‘Yo)
renewable (decrease in demand is 3.8 O/O).
l Substituting oil and gas based power production (28 % of total EU production) with
renewable. Leaving the coal based power production unchanged.
l Some combination of the two alternatives above
l Converting oil based power production to gas, and substitution 14 YO of coal production
to renewable. (Decrease in electricity demand is 3.8 ‘A coal based).
Whether it is possible to substitute almost all conventional coal based power production
with renewable (at least 14 0/0of total electricity production) at a price not higher than 300
DKK/ton CO?, is difficult to answer. With respect to wind power it depends on wind
conditions, the size of the transmission net and the technical problems with the fluctuating
wind power.
The new Danish electricity act demands that 20 % of Danish electricity consumption
should be based on renewable (which in practice wil 1 say almost 20 0/0wind). Compared
‘2 The 6 ‘Y.is a little lower than the assumed Danish electricity price increase. The simple, but highly
uncertain, reasoning is: European net taxes on electricity are lower than the Danish, but Danish
electricity production is more COZemitting. The first effect suggest a higher EU price increase than
the Danish, the last effect a lower price increase. The net effect could be 6 O/O.
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to Denmark the EU has got very little combined heat and power. This means: 1) that wind
power in principle can substitute almost all the thermal power production, and 2) that it is
easier to use conventional power plants to compensate for the fluctuating wind. (In
Denmark much of flexibility of the electricity production is hindered by the production of
heat).
In other EU countries conversion to biomass or other renewable than wind, may be
cheaper than in Denmark.
The conclusions with respect to an EU quota price are:
As one of the main emitters of COA the power sector has to reduce emissions considerably.
At quota prices equal to the costs of fuel conversion or costs of investments in new
conventional capacity (i.e. below 100 DKK per ton COZ, given the assumptions in this
section) the power generating sector is capable of reducing emissions by 20 0/0Given the
emission projections hold, a 20 ‘/o emission reduction is the average reduction needed in all
sectors to fulfil the EU Kyoto commitment.
If the EU power sector has to reduce emissions by much more than 20 %, renewable
(hydro power or nuclear power) must be an important part of the strategy. There is a large
EU potential for wind power at quota prices below 300 DKK/ton COZ. It is possible that
biomass is cheaper in the EU than in Denmark.
If renewable – for example wind power – is promoted by other policies than COZ emission
quotas, the price of C02 emission quotas can be effected.
There is a large emission reduction potential in renewable; therefore it seems likely that
an EU COZ quota price will not exceed the price of the marginal investment in renewable.
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Table 8.10. Emission reductions at quota prices below 300 DKWton C02. Dl~ferent
scenarios. European Union
Quota price per ton Decrease in marginal Decrease in COZ
Coz production emissions within
Approximately electricity sector
Change in demand for
electricity
Decrease in EU
electricity demand, for 100 1.5 %** 3 ‘/o***
given elasticity and DKK
price increase
Decrease in EU
electricity demand, for 250 3.8 ‘/O** 7 YO***
given elasticity and DKK
price increase
Change in power
production
Extra 10% of
electricity production <300 0 26 %*
based on renewable DKK
100 % coal converted <100
to gas DKK o 20 ‘%0*
Extra 10% renewable
50 0/0coal converted to < 30(-I 33 ‘/o*
gas DKK o
Increasing fiel
efficiency
* The decrease in domestic electrici~ demand is not subtracted before calculating the emission
reduction. Therefore the decrease in domestic demand cannot be added to this figure.
** The effect is highly Uncefiain. R-ice increases are assumed lower and elasticities identical to the
Danish, but percentage price increases and price elasticities may differ widely between countries, and
the true effects may be higher or lower than the Danish. Feed back effects are not taken into account,
which it should be especially when considering big quota prices.
*** It is assumed that the marginal power plant is coal based.
8.7 Conclusions on COZ quota prices
This sections conclusions with respect to the price on especially an EU quota market are
listed below. All cost estimates are subject to a number of highly uncertain assumptions.
Therefore these estimates must be interpreted with a high degree of caution. But having
said that, we believe that the cost estimates do carry information.
A precondition for trade on an EU market is a sufficient supply of quotas at prices,
which are equal to or 10wer than alternative emission reduction opportunities.
[f CDM or Joint Implementation with countries outside the EU is a possibility, or if a
system of quotas including other countries than the EU counties exists, it will be a
precondition for trade on the EU quota market that there is a supply of quotas at the
equi Iibrium price on the EU- market. That is, there must be at least one country within the
EU, which have enough of low costs emission reduction options to fulfil their own
international commitments and to sell quotas on an EU-market with profits. If emission
reduction prices are lower outside the EU, there will be no trade on an EU market for
quotas.
Risa-R-1 184 (DRAFT 10 May 2000) 195
,..
Chapter 8. Quota prices
Given trade on an EU quota market, and 1~EU tradable quotas are one out of more
alternatives to the agents, there will be a [inking between the quota price and prices of
tke alternative embsion reductions.
Prices on EU quotas will be equal to either the quota price on broader markets, or equal to
the price on Joint Implementation emission reductions outside the EU, if these markets
exists (i.e. in case of a broader than the EU-market for quotas exists or if Joint
Implementation with countries outside the EU is a possibility).
EU quota price when EU tradable quotas are the otdy alternative to reducing your own
emissions to the agents.
The EU quota price will be equal to the cost of the marginal COZ emission reduction within
the EU as a hole.
Upper limitsto the quota price
If there are backstop technologies (i.e. emission reduction technologies) which have great
emission reduction potentials within the EU, the COz-reduction price of one of these
technologies may be the upper limit to the quota price. The cheapest backstop technology
will be implemented first.
Within the EU power sector there is a great emission reduction potential in fuel switching
and higher fuel efficiency. The prices of C02 reductions carried out through fuel switching
range from 70 to 300 DKK per ton C02, depending on which fuel is substituted by which,
the type of power plant etc. The price span is not defined as the largest possible, but as the
price span within which the bulk of emission reduction potentials are to be found. And
furthermore, at the upper limit of the price span another technology with great potential
takes over.
The cost of extending the EU windmill capacity as a mean to reduce emissions, depends on
the wind conditions where raised, and the technical possibilities of fitting fluctuating wind
power into the overall power system. It will be technically possible to extend the EU wind
capacity considerably at prices below 280 DKK per ton COZ.
According the Kyoto Protocol the EU must reduce emissions by 8 % as compared to
emissions in 1990. If it is technically possible to reach the 8 0/0target level through fuel
switching in the power sector and increased wind power production, the upper limit to the
EU quota price must be around the 280 DKK/ton C02, which is the estimated price of
reducing emissions trough installing new wind mills. Even if it is not possible to reach the
target level solely by using these two techniques – if it is likely that cheaper C02 reduction
technologies in other sectors can reduce the rest, then the upper limit to the quota price will
sti 11be given by the marginal wind power investment.
If windmills are the marginal COz-reduction investment on a European quota market, the
price of the quotas will be around 280 DKKAon COZ. If fuel switch in the power sector
wi 11be the marginal investment, the quota price will properly be somewhere between 70
and 280 DKK/ton COZ, depending on the price and potentials of alternative COZ reduction
investments.
The lower limit to the quotas price
The lowest possible quota price will be zero. This price will only be realised ifi
1. either new technolobg makes COZ-reductions almost free, or
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2. due to low activity levels (within the EU or outside) there is sufficient of “hot air” to
reach the total EU target – and, none of the “hot air suppliers” are able to expel
monopoly power, and they are willing to sell quotas at prices next to nothing.
Other policies, new technologyetc.
In general all EU and national policies having an impact on the COZ emissions will affect
quota prices, given an overall reduction target. For example will limitations of car traffic
(through trees or direct regulation (no cars in city centres) and heavy taxation of trucks (on
a per kilometre basis) properly reduce emissions, and reduce the demand for and price of
quotas.
New technologies may affect the supply and demand for quotas and the quotas price: If
new enera~ saving cars were introduced, if renewable electrici~ production became
cheaper or new ener=~ saving inventions were made, this would increase the low cost
potentials for emission reductions and likely reduce the quota price.
The speed of C02 reductions
The speed of CO? reductions may be dependent on the size and wider implications of tile
investment decision, the profitability of the investments and technological factors. Fuel
conversion and for example small-scale windmill investments may be fairly easy to decide
on. Decisions to invest in new conventional power plants, large-scale wind or for example
hydropower may be harder. High quota prices may ease the investment decisions, and
fasten the COZ reductions.
Studiesof quota priceswhen backstoptechnologiesmatter
The present analysis stress the importance of attention on backstop technologies, the prices
at which they become profitable and their emission reduction potentials, in studies of quota
prices and costs of COZ reductions. The present analysis indicates that failure to include
backstop technologies may give quota price estimates of limited value.
Rise-R-l 184 (DRAFT 10 May 2000) I97
.. -
References
Brian Mclean 1998
Browne 1998
Burtraw, D. (1996), The SOI Emissions Trading Program: Cost Savings Without Allowance Trading.
Contemporary Economic Policy, 14,79-94.
Burtraw, D. and Swill, B. (1996), A New Standard of performance:An Ana&sis of the Clean Air
Act’s Acid Rain Program. EnvironmentalLawReporter,26, 10411-23.
The BusinessRoundtable,1998
Bohringer, C., Jensen, J., Rutherforcl,T.F. (1998). The Costs of Carbon Abatement in Six EU
Countries: Implications of Alternative Baseline Energy Projections. Working Paper.
Bdhringer, Harrison, G.W., Rutherford, T.F. (1998). Sharing the Burden of Carbon Abatement in the
European Union. Working Paper.
Christensen, J.L. and Svendsen, G.T. (1999): The US S01 Auction and Environmental Regulation.
Homo oeconomicus, Vol. XVI(2), 191-203 (ACCEDO Verlagsgesellschaft, Miinchen 1999).
COHERANCE (1991) Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of C02 Reduction Options. Syn-the-sis
Report/CountW Reports (Report for the Commission of the European Communities, DG XII,
JOULE Programme. Models for Energy& Environment), Brussels.
Criqui et al. (1999). Marginal abatement costs of CO~emission reductions, geographical jlexibilip
and concrete ceilings: an assessment using the POLES model. EnerDqPolicy 27, pp. 585-601
Danmarks Statistik. Statistisk Tidrsoversigt Diverse hrgange.
E1sam System. (1997). IRP97 Programdel - Sammenfattende notat. Notat SP97-62 1.
Elselskabemes og EnergisIyelsens Arbejdsgruppe for havmdler. (1997). Havmalle-handlingsplan
for de danske farvande.
Energislyrelsen (1995), Danmarks Energl~remtider, I@benhavn.
Energy Journal, Special Issue (1999). The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: a Multi-Model Evaluation.
European Commission (1992): The c[imate challenge - economic aspects of the Community’s
strategy for [imiting COZ emissions, European Economy, No. 51, May 1992
European Commission (1995). JOULE II Programme, The PRZMES Project. EUR 16713 EN.
European Commission (1999). Economic Foundations for Energy Policy. Energy in Europe Special
Issue, December 1999. www.shared-analysis. fhg.de/
GAO (1994), Air Pollution: Allowance Trading Offers an Opportunity to Reduce Emissions at Less
Cost, GAO/RCED–95–30. United States General Accounting OffIce.
Grohnheit, P.E. (1991), Economic interpretation of the EFOM model. Energy Economics. v. 13 p.
143-152.
Grohnheit, P. E. (1993), Modelling CHP within a national power system. Energy Policy, Vol. 21 (4),
418-429.
Grohnheit, P.E. (1996), Modelresultater for det danske elsystem. AKF Forlag,et, Kabenhavn. 1996.
187 p.
Grohnheit, P. E.; Olsen O. J. (1995), Electricity liberalisation and export of hydro power from the
Nordic Countrie., Pacific and Asian Journal of Energy, Vol. 5(2).
Grohnheit, P. E. (1997), Application and limitations of annual models for e[ectrici~ capacity
development. In: D. W. Bunn and E. R. Larsen (Eds.), Systems Modelling for Energy Policy.
John. Wiley & Sons.
Grohnheit, P.E., (1999) Energy policy responses to the climate change challenge: The Consisten~
of European CHP, Renewable and Energy Eficiency Policies. The Shared Analysis Project,
Volume 14. www.shared-ana@sis.jlzg. de/ (Rka.R- 1147. RiswNational Laboratory, Roskilde)
Grohnheit, P. E., Skytte, K., Wolffsen, P. (1998) En nordeurop~isk e[bars (A Northern European
Power Exchange). Ris~-R-1002. Forskningscenter Risa, Roskilde, www.risoe.dklrispubl/SYS/ris-
r- 1002.htm.
Hauch, J. (1999). The Kyoto Agreement - Consequences for Nordic Electricity Markets. Working
Paper, DORS. Copenhagen.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1996), ‘Climate Change 1995, in J. Bruce, H.P. Lee
and E.F. Haites, eds. Cambridge University Press.
198 Risa-R-l 184 (DRAFT 10 May 2000)
,.,..
Jacobsen, H., Morthorst, P.E., Nielsen, L., Stephensen, P. (1996). Sammenkob[ing af
makrookonomiske og teknisk-okonomiske modeller for energisektoren, Hybris. Risa-R-9 10(DA).
Jensen, J., Rasmussen, T.N. (1998). Allocation of COZEmission Permits: a General Equilibrium
Analysis of Policy Instruments to Facilitate Danish Carbon Abatement. Working Paper.
Jepma 199S
Klaassen, G. (1996), Acid Rain and Environmental Degradation. New Horizons in Environmental
Economics. Edward Elgar and IIASA..
Klaassen, G. and Nentjes, A. (1997), Su@r Trading Under the 1990 CAAA in the US: An
Assessment of First Experiences. Journalof Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2,384-410.
Michaelowe. 1998
Ministry of Environment and Energy (1996), Energy 21, Copenhagen, www-ens. dk.
Montero, J-P., Ellerman, A.D. (1998). Explaining low s@r dioxide allowance prices: the efiect of
expectation errors and irreversibility. Working Paper, MIT.
Nielsen, L. (1999). Okonomiske forua!xetninger for anvendelse af omsattelige kvoter indenfor
Norden. Energimiljmildet, Resum6 af opl=g og discussion.
Nordel (1997) Krajlbalans for Nordelsystemet fir 2005. Final Report prepared by the System
Operation Group for Nordel’s System Committee, June 1997.
A Northern European Power Exchange. Research project for the Danish Energy Research
Programme. Risa National Laboratory. www.risoe.dkkys-esy/elbr
Oliver, M., Jackson, T. (1999). The Market for Solar Photovoltaics. Energy Policy 27, pp.371 -385
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parkinson 1998
Rico, R. (1995), The U.S. Allowance Trading System for Sulfur Dioxide: An Update on Market
Experience. Environmental and Ressource Economics, 5, 115-29.
Rypnski. 1998
Schmalensee, R. etal(1998): An Interim Evaluation of Sufur Dioxide Emissions Trading. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 12,53-68.
Smith, A.E, Platt, J., Ellerman, A. D. (1998), The costs of reducing utiliv S02 emissions - not as low
as you might think Working Paper, MIT.
Survey of energy models in Denmark. Rkw National Laboratory. www.risoe.dk.fsys-esylemodf
Svendsen, G.T. (1995): ‘California Shows the Future of Electricity Production in the Single Market.’
Energy Policy, 10,857-59.
Svendsen, G.T. (1998a): Public Choice and Environmental Regulation: Tradable Permit Systems in
United States and CO1 Taxation in Europe. New Horizons in Environmental Economics, Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Svendsen, G.T. ( 1998b): Towards a COZ Market for the EU: The Case of the Electric Utilities.
European Environment, 8, 121-28.
Svendsen, G.T. ( 1998c): The US Acid Rain Program: Design, Performance and Assessment.
Government & Policy, 16, 723-34.
Svendsen, G.T. (1999): US Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective. Public
Choice, Vol. 101, Issue 1/2, 109-28.
Svendsen, G. T., Christensen, J. L. (1999). The US SO1 auction: analysis and generalisation. Energy
Economics 21, pp. 403-416
Svendsen, G.T.; Daugbjerg, C.; Hjoellund, L. and Pedersen, A.B. (2000): Consumers, Industrialists
and the Political Economy of Green Taxation: CO~ taxation in OECD. Submitted tO European
Journal of Political Economy.
Tietenberg 1974
UNCTAD, 1998
UNFCCC. 1997
UnSer, T.; Andersson 0.; Ryd&, B.; Wene, C.-O. (2000), The Nordleden Project: Grid distributed
energy trade and common action among the Nordic countries to facilitate CO1 reductions. Final
Report. Energy Systems Technology Division, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg.
Zhang 1998
Risa-R-l 184 (DRAFT 10 May 2000) 199
